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Abstract 
This research explores the state of health service trade unionism in the 1980' s 
and considers its prospects for the future. This is located within the context of trade 
unionism in general and more specifically within the public services. Historically 
trade unions have reflected the contours of capitalist work organisations and the 
social relations within them.The review of British trade unionism in the 1980's 
therefore considers the impact of institutional factors together with broader social 
processes upon unions and the "models" of union behaviour which have emerged. 
The development of trade unionism in the health service is examined to con-
sider how far it can be understood in similar terms. It proceeds from a review of 
work organisation and management in the NHS which is used to identify a continu-
ing emphasis by the State on cost-containment in the form of efficiency gains. 
Attempts to introduce greater "rationality" in bureaucratic forms have confronted 
the influence of the medical profession in the locally negotiated order. However, 
more recent changes can be presented as introducing more market-oriented criteria. 
The possible implications of this new environment for health service trade 
unionism are considered. 
A single Health AuthQrity case study is used to examine the types of 
opportunities which may be created for alternative models of trade unionism, 
described in terms of bargaining, professionalising and campaigning. Following 
some general information on the Health Authority and its context, six selected 
episodes are used to consider the application of alternative strategies. Each 
illustrates contradictory pressures to which unions may be subject. Finally, the 
analytical questions on the relationship of public service work to capitalist work 
organisation, and the consequences for trade unionism are reconsidered. 
v 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
One in ten of all British trade unionists work in the National Health Service. 
The context of their work changed radically during the 1980's under the impact of 
general management, competitive tendering for ancillary services and a more 
stringent financial environment. All served to focus greater managerial attention on 
issues of efficiency and labour utilisation. With the passage of the NHS and Com-
munity Care Act 1990, and the establishment of self-governing hospital trusts 
operating within an "internal market", the prospect appears of collective labour 
organisation operating in an increasingly commercial environment. 
In the economy as a whole, deregulation of the market in the 1980's was 
accompanied by a deep and continuing decline in union membership. This now 
stands at its lowest level for thirty years, with one in four of all union members 
having been lost since 1979 (Bird et ai, 1992). Union density, at 38% according to 
the Department of Employment Labour Force Survey, is at its lowest level since 
before the War. Union membership within the health service, as within public serv-
ices generally, has meanwhile fared relatively well. The impact which continuing 
health service organisational change may have upon levels of union membership 
and its character provides an important starting point for this research. 
This requires a more general assessment of why trade union fortunes have 
reached such a low ebb. Does the decline merely represent a cyclical tluctuation, or 
is it symptomatic of a more deep-rooted secular trend? Have shifts in the occupa-
tional composition of the workforce pennanently undennined much of the tradi-
tional basis for trade unions? Has legislative hostility to trade unionism simply 
been the product of an aberrant Government, or does it signify a broader cultural 
shift away from collective identities? 
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It is against the backdrop of questions such as these that the policy responses 
of unions themselves need to be considered. Though rarely raised explicitly, such 
concerns informed much of the analysis and prescription offered in "models" for 
union behaviour in the 1990's. Alternative forms these took reflected the "sec-
ondary nature" of trade unions (Hyman and Fryer, 1975). "Market" or "business" 
unionism emerged in the context of unions experiencing the most severe loss of 
members, those organising manual workers in the manufacturing sector. The two 
unions most closely associated with this model, the AUEW and the EETPU, 
between them lost four out of every ten members from 1979 to the time of their 
merger. 
Other union leaders sought to advance an alternative model deemed more 
appropriate for the growing workforce in the private service sector. Not only has 
recruitment failed to match the growth in employment, union density in this sector 
has fallen, from 18.1% in 1979 to 14.4% in 1987 (Waddington, 1992). A notable 
advocate of a more distinctive strategy has been John Edmonds of the GMB, who 
emphasised the role of individual representation within a legislative framework 
providing individual employment protection. 
There has been less explicit attempt to articulate a distinctive model for trade 
unionism in the public services. This is despite, or perhaps a consequence of, the 
fact that forty per cent of trade unionists now work in them. Among the organisa-
tions which represent these workers, considerable divergencies in behaviour have 
remained apparent. For example, while there have been several major public serv-
ice industrial disputes throughout the 1980's, some of the biggest membership 
growth in the decade was achieved by organisations which explicitly rejected the 
use of industrial action and remained outside of the TUe. 
The former leader of one of these associations, the Royal College of Nursing, 
has argued that preoccupation with the conditions of employment and collective 
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bargaining was mistaken in the context of "professional" work in which the content 
of work demanded equal attention (Clay, 1987). The RCN achieved a seventy five 
per cent increase in membership from 1979 to 1990 and is now the ninth largest 
trade union in the country. Others argued that public service unions needed to give 
greater attention to campaigning activities, building public support and alliances 
with groups in the community (eg Fryer, 1989). Support for such a role has been 
expressed in several documents produced for the new union, Unison, although as a 
general strategy for unions it has been questioned (Kelly, 1988). 
Alternative strategies are focusing attention on long-standing ambiguities and 
contradictions in much of trade union practice. In which ways these may be deriva-
tive of structural or ideological influences forms an important analytical theme for 
this research. From this flows the question of whether the secondary nature of 
health service unions, and public service unions more generally, is such to require a 
more distinctive model for this sector. This must be approached with some 
understanding of health service trade union traditions, and the contexts in which 
they emerged and developed. Of particular relevance in this is the historic 
divergence between collective organisations. To what extent can these be attributed 
to variant social and cultural identities, or to the influence of employer behaviour 
and bargaining structures? 
Questions such as these provided the basis in the 1970's for contrasts 
between the "sociological approach" and the "industrial relations critique", when 
much of the focus was upon "white-collar workers" (Hyman & Price, 1983). The 
application of these issues to an historical review of health service trade unionism 
provides a context for considering how changing experiences in the post-war period 
may have influenced the current character of health service trade unionism. 
Health care work has traditionally been engaged in the production of use 
values. How far are recent and ongoing changes altering this; do these suggest the 
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introduction of exchange relations into health services? If so, what consequences 
might this have for union behaviour? These questions are approached by examining 
the nature of Government NHS changes, before developing a more detailed focus 
using local case study material drawn from a single Health Authority. Using a 
range of individual episodes, attention is given to the origins of organisational 
change and the nature of union response. Of particular interest is the extent to 
which this renected objectives designed to secure innuence over the character of 
change rather than the terms upon which it was implemented. This is considered in 
terms of the innuence upon definitions of union purpose of occupational identities 
on the one hand, and institutional support for unions from the employer on the 
other. In this, an approach is taken which aims to draw on the strengths of both the 
"sociological approach" and the "industrial relations critique". 
Throughout, an underlying issue is whether there is evidence to suggest that 
the restructuring of health care is moving it into a more commodified form. If this 
is so, it might be hypothesised that NHS trade unions may increasingly be required 
to adopt a market-bargaining model. Alternatively, earlier identities might be 
expected to retain a significant residual innuence. The case study material is 
intended to throw some empirical light on these possibilities, enabling some of the 
analytical and policy implications to be returned to. This is an issue having particu-
lar relevance in the context of the formation of a new public service union, Unison. 
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Analytical framework 
An important question running through this research is whether the analytical 
treatment of trade unions in general is appropriate for those in the health service, 
and public services more widely. A starting point for this is to consider the charac-
terisation of trade unions, whether this is to be by behaviour, as with participation 
in collective bargaining, or ideology, as in attachment to collectivist principles. 
This is an issue which has surfaced in several contexts, as during the 1970's in 
debates on the interpretation to be placed on the growth of white-collar trade 
unionism. A second issue concerns the analytical treatment to be given to public 
services. In particular, do they need to be analysed in ways which emphasis their 
distinctiveness from the social relations of capitalism? This section concludes with 
a discussion on the implications of these issues for understanding the nature of pub-
lic service trade unionism. 
The character of trade unionism 
Approaches to the growth of white-collar trade unionism during the 1960's 
and 1970's have been located in two competing camps, represented by the 
"sociological approach" and the "industrial relations critique" (Crompton, 1977). 
The latter, expounded by George Bain and his colleagues, emphasised the structural 
context, particularly the role of employer behaviour (Bain et ai, 1970) and later the 
business cycle (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976). The former was far more concerned with 
understanding differences in character and ideology. These were held to reflect not 
the institutional features of collective bargaining but, "the commitment of a body to 
the general principles and ideology of trade unionism" (Blackburn and Prandy, 
1965). These were given analytical priority as indicators of "unionateness". 
5 
Some parallels can be drawn with continental European writers, who have 
given more emphasis to indicators of active participation rather than membership 
which may be largely passive. Unlike much of the traditional focus for British 
industrial relations in its examination of membership growth and density, German 
writers have been concerned with notions such as a "willingness to act" (Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1980), and sought to use strike activity as a measure of union strength 
(Muller- Jentsch, 1985). 
The importance of which indicator is to be used is considerable when the 
1980's are considered. The issue of strike activity has particular complexities in the 
context of public services, and is returned to later. At this point it is useful to con-
sider further if participation in collective bargaining provides a sufficient indicator 
of unionisation, or whether a broader ideological attachment to collective principles 
is also necessary. This was the view taken by Blackburn and Prandy (1965) who 
identified a series of characteristics regarded as representing "unionateness". 
Briefly, these were; self-declaration and registration as a union, affiliation to the 
TUC and Labour Party, independence from employers, collective bargaining and 
protection of members as a major function, and a willingness to take industrial 
action. 
There are several problems with adopting this type of approach. Not least is 
the difficulty in distinguishing collective action as an indicator of ideological pur-
pose from its use as a strategy for individual advancement. Collective identities 
within the wage labour relationship can in any event be held at a range of levels, 
with the reference point being the working class as a whole, or more narrowly con-
ceived in terms of a craft, profession or particular work group. This can give rise to 
a range of cultural and ideological expressions, as EP Thompson noted for an ear-
lier period: 
The class experience is largely determined by productive rela-
tions into which men are born - or enter involuntarily. Class-
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consciousness is the way in which these experiences are hand-
led in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, 
ideas and institutional forms. If the experience appears as 
determined, class consciousness does not (Thompson, 1963). 
This point has particular relevance in the context of post-modernist claims 
concerning the disintegration of traditional social identities. There is no a priori 
reason for assuming greater heterogeneity implies a wholesale transformation of 
existing social categories. As Offe has written: 
It would of course be mistaken, or at least premature, to diag-
nose or predict a general "transformation of values" affecting all 
strata and age groups of the working class. Such uniformity on 
the basis of "new" cultural values is, we suggest, not at all to be 
expected. Arising out of conditions of economic crisis and 
tendencies of cultural change, the problem consists rather in an 
attenuation of the economic and "moral" divisions within the 
working class. The result, in other words, is a growing 
heterogeneity in the objective situation of different groups of 
employees, as well as their subjective perceptions and inter-
pretations. (Offe, 1985, p 154). 
For this reason, it becomes more important to avoid too narrow a definition 
of union character. Collective activity by employees can generate a variety of 
forms, as was evident in the notion of "Associations of Producers" used by Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb (Webb, 1920). Equally, an approach which defines a trade 
union in terms of participation in collective bargaining alone may be just as narrow. 
While this has represented the dominant historical tradition, it has not been the only 
alternative available. Because unions may exhibit a range of characters and 
behaviours, the question becomes one of seeking to understand different processes 
of development. Of particular relevance is the influence of social relations other 
than those of capital and labour. 
Trade unions derive their "secondary nature" from their emergence in the 
context of capitalist social relations (Hyman and Fryer, 1975). In this, capital may 
be seen as the "primary organiser" of labour (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980). This 
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should not be taken to mean that trade union behaviour is wholly determined. To 
do so would be to imply, as one reviewer wrote in a different context, that, 
"management makes industrial history and unions follow" (Aronowitz, 1987, 
reviewing Kochan et al, 1986). 
The notion of agency is an important one, and is given recognition by Offe 
and Wiesenthal in their description of the "willingness to act" by members requir-
ing a "dialogical" pattern of membership communication, with member involve-
ment in decisions. In Gramsci's words: 
The trade union ... becomes a determinate institution ... to the 
extent that the strength and will of the workers who are its 
members impress a policy and propose an aim that define it 
(Gram sci quoted in Hyman, 1983). 
For some writers such policies and aims could never extend beyond the 
boundaries set by capitalism. In Perry Anderson's view, "trade unions do not chal-
lenge the existence of society based on a division of classes, they merely express it" 
(Anderson, 1967). This research is not about the revolutionary potential of trade 
unions, but does seek to consider whether their character may derive from sources 
other than those set in the context of capitalist wage labour. Here it is necessary to 
give some attention to alternative conceptions of union purpose in terms of what 
can be broadly described as industrial and political objectives. 
Nineteenth century craft unionism provides much of the basis for defmitions 
of union purpose in terms of bargaining activities over both job conditions and con-
tent. Such political action as emerged was frequently designed to achieve the 
organisational security for this to take place. The threat to union funds in Hornby v 
Close in 1867 prompted action by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in a way 
that the Master and Servant Laws had not, even though the latter had allowed the 
imprisonment of workers for breach of employment contract. Generally, and con-
tinuing into the twentieth century, trade union engagement in political activities 
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was a means of supporting bargaining objectives and activities, as in the stimulus 
which the Taff VaLe judgement provided for the creation of the Labour Party. 
Some prominent craft unionists had become involved in wider social policy 
issues, as with Robert Applegarth's appoinunent to the Royal Commission on 
Venereal Diseases in 1871. The response to this by his Executive of the Carpenter's 
Society was to urge his resignation, castigating him for his involvement in a, 
"loathsome subject" which did not "specially affect" their members. 
Attitudes by many leading trade unionists to early health reform similarly 
reflect the objective of representing members' rather than class interests. The lib-
eral Government's National Insurance Act of 1911 won support from the majority 
of union leaders for its provision of contributory benefits for workers, though it did 
not provide for dependents during periods of sickness and unemployment. Neither 
did it address wider issues of health provisions such as the lack of maternity care 
and TB sanatoria (lliffe, 1983). 
These were issues being addressed by some new Labour Councils elected at 
this time. Of particular note is Poplar Council, elected in 1919, which introduced 
free milk for expectant mothers and appointed a TB officer, and which possessed a 
strong influence of "new unionism". This included a branch secretary and a former 
branch secretary of the dockers union, a former district president of the dockers, the 
General Secretary of the National Union of Vehicle Workers, the secretary of the 
Bow branch of the Postmen's Federation, the Secretary of Poplar Trades Council, 
and the Bow branch Secretary of the Engineers among many other activists 
(Branson, 1979). 
An unwillingness on the part of many older craft unionists to engage in wider 
political activity has been attributed to the "aristocracy of labour" thesis. Whatever 
its deficiencies, it does serve to highlight differences on definitions of purpose 
within organisations of the working class which reflect occupational divisions. An 
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example of this is provided in the 1889 TUC meeting, when leaders of the Miners 
Federation of Great Britain joined with the majority of other unions to defeat Keir 
Hardie's resolution for a general eight hour day for all workers. They then went on 
to successfully appeal for Congress support for an eight hour day for the miners 
(Muller, 1977). The sectional commitment of the miner's leaders in this also 
reflected an ideological rejection of a more radical politics. 
This standpoint continued when in 1922 JH Thomas, General Secretary of the 
NUR, blamed Labour's poor showing in the London County Council elections on 
a, "revolt against the kind of Poplar methods of administration which certainly 
alarmed people" (Branson, 1979, p132). When Labour did win control of the 
London County Council it was under the leadership of Herbert Morrison, held up 
by the national Labour Party as a model of moderation (Cole, 1948). Of particular 
interest is the fact that this gave rise to a significant dispute over working hours 
with the Guild of Nurses, part of the National Union of County Officers. 
In addition, Labour's attempts to improve London's municipal hospitals 
appear to have been carried out in a highly bureaucratic manner. A general 
grievance was voiced by one member of the Guild of Nurses: 
We have become mere numbers in the machine ... and carry 
out the instructions of someone who does not even know where 
the hospital is situated. (quoted in Carpenter, 1988, p216). 
Despite these early indications of the potential consequences of more cen-
tralised and bureaucratic control, the LCC model exerted a major influence on 
Labour's post-war policies. Meanwhile, the TUC lent its support to the BMA, its 
partner over the National Insurance Scheme (TIliffe, 1983). In the structuring of 
public services there was little room for crossing the boundary between political 
and industrial roles through industrial democracy. Aneurin Bevan, having a back-
ground in both trade unionism and left Labour politics, rejected requests for the 
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inclusion of non-medical staff on Hospital Management Committees, asking where 
such moves would stop (Stacey, 1988). 
Post-war social democracy consolidated the separation of the industrial and 
the political. Within the Labour Party, Crosland in particular saw a distancing from 
the unions in the wake of the 1959 election defeat as a means of capturing a 
broader base of electoral appeal (Minken; 1978). This provided the context for the 
development of post-war health service trade unionism: the new structures pro-
vided for input from staff organisations primarily on wages and conditions issues, 
while health services and their delivery came under the control of medically 
dominated management committees. 
These outcomes would seem to lend support assessments of the 'secondary 
nature' of trade unions, although as has been described, other traditions emerged 
which do not appear to have been principally determined by collective bargaining 
contexts. Can health service unions today draw upon such traditions, concerned 
with securing wider improvements in the "conditions of labour"? Before this ques-
tion can be addressed it is necessary to consider the nature of the services within 
which they operate, in particular to ask the further question of what sets of social 
relations are important within the 'primary' organiser of health care labour? 
The analytical treatment of public services 
The claim has recently been made in one introductory text to industrial 
sociology that: 
There are differences between . . . private and public sector 
employment, but the nature of these differences is something 
which has to be established empirically, not asserted a priori. 
(Brown, 1992, pI89-190). 
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The later case study material is intended as such an empirical contribution, 
but this must be approached through some prior conceptual questions. Of particular 
importance is whether public services are seen to follow a different logic from that 
of capitalist accumulation. If this is so, how are they to be analysed? Running 
parallel with these questions are ones concerning the relative analytical priority to 
be given to class and gender. 
The issue of whether public services need to be understood in terms of a dif-
ferent logic from that of capitalist accumulation has been addressed by several 
writers (Cousins, 1987; Joyce et ai, 1988; Mailly et ai, 1989). Massey (1984, 
p 182), for example, has suggested that the state provision of health services, and 
their non-dependence upon the process of capitalist accumulation, has created less 
geographical variation than has occurred in the private sector. Claims for such dis-
tinctiveness have drawn on Offe's distinction between the productive and allocative 
functions of the state, and the suggestion of a "decommodification" of social rela-
tions within the state welfare sector (Cousins, 1987). 
Yet as Cousins and others observe from the 1980's, the influence of market 
relations has become increasingly evident. This can be interpreted as reflecting the 
inherently contradictory nature of the welfare state in capitalism (Offe, 1984). 
Some writers have argued that a consequence of this has been that public service 
managers, "are nevertheless constrained to act as "capitalists" in respect of the 
organization and control of their labour force" (Crompton and Jones, 1984, p214). 
This approach in many respects mirrors that of earlier structural accounts of public 
services such as health care. In the context of debates over professional control, 
Navarro argued from a Marxist perspective that the "health industry", "is 
administered but not controlled by the medical profession .... power is primarily 
one of class not professional control." (Navarro, 1975). 
Such capital-logic accounts have been dismissed by Mailly et al (1989), who 
maintain that public services continue to operate differently from other sectors, 
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attributing this largely to the political context in which they operate. In this the 
writers focus mainly upon the role of national Government, but such a definition of 
the political sphere is unduly constraining. Again it is useful to tum to Offe for a 
more satisfactory approach, one which describes the political context at three tiers 
or, "cumulative arenas of conflict". (Offe, 1984). 
The first of these is that of decision making within the state apparatus, "But 
this is by no means the only level at which political power is generated, distributed 
and utilized". (Offe, 1984, p159). This is seen to occur within the second level, 
described as: 
a matrix of social power according to which some social 
classes, collective actors and other social categories have a 
greater chance of shaping and reshaping political reality, open-
ing or closing the political agenda, than others. (Offe, 1984, 
pI60). 
Power is not static and, "the struggle for the redistribution of social power is 
what takes place on the third, and most fundamental level, of politics." (Offe, 1984, 
p160). Analytically this provides a useful tool with which to understand the NHS as 
a political organisation. Public service managers have to operate in a context in 
which attempts by Government to recommodify state services confront the "matrix 
of social power" fonned, and refonned, around those services. The analytical task 
is to generate a framework within which influential agents and forces within this 
process can be conceptualised. 
Significant in this is the fact that, "the production of welfare services involves 
the collaboration of professional providers in the detennination of goals" (Cawson, 
1982). This has been used by several analysts of health care organisations to 
emphasise the degree of control held by medical staff. At a "macro" level this 
aspect influenced the work of Illich (1975), while also providing the context for the 
original use by Strauss (1963) of the "negotiation of order". This latter approach 
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suggests an encouraging line of enquiry, while recognising the criticisms made of it 
for neglecting inequalities in power, and the need for it to, "become much more 
politically, structurally, and historically grounded." (Day and Day, 1977). 
This is sought within this framework by placing health care organisations 
within the overall structure of capitalist social relations, while accepting that these 
may not be sufficient to account for its character. For this, it is necessary to take 
account of ways in which power is distributed within the organisations, and upon 
what sources of support it may rest. The basis of medical dominance has been 
attributed to the nature of the early relationship with the patient (Johnson, 1972). 
Johnson, however, argued that increased state provision of services fundamentally 
altered this relationship, undermining any future opportunities for the experiences 
of the "classic" professions, medicine and law, to be emulated. 
This interpretation derived from the nature of contractual relationships 
between the independent practitioner and their clients. Though this has largely 
gone, a distinguishing characteristic of the labour processes within health services 
continues to reflect other, non-contractual, aspects of this relationship. Much of 
public service work carried out with people inherently possesses a degree of 
indeterminacy arising from the individuality of patient's or client's responses. The 
term "sentimental work" has been used to describe such work (Strauss, 1982). It 
has further been suggested that in the context of the NHS, this may place con-
straints upon the extent to which managerial desired rationalisation can be achieved 
(Morgan, 1991). This issue can be seen to arise in controversies over "task-centred" 
and "patient-centred" approaches to nursing (Mackay, 1989). 
This suggests that the labour process in welfare work remains analytically 
distinctive even where state provision has become the norm. Whatever the term 
used to describe it, the notion that Work involved in caring for other people is in at 
least some ways distinctive from the capitalist labour process has a further impor-
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tant aspect. Mostly it is performed by women. This reflects the transference of roles 
within the unpaid domestic sector into the wage labour market. 
It is untenable to explain such occupational divisions as being a consequence 
of capitalist social relations alone. In this sense, capital cannot be held to have his-
torically been the primary organiser of health labour, or at least not independently 
of the role of gender. Some version of "dual systems theory" is needed to recognise 
that workers sell their labour power in jobs which in many cases are already 
segregated by gender (Davies and Rosser, 1986). 
None of this is to suggest that capitalist social relations have not made a fIrm 
imprint on health service organisation. Rather it is argued that these influences may 
be constrained by the different nature of the labour process within health. A further 
consequence of the nature of health work is a particular need to take account of 
gender relations alongside class ones. These issues may have particular relevance 
in understanding the local "negotiation of order" within health care services 
(Strauss, 1963). Here attention returns to considering some of the implication of 
these issues for public service trade unionism. 
The consequences for public service trade unionism 
Differences in the behaviour of collective labour organisations reflect a vari-
ety of structural and cultural influences, including the fact that the workforce will 
have been brought into being within the context of capitalist social relations and 
organisation of work. The influence of capitalist priorities may now be extending to 
those public services which grew rapidly in the post-war period to a substantial 
extent outside of such relations. This must be qualified by the recognition of impor-
tant counter-tendencies. Significant in this is the status of professional groups and 
the inherently indeterminate nature of much caring work. While this might suggest 
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obstacles to a process of capitalist-type rationalisation, consequences of the gender-
structuring of much of this work should not be ignored in this process. Neverthe-
less, it can be maintained that analytically public services remain, to a degree, inde-
pendent of capitalist social relations. 
This suggests the possibility of divergent strategies from organisations 
representing staff within them. This links with earlier debates which focused on the 
likely development of professional organisations. Some writers saw the develop-
ment of collective organisation among professional groups as possibly leading to 
militancy but more likely to produce a professional ethos in which the defence of 
privilege and distinctiveness would make an alliance with labour unlikely (Bell, 
1974). Others saw rising levels of education producing dissatisfaction with the con-
straints of capitalist enterprises (Gorz, 1967), creating in the view of Touraine and 
Mallet the prospect of alliances between professional and manual workers (Gallie, 
1989). Yet others stressed the "proletarianisation" of professional workers them-
selves as managerial rationalisation reduced their autonomy (eg BeUaby and 
Oribaber, 1977). 
The focus of many of these debates was on the likely impact of processes of 
capitalist rationalisation upon professional autonomy. What may now be emerging 
as a more significant aspect is the possibility of conflict arising where the produc-
tion of use values becomes subject to a process of commodification. This might 
suggest an alternative form of alliance, not so much between professional and 
manual groups as between health care producers and users. Rowing from this are 
particular implications for the notion of "unionateness" and "willingness to act". 
Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) emphasised "willingness to act" as a character-
istic distinguishing worker organisations from other interest groups which required 
only a "willingness to pay". Earlier, this was compared with the way in which 
Blackburn and Prandy (1965) employed strike activity as an indicator of unionate-
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ness, and Muller-Jentsch (1985) identified it as a component in a measure of union 
strength. Analytically, these are founded on the basis of capitalist work relations in 
which the withdrawing of labour presents a means of obstructing production, and 
hence the extraction of surplus value. 
Two points on this may be made in relation to public services. Firstly, indus-
trial militancy within them may be better described as a political rather than an eco-
nomic sanction. The second flows from drawing a distinction between workers 
engaged in the production of use values and those producing exchange value, in 
terms of the nature of the relationship with consumers. affe and Wiesenthal's 
notion of a "willingness to act" is an important one for differentiating worker 
organisations from others but it may need to be given a broader meaning than 
industrial militancy alone. In itself this provides a limited indicator of the strength 
of public service trade unionism. 
A review of current trends in employment and social stratification concluded 
with the observation: 
The form taken by the collective organization of non-manual 
workers has developed in the context of, and has been heavily 
influenced by, the powerful traditions of trade unionism among 
British manual workers (Gallie, 1989, p489). 
The analytical issues discussed here suggest the possibility of alternative 
future scenarios for trade unions in the NHS. Firstly, concerning the labour process, 
managers increasingly constrained to act "as if' they were capitalists, having the 
effect of reducing the distinctiveness of health work. Alternatively, this process 
may be constrained by the inherent indeterminacy of health work. Secondly, health 
care services may be becoming subject to processes of commodification which are 
undermining the traditional nature of power relations within them. Alternatively 
again, this process may be constrained by the continued production of use values. 
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If an extension of exchange relations, and the application of more capitalist 
work techniques, is anticipated, then the comment by Gallie would be likely to 
retain its relevance, possibly in the emergence of a more market-based bargaining 
model. On the other hand, if health care services are viewed as maintaining a 
degree of distinctiveness, then this may suggests a need to rethink existing models. 
Research Methods 
The thesis falls into three parts. The first examines pressures on British trade 
unionism during the 1980's, and considers how responses to these might be 
categorised. The second explores aspects of the development of the National Health 
Service and forms of collective organization which emerged within it. The third 
provides a more detailed local 'case study' in which these themes are considered in 
a more focused context. 
For the first section it was necessary to draw upon a range of primary and 
secondary sources. Considerable use was made of official statistics for data on 
occupational changes within the labour market, and measures of union member-
ship, density, and activity. Of particular value in this were statistics published by 
the Department of Employment and the Certification Officer. Without disregarding 
the deficiencies of such sources, as in data on industrial stoppages for example, 
they can assist in providing a useful indication of general trends. 
This has been supplemented with evidence drawn from other bodies, includ-
ing the rue and individual unions. For the review of union policy responses, 
sources included individual union and ruc policy documents and statements, arti-
cles by prominent trade union leaders, together with union journals and other pub-
lications. In conjunction with the use of official statistics, these provided a means 
of identifying factors perceived as being significant 
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The second section similarly required both primary and secondary material, 
this time relating to health selVices and its trade unionism. For the former, use was 
again made of official statistics, in this case primarily those published by the 
Department of Health. The ways in which these are presented sometimes limits 
their value, but despite this they provided an important source for identifying 
aggregate trends. These related to issues such as changing patterns of expenditure, 
evidence on labour productivity, and shifts in the composition of the workforce. In 
addition to these sources, it was possible to incorporate details from various 
inquiries and reports into aspects of the health selVice that have been published 
over the years. 
On trends within health service trade unions, use was made of union pub-
lications, including journals, conference reports and discussion documents. Sec-
ondary sources included published histories of the NHS and its trade unions. In 
addition, although the national situation did not form the major focus for the field 
work, one intelView was conducted with a national officer of a health selVice 
union. 
The following explains the approach that was taken for the case study. The 
material which was collected might more accurately be described as a series of case 
studies, but for reasons explained later, as well as for convenience, it is referred to 
as the case study material. The purpose of this part of the reasearch was to provide 
a more focused empirical opportunity to consider some of the categories of union 
strategy and behaviour derived from the previous two sections. The claim for 
validity of case studies is not based upon them being representative, but that they 
exhibit some general theoretical principles (Silverman, 1985). Their importance lies 
in the nature of explanation which is used, designed to identify the nature of con-
nections between processes. The case study material here is included to provide a 
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focus upon processes of change within the National Health Service at a local level, 
particularly in terms of whether these were causing it to become less analytically 
distinct from capitalist social relations. No claim is made for its typicality other 
than as a means of investigating these processes. 
The case study is based on several "sub" units, although this is not prinCipally 
to overcome the criticism sometimes made of case studies of "N= I ". They are used 
as a means of comparison but within a context of their organisational integrity. This 
was important in indicating whether general processes may be having variable 
impacts upon differing occupational groups. Much of the methodological rationale 
which was used draws upon points made on case study standards of rigour by 
Stoecker (1991). 
A case study must avoid becoming simply a collection of descriptive anec-
dotes, and an essential requirement in this is adequate design of the research frame. 
Of particular relevance for this is the role of theory, historical perspective and 
choice of methods. In line with what has been noted above about the purpose of 
case studies, Stoecker (1991) argues that theory must determine which questions 
are to be asked, and consequently, the structural boundaries of the research frame. 
The broad theoretical issues upon which the current case study is founded have 
been described above: the relationship between the restructuring of labour and trade 
unionism, and the welfare sector in capitalism. Stoecker's related requirement is 
that the theoretically generated questions must inform the structural and historical 
boundaries of the research frame: this is described in more detail in application to 
the case study in Chapter Five. The need for theoretically generated structural and 
historical boundaries for the research frame leads to Stoecker's third criteria: the 
need for a variety of research methods. 
Here it is important to give some background to my own involvement in the 
Health Authority being studied. I had been employed by the Health Authority, as a 
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hospital porter, for the period from 1978 to 1985. In 1981 I became a COHSE stew-
ard, and Branch Secretary in the following year. I retained that position, and others, 
until I left in 1985 to go to Warwick for the MA in Industrial Relations. Although 
most of the episodes being used in the case study occurred after my own direct 
involvement in union activity in the Authority had ceased, many of the other 
processes described, including the introduction of competitive tendering and of 
general management, happened earlier. Questions which I wished to raise were 
inevitably influenced by my own earlier experiences. 
In any event, direct personal involvement was re-established in 1990 when I 
was appointed as TUC nominee to the Plymouth Health Authority. This ceased 
upon the reorganisation of Health Authority membership in 1991. However, I was 
then appointed to the local Community Health Council as a nominee of Plymouth 
City Council. Each of these roles provided differing opportunities to identify issues 
and obtain information surrounding them. It nevertheless raised issues concerning 
the ethics of research. 
While in formal interviews with managers my role as a former union repre-
sentative and current researcher was accepted, by the time I had become a Health 
Authority member much of this stage of the research had been conducted. I was 
now in the position of a participant-observer, having, "unique access to the other-
wise 'closed world' of a social group." (Layder, 1993). In general, I decided that it 
was legitimate to incorporate such experiences into the research. Although it does 
raise the important issue about informed involvement by those who are being 
researched, there were two main reasons for my decision. The fIrst arose from the 
fact that as I had already been engaged in a more formal stage of research within 
the Authority, and my role in this had been understood. The second was the virtual 
impossibility of discounting the evidence I was coming into contact with once I 
was aware of it. 
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Before and during the period of my Health Authority membership I had many 
opportunities to attend union and other meetings. In addition, I have had access to 
many policy documents and statements produced by both management and unions, 
as well as minutes of joint meetings. Formal interviews were conducted with ten 
managers and an equal number of union representatives. The fonner included gen-
eral managers, clinical managers (mainly within nursing) and personnel officers. 
The latter included branch officers, stewards and full-time officers. All of the inter-
views were conducted on a semi-structured basis. 
Aside from the fonnal interviews, many opportunities were taken to talk with 
a wide range of individuals. This was regarded as being of considerable impor-
tance. Although the case study was being conducted within a certain analytical 
framework, it was vital to have a sensitivity to the perceptions of those involved. In 
this, it was important to recognise criticisms that have been made of field work 
research which allows fonnal theories to dictate, "before empirical examination, 
presumed relevancies in problems, concepts and hypothesis" (Glaser and Strauss, 
1971). From talking to a wide range of health care staff, many insights, views and 
feelings emerged which were essential in developing a view of their own construc-
tion of their social world. This was not the main focus for the research, but 
nevertheless represented a vital element. 
The combination of research methods, while meeting the criteria advanced by 
Stoecker, clearly makes it unreplicable. However, in tenns of its rationale this is 
not regarded as a deficiency; instead opportunities have provided a relatively 
unique opportunity explore a case study detennined within theoretically infonned 
structural and historical boundaries. 
One further research method which I gave considerable consideration to 
using was some form of survey of union members. Eventually I decided against 
this. My objective would have been to have gone beyond perceptions of union rep-
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resentatives to identify the attitudes of "non-activist" members to the importance of 
issues being dealt with and their relative priority. Even though this was not the 
main focus for the research, as noted above, it was important in providing a deeper 
context. 
After considering results of such member surveys, some of which are 
reviewed in Chapter Two, I came to the conclusion that with limited resources I 
would be unlikely to add to the general understanding of member's attitudes. Fur-
thermore, in taking opportunities to talk to staff, not all of whom were active in 
their union, alternatives means of identifying these were emerging. Because of the 
range of people I came to know during my differing forms of association with the 
Health Authority, I felt able to gain a good understanding of issues which were 
generating greatest concern. This was not in any form quantifiable, but my view 
was that any alternative, within the resources, would have been of little more value. 
A remaining question is whether my involvement undermines the "objec-
tivity" of the research. This is a familiar issue addressed by many others. On this, I 
should state that I hold a commitment to the principles of trade unionism, and to the 
value of a publicly funded and accountable health service; commitments which 
inevitably influence the choice of research questions asked as well as many of the 
conclusions drawn. 
More than this, much of the original motivation to conduct the research came 
from my personal experiences. In addition to my own trade union activity, a period 
in the mid-1980's and since working as a part-time WEA tutor in Trade Union 
Studies, encouraged me to think about the nature of trade union education and the 
purposes for which it was designed. A recurring question for me became whether 
the frequent emphasis upon bargaining skills provided a sufficient resource for 
union representatives in the changing climate of the 1980's. 
This experience reinforced questions I had in my mind as a consequence of 
my own period as a lay representative. To take one example, personal involvement 
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in negotiations over staffing changes which were arguably to the disadvantage of 
women involved (described more fully later), encouraged me to think critically 
about the processes and outcomes of bargaining strategies. As Stoecker argues, 
attachment to the subject being researched should be regarded as a source of 
strength rather than weakness. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter Two identifies and discusses key sources of change acting upon 
unions in the 198's, including compositional changes in the workforce, managerial 
strategy and Government policy. The material is organised in a way which allows 
alternative accounts for union decline to be considered, particularly in terms of the 
predominance of "institutional" or "social" factors. The assessment is made that 
employer and Government behaviour provides a necessary but insufficient explana-
tion for union fortunes. Attention must also be given to the attraction which unions 
hold for different occupational groups, and the ways in which their definitions of 
purpose come to be socially constructed. 
This leads to a review of models advanced by unions and prominent union 
leaders during the last decade. These are considered under the heading of market, 
representational, professional and campaigning trade unionism. They are discussed 
both generally and with specific attention to their potential relevance to public serv-
ices. 
Chapter Three provides a selective review of the development of the NHS. 
The main objective is to consider how valid are claims that it is distinctive from the 
social relations of capitalism. Particular emphasis is given to describing increasing 
control by the State over finance and efficiency. State control of pay through highly 
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centralised arrangements for pay determination was introduced within a context of 
a high level of medical control at local level, and consequences of this for the 
organisation of work are considered. Addressing differences between the general 
and psychiatric hospital sectors, attention is given to trends in labour recruitment in 
the 1960's and 1970's. 
There is emerging evidence from the 1980's of a more strategic intention to 
restructure health services and labour within health care. Financial pressure have 
been a significant spur to organisational change, but until recently both the scale 
and the pace of change has been less than in many other sectors. This may suggest 
that despite the greater evidence of commercial pressures within the NHS, their 
impact remains to some extent constrained. 
Chapter Four describes the variant historical traditions of collective organisa-
tions within the NHS. Particular attention is given to developments among nursing 
staff, a discussion on which allows consideration to be given to the influence of 
class, gender and organisational context. This provides a background to address the 
growth of trade unionism in the late 1960's and 1970's, and the form which it took. 
Reference is made to explanations which have been offered for this, notably the 
impact of incomes policy, the bureaucratisation of management and the 'deskilling 
thesis' . 
Changes occurring in the 1980's are discussed in terms of their consequences 
for forms of union activity. While aggregate union membership and union density 
has remained relatively high, differences in experiences of individual organisations 
are discussed. These are highlighted in terms of the models described in Chapter 
Two. 
Chapter Five provides a context for the case study material. Beginning with 
an explanation for the choice of approach, it describes social and economic features 
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of the Plymouth area and their impact upon the character of local trade unionism. 
Following this, material on the Health Authority includes a description of important 
organisational and managerial changes. Mainly this is intended to provide neces-
sary background material for subsequent chapters. 
A review of trade union organisation within the Authority includes an 
account of the major organisations, their areas of influence and aspects of their 
local organisation. Much of the formal negotiation around the issues described took 
place through joint union machinery and an account is also given of changes in the 
form that this has taken. 
Chapter Six uses two examples to consider the implications of new 
opportunities for local bargaining. The first is drawn from catering services and the 
second from nursing. In both cases changes to work arrangements designed to 
secure savings were initially resisted by unions, but as this proved unsuccessful 
attention turned to bargaining over the terms of change. The examples are 
described in terms of the origins, processes and outcomes of change, with attention 
being given to differential experiences. 
Bargaining activities could increase reliance upon employer support, but out-
comes were also influenced by the character of existing union organisation. 
Although financial and managerial changes served to encourage new opportunities 
for bargaining, this was also highly constrained by the political relations within the 
health service. 
Chapter Seven examines two examples from within non-general hospital 
nursing where issues concerning conditions of employment became linked with 
those of service delivery. The first example arose from staff opposition to manage-
ment changes to planned developments in mental illness services, the second con-
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cerned management intentions to reduce the role of NHS provision in mental hand-
icap services. 
The defence of jobs and employment arose in each, but in a context where the 
form of service delivery became a major issue of dispute. The chapter considers 
whether union attempts to gain involvement in these broader issues suggests an 
alternative to a more market bargaining model. 
Chapter Eight describes two campaigns which were organised to generate 
public support during periods of conflict with management Unions maintained a 
high profile public opposition to the planned replacement of an NHS hospital by a 
private company, but were unwilling to engage in a campaign orchestrated by 
medical consultants in opposition to management plans for a self-governing trust. 
The reasons for this difference are discussed and located in the context of compet-
ing pressures to which unions may be subject. Of particular importance was the 
need to gain recognition for bargaining purposes from the employer. 
The Summary and Conclusion reviews the case study evidence in the context 
of earlier themes. Some theoretical and policy implications are discussed, with the 
assessment that current pressures may be encouraging the adoption of a market 
model but this is likely to prove inadequate to meet the needs of trade unions within 
the health service. Some concluding comments are made on whether this reflects 
the continued distinctiveness of health work, or a more general limitation of the 
model itself. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRADE UNIONISM IN THE 1980's 
Writing in the early 1980's George Bain and Bob Price predicted that, "all 
other things being equal", anticipated workforce restructuring would reduce union 
density from its 1979 level by 3.7 percentage points by 1990. This was qualified by 
the observation that the direction of union growth, "will depend ... upon the cru-
cial inter-relationship between economic forces, employer policies and government 
action" (Bain and Price, 1983, p33). 
The actual percentage point decline in union density by 1990 was however 
almost five times that predicted by Bain and Price. Similarly, Waddington (1992) 
notes that predictions made by Carruth and Disney (1988) on the influence of the 
business cycle have consistently overestimated the likely levels of union density for 
the years since 1983. How is this to be explained? 
A recent Open University course book intended to, "examine the social and 
cultural spheres", of modem society makes slightly more mention of transvestites 
than trade unionists (Bocock and Thompson, 1992). The implication is that the role 
unions play in the lives of their members is diminishing and being replaced, partic-
ularly among younger people, by more diverse and individualised consumer 
identities (Willis, 1990). This approach, placing trade unionism in its wider cultural 
setting, mirrors that adopted by many labour historians for earlier periods. As 
Gareth Stedman Jones wrote of London working class culture at the end of the last 
century: 
The growth of trade unionism on the one hand and the new 
working class culture on the other were not contradictory but 
inter-related phenomena (Stedman Jones, 1974). 
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Does it then follow that the decline of trade unionism is symptomatic of a 
deeper cultural change? Alternatively, is it principally a consequence of changes in 
its structural environment? These questions parallel those of earlier debates over 
the origins of union growth, particularly between the "sociological approach" and 
the "industrial relations critique" (Crompton, 1977). The issue now to be addressed 
is whether the evidence from the 1980's provides any insights into the importance 
which should be given to economic, political and institutional factors on the one 
hand, and the social, cultural and ideological on the other. 
At the outset it should be noted that rising unemployment in the early 1980' s 
had a profound impact on levels of union membership. In the words of one writer 
reviewing the period, this: 
suggests that the major source of trade union decline can be 
attributed to structural constraint rather than to any significant 
erosion of allegiances to trade unions on the part of employees 
(Gallie, 1988, p476). 
The exclusion of unemployed workers from measures of union density allows 
this assessment to be partially tested. The effect is indeed to considerably reduce 
the scale of decline. While from 1979 to 1983 the fall in "labour force density", 
including the unemployed, was from 53.4% to 45.6%, the comparative figures for 
"employment density", excluding the unemployed, was from 55.8% to 52.3% 
(Waddington, 1992). However, this only holds true for the early years of the 
decade. By 1987 the level of employment density had fallen to 46.3% (Wadding-
ton, 1992). In other words, membership decline continued in a period of employ-
ment growth, albeit at a slower rate. 
Whatever the merits in challenges made by Kelly (1988) to the more 
cataclysmic predictions of trade union fortunes, doubt is cast upon his more 
optimistic assessment that trade unions had generally weathered the recession well. 
His expectation that union fortunes would wax again as the economy moved out of 
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recession was not generally born out. To try and understand the reasons for this it is 
necessary to go beyond the aggregate data. 
In the early 1980's, job losses were caused disproportionately by the impact 
of closures of large manufacturing plants (Millward & Stevens, 1986), while 
employment growth in the later part of the decade was smallest among male full-
time workers. Employment shifted away from the traditional bed-rock of union 
membership and towards what the ruc described as, "the more difficult to 
organise sectors, particularly private services" (TUC, 1988). 
Whereas for much of the post-war period there had appeared to be a gradual 
convergence towards higher levels of union density, the 1980's showed increasing 
sectoral divergence, as shown in Table 2.1. Of particular relevance for the current 
research is the widening difference between the private sector, including manufac-
turing and services, on the one hand, and public services on the other. 
Table ~.1: Trade union density by sector, 1979·1987 
1979 
Public sector 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Private services 
Source: Waddington (1992) 
% 
83.7 
72.9 
41.4 
18.1 
1980 
% 
81.7 
60.1 
29.8 
14.4 
The following discussion reviews aspects of change in the institutional, struc-
tural and cultural context within which unions operated in these sector during the 
1980's. Although a clear dividing line cannot be drawn between the two, the dis-
cussion is structured in terms of institutional and social forces. This account is fol-
lowed by a review of union responses to the challenges they faced. 
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The Institutional Framework: the role of employers and government 
The influence of employers upon the decline in union membership in the 
1980's is acknowledged by both Hyman (1989) and Waddington (1992), although 
neither identifies it as providing more than a partial explanation. A far more sig-
nificant explanatory role has been given to employers in an American account of 
developments in industrial relations (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986). A three-
level model is used to claim that collective bargaining, conducted at the middle 
level, is being squeezed out by developments at the top and bottom levels. Underly-
ing anti-union attitudes among managers are seen as having been given 
opportunities for expression in a harsher economic climate, while the growth of 
human resource management has displaced traditional personnel functions in the 
workplace. At the very least this model provides a convenient framework for con-
sidering the impact of institutional changes upon unions. 
In Britain it is difficult to conclude that corporate policy has moved towards a 
wholesale rejection of trade unionism. There may, however, have been notable dif-
ferences between large and small employers. From the Industrial Relations 
Research Unit survey of two hundred and twenty nine manufacturing estab-
lishments employing over two hundred and fifty full-time workers, Edwards (1985) 
concluded that, "managements in large firms have not been engaged in a systematic 
attack on unions." (emphasis added). 
Kochan et al (1986) attributed anti-union corporate strategy to the allegedly 
poorer economic performance of unionised establishments. These were claimed to 
have substantially higher labour costs than their non-union counterparts. Case study 
evidence has been used to substantiate such claims, both in America by Kochan et 
al and in Britain by David Metcalf, but this has been severely criticised for 
misinterpretation and unjustified generalisation (Nolan & Marginson, 1988). Con-
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flicting results produced by case studies underlines the need to place individual 
episodes within their industrial relations context (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The 
importance of this can be illustrated by considering Kochan et at's broad assertion 
that unionisation imposes "productivity constraints" upon employers. 
Although Metcalf concluded from Edwards (1987) that, "managers in non-
union plants claim to have higher productivity than their unionised counterparts", 
those managers in the IRRU survey failed to identify unionisation as a significant 
problem. The proportion who mentioned union restrictions or overmanning as an 
internal constraint, fewer than seven per cent, was slightly less than that which 
identified the quality of management. Similarly, there is little corroborative evi-
dence for Kochan et ai's claim that company investment decisions have favoured 
non-union plants. As Nolan and Marginson (1988) comment on the work by 
Metcalf: 
Citing recent econometric evidence, he suggests that there is "a 
bit of a puzzle" because unionised firms do not appear to invest 
less than non-unionised firms. (Nolan and Marginson, 1988). 
Of course there have been notable examples of anti-union corporate policy in 
Britain, with both News International and P&O providing instances where 
employers were prepared to go to great lengths to break existing union organisa-
tion. However significant in themselves, these tended to be the exceptions rather 
than the general rule. A far more frequent response from British employers has 
been to alter the nature of existing bargaining relationships rather than to reject 
them altogether. This is illustrated in remarks made by the Director General of the 
Engineering Employers Federation on the advantages of "single union agreements". 
These, it was suggested, enabled an employer: 
to select a moderate and progressive minded union with which 
he can agree to operate at the outset an industrial relations cul-
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~ure embracing all the different aspects . . . that is, employee 
mvolvement, harmonisation and flexibility of labour. (quoted in 
McIlroy, 1988, p193). 
Although the impact of single-union agreements has been largely limited to 
greenfield sites, they can be seen as representing a more generalised intention to 
establish a new form of accommodation. Although this often involved considerable 
change in the workplace, even this was not generally of the type described by 
Kochan et al (1986). Rather, the tendency has been to develop a system of collec-
tive bargaining within a context of mutual acceptance of corporate goals. Before 
discussing this in a little more detail, it should be noted how moves towards a new 
form of collaborative relationship were further encouraged by Government policy. 
Ideological aspects of this policy are returned to later, here it need only be 
noted that since 1979 Britain has had a Government which has been out of 
sympathy with both the purpose and methods of trade union collective action. As 
both legislator and employer it sought to restrict the rights of trade unions and indi-
vidual workers. The framework of collective labour law returned to its pre-1906 
stage. This had particular significance given that the conventional justification for 
minimal individual protective legislation has been the existence of legal immunities 
in tort for trade unions. This erosion was indicative of a strategic intent to alter the 
relationship between British labour and capital. Further evidence for this emerged 
in the refusal of the British Government to ratify the "Social Chapter" of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
Yet, despite such hostility to trade unionism, Waddington concluded: 
It is unlikely, therefore, that legislative change caused the 
decline in membership during the 1980's. This is not to argue 
that legislation has had no influence, but to suggest that the 
structural and economic context of legislative enactment condi-
tions its effect. (Waddington, 1992). 
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A greater consequence of the legislation has been in its impact upon the 
character of union behaviour. Re-definitions of what constituted a lawful trade dis-
pute, and the imposition of financial penalties against union funds rather than indi-
viduals, substantially constrained the activities which unions felt able to support 
Aside from its legislative role, the Government was able to change other 
aspects of the union's institutional environment, symbolised in its rejection of a 
tripartite approach to the national economy. The high point for this had been in the 
1960's and 1970's when national union leaders achieved a degree of involvement 
in economic and social policy which had been unsuccessfully sought by their 
predecessors in the late 1920's. However, the 1980's saw union leaders "back on the 
sidelines, and by 1992 the announced disbandment of the NEDC formalised what 
had in effect been largely achieved. The demise in corporate-style involvement had 
greatest impact upon the ruc, for which it created a very specific crisis. For most 
unions the major direct consequence was in making the maintenance of relations 
with employers increasingly important. 
Meanwhile, several pieces of research confmn changes in patterns of work-
place representation during the 1980's. Attracting particular interest have been 
claims concerning the emergence of a more "macho" style of management. Mackay 
(1986) reports results of a survey of fifty six establishments indicating forty three 
per cent of personnel managers felt that management's approach to employee rela-
tions was harder and more confident. This has occurred alongside an apparent inter-
est in the use of quality circles and other techniques designed to alter the nature of 
collective bargaining rather than displace it. 
Evidence also suggests an emergence of new forums for representation, as in 
the establishment of joint consultation committees, which one-third of managers 
interviewed in surveys conducted "by the IRRU and UMIST reported as having 
been newly established or recently strengthened. While Mackay (1986) interpreted 
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this as a move to by-pass trade union organisation, Edwards (1985) was more 
qualified in his assessment of it as a "significant trend" rather than a "massive 
shift". 
What is clear is that institutional support from employers continues to pro-
vide an important base for union organisation. This is illustrated in a comparative 
study of electronics factories which found the most important variable detennining 
union membership to be the individual plant at which a worker was employed, with 
management at one being particularly supportive (Guest and Dewe, 1988). 
Employer support for unions has not shown a universal decline, although it may be 
that the role of employer behaviour may be greatest in newer workplaces (Wad-
dington, 1992). 
Undoubtedly there has been hostility to unions within the private service sec-
tor. At the same time, the conclusion of the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey should be noted: 
Generally speaking, these results do not indicate extensive 
attempts by unions to recruit in no-union establishments, given 
that our questions were about attempts within the previous five 
years (Millward and Stevens, 1986). 
Similarly, in a study commissioned by USDAW the main reason given by 
part-time shop workers who were not in a union was that no-one had asked them to 
join. Most of these worked in non-union establishments (Labour Research, March 
1989). Nevertheless, so far as unionised establishments are concerned, much of the 
evidence from the 1980's suggests most employers seemed prepared to accept a 
changed relationship with established unions. To this extent the institutional sup-
port they were willing to provide can be seen to have been a significant influence 
on the character of union organisation and behaviour. Even when a hostile 
employer, the Government, withdrew the bargaining machinery for teachers the 
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greatest impact may be judged to have been in its effect on the character rather than 
the level of school-teacher trade unionism. 
Overall, neither employer or Government behaviour in themselves seem suf-
ficient to explain the scale of union decline. Their influence would seem to have 
been as much in the style and character it took as in its density. The important issue 
for the present discussion is the relationship this has with sectoral and composi-
tional changes in the workforce. How far have these fundamentally altered the 
potential for union activity within the workplace and beyond. This also can be 
approached by considering the consequences for collective organisation among 
workers per se, and the character and fonn which it takes. 
The Sociological Context: understanding union character 
As in the preceding discussion, it is important to look at divergencies within 
aggregate trends. It should also be noted that even after the considerable fall in 
union membershipit remains at a significant level. Almost ten million people in this 
country remain trade union members, a figure at least five times greater than the 
membership of the Anglican Church, a body which has enjoyed a substantially dif-
ferent relationship with the state. Indeed, in the early 1980's the ideological 
hostility of the Government to the principle of trade unionism was not generally so 
evident as it later became. Wedderburn discusses its progression from the time 
when the then Employment Minister introduced the 1979 Employment Bill by stat-
ing: 
The law should always give full recognition to the inherent 
weakness of the individual worker vis-a-vis his employer, to the 
need for him to be organised in a union and to the need for his 
union to have such exceptional liberties as may be necessary to 
redress the balance. (quoted in Wedderburn, 1989, p3). 
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The ideological source of the subsequent shift, which Wedderburn attributes 
to the influence of Hayek, is less important here than whether or not it cor-
responded with a wider change in popular cultural perceptions about trade unions. 
Such a claim receives little support from opinion poll evidence which suggests that 
unions became more popular than they had been for many years. This may well 
reflect union weakness rather than strength (Edwards and Bain, 1988), but even so 
it does not suggest ideological success in challenging the basis of trade unionism. 
To this extent the ruc Special Review Body seemed justified to conclude from its 
own review of opinion poll evidence that, "Most people have a positive attitude 
towards the trade union Movement." (TUC, 1988). 
Yet even though this may be true, it does not explain why so many have 
chosen not to join it. An important aspect of this has been the impact of occupa-
tional change, the real significance of which lies in its relationship with social 
identities. The link between sectoral change and unionisation is not automatic. As a 
review of European union experiences in the 1980's noted, "There are a number of 
instances where unionisation expanded rapidly while labour markets militated 
against union growth" (Visser, 1988, pI43). The successful unionisation of private 
mail and fast food service workers in Lombardy offer such examples (Kane and 
Marsden, 1988). Historical experiences similarly demonstrate the dangers of 
assuming, as one writer said in the 1940' s of white-collar workers, that certain 
groups of workers, "don't join unions". (Quoted in Nicholson et ai, 1981). 
It should also be noted that some of the historical examples used by Kelly 
(1988) to demonstrate that occupational changes need not necessarily impede union 
growth, involved workforces already in possession of a strong trade union tradition. 
This was not by any means universally true, but was the case, for example, for 
much of the new manufacturing industries the 1930's. Similarly, when Terry 
(1984) uses the example of the development of strong workplace organisation at 
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Fords in the face of management hostility, account must be taken of the previous 
trade union backgrounds of local activists and related features of local culture, as at 
Halewood (Beynon, 1973). 
This style of trade unionism was highly "unionate", and it has been the one 
which has taken some of the hardest battering in the 1980's. In the case of strike 
activity, the average number of stoppages per year in the 1980's was less than half 
that of the 1970's, and by 1991 the number of working days lost was fewer than in 
any year since records began one hundred years ago (Bird, 1992). Interpretations of 
union development in the 1980's must therefore confront the question as to whether 
the character of trade unionism constructed in the industrial manual sector con-
tinues to provide a sufficient indicator against which to judge developments. 
Not all organisations have suffered decline. Nor can sectoral change alone 
account for the 78.4% growth in membership recorded by the Royal College of 
Nursing between 1979 and 1990, or the boosting of the membership of the 
Assistant Master and Mistresses Association to 138,571 by 1990 (Certification 
Officer, 1991). A proportion of this growth, but by no means all, has been achieved 
at the expense of traditionally more "unionate" organisations. Nevertheless, it does 
not suggest an abandonment of collective organisation. 
Nor should the figures be taken to imply a wholesale rejection of industrial 
militancy. The public services in the 1980's provided the setting for some of the 
major disputes of the decade. Albeit in the context of an all-time low in strike 
activity, one-half of worl9.ng days lost through stoppages of work in 1991 were in 
public administration (Bird, 1992). What it suggests is that divergent trends have 
reflected alternative forms of collective representation rather than substitutes for it. 
The continued need for collective organisation is founded upon the inherent nature 
of the employment relationship. The following considers ways in which this rela-
tionship can give rise to an attachment to trade unionism, beginning with the notion 
of "instrumentality". 
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In an early piece of work, claims that the more individualistic orientations of 
white-collar workers provided the explanation for lower levels of union member-
ship was questioned by Cook et al (1975) who suggested that differences were 
more of a practical than ideological character. That interpretation appeared to be 
largely born out by the subsequent recruitment of white-collar worker. The view 
that instrumental rationality provides the basis for union membership decisions is 
implied in the conclusion drawn by Bassett (1989) that union success in meeting 
instrumental demands of members is of over-riding importance. If this is so then 
wider attitudes towards the role of unions in society might be regarded as far less 
important. 
Indeed, there appears to be no necessary link between general perceptions of 
unions and individual membership decisions. This is shown in the apparent paradox 
that the increased popularity of unions correlates with reductions in strike activity 
and lower inflation (Edwards and Bain, 1988), whereas membership growth has 
been associated with periods of increase in these two variables (Bain and E1sheikh, 
1976). American research tends to conflrm that worker's perceptions of what 
unions achieve in their own workplace has a far more important influence on mem-
bership decisions than do the general image of unions in society held by individuals 
(Kochan, 1980). 
This type of research also provides an opportunity to explore some of the 
issues which seem to be given priority in these decisions. Reviews of the literature 
suggest that union membership is associated with levels of job dissatisfaction, 
together with a perception that unions are instrumental in improving terms of 
employment (Nicholson et ai, 1981; and Klandermans, 1986). These factors were 
found to be better predictors of union certiflcation voting behaviour than personal 
characteristics of the type analysed-by Bain and Elias (1985). Similarly, Guest and 
Dewe (1988) ranked factors influencing union membership in their study of 
39 
selected electronics factories in the following order; employer support, the extent to 
which unions were seen as representing workers interests better than anyone else, 
and worker's perceptions of union success at the plant. Conversely, a union 
sponsored survey of ex-members in Holland found that among those who were still 
employed, the most common reason for leaving was dissatisfaction with services 
provided rather than hostility to unions in general (Klandermans, 1986). 
The implications of such findings has led a number of unions to use surveys 
as a means of identifying preferences by members and non-members. However, a 
difficulty arises in the notion of instrumentality in terms of what is implied about 
the nature of rationality involved. Hyman (1977) has pointed to the difficulties in 
applying rationality to strike activity, and a similar point could be made in relation 
to participation in collective organisation more generally. If someone is asked for 
an explanation as to why they joined a union they are unlikely to offer an "irra-
tional" reason. 
In his review of the American literature on union recruitment, Klandermans 
(1986) criticised many of the studies on the grounds of inadequate theory and 
method, arguing a need to give greater emphasis to factors such as social pressure. 
It is not necessary to deny any role for "instrumental" factors to question their loca-
tion within a neo-classical model of human action which ignores the social circum-
stances of individual subjectivity. The notion of "union commitment" must be con-
sidered within a broader social context than is implied in a purely instrumental 
approach. This encompasses influences derived from pre-workplace experiences as 
well as within the workplace itself. The dynamic qualities of attitudes does not 
mean they are constantly changing, but that this can occur within particular con-
stellations of circumstances. 
This suggests not so much a waxing and waning of union fortunes as an 
automatic reflection of the business cycle, nor a widespread rejection of trade union 
values, but rather a continually changing environment to which collective labour 
40 
organisation must adjust. What shape might union character then take in order to 
respond to these changing circumstances? 
A starting point is to note social survey evidence which suggests members 
may rate unions in their own workplace more favourably than they do unions in 
general (Harrison, 1984). However, in their study of electronics plants, Guest and 
Dewe (1988) found almost fifty per cent of union members, and over two-thirds of 
non-members, describing their own unions as either "unsuccessful" or "not very 
successful" in representing workers interests. Over fifty eight per cent of all 
workers, and this included nearly one-third of union members, felt there were no 
issues for which their best representative was their union. The significance of this 
lay in the authors conclusion that this may reflect the fact that worker's concerns 
extend beyond the terms and conditions of employment: 
There is evidence to show that dissatisfaction with work is asso-
ciated with union membership but it exerts only a minor 
influence. . . it is dissatisfaction with involvement rather than 
with the terms and conditions of employment that is more 
important. . . unions might increase their appeal if they paid 
more attention to issues of involvement. (Guest and Dewe, 
1988). 
This statement has parallels with the "professional union" model for nursing 
advocated by Trevor Clay and which is described later. It implies that the basis for 
a manual-professional distinction may be less clear-cut than is sometimes sug-
gested. If this were so, it would lend support to the thesis advanced by writers such 
as Touraine and Mallet in the 1960's on the prospect of alliances between profes-
sional and manual workers. Some evidence for this was apparent in the 1970' s, but 
this has not been the case for much of the 1980's. 
While encroaching managerial control over the labour process may be a gen-
eral tendency, the way in which workers respond to this may not be so uniform. 
Goals concerning control over work become socially constructed in ways which 
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retlect differing sectoral and occupational identities. This in turn will shape the 
character of collective response to which it gives rise. 
Writers such as Kelly (1988) have disputed the possibilities of "extended col-
lective bargaining" within the constraints of capitalism, and to some extent this 
assessment receives support from what was noted earlier concerning managerial 
support for unions. Often this appears to have been continued on the basis of a 
more restrictive bargaining agenda. The potential conflict this can create, between 
maintaining employer support or member support, may underlie many of the diffi-
culties faced by unions. The issue as to whether public services may retain some 
distinctiveness in this process can be left for now, instead one further consequence 
of Government policy upon union character needs to be noted. 
If the Government proved unable to undermine collective organisation itself, 
they appeared to win a greater measure of support for challenges to allegedly 
undemocratic or bureaucratic procedures. An early clarion call of the Government, 
to "give the unions back to their members", provided an important ideological 
device for justifying several policy initiatives. Such claims were unfounded, as 
became evident when the legislation was used to obstruct membership ballots in the 
NUS dispute with Sealink, and prevent the TGWU giving support to decisions 
arrived at by its dock worker members through a ballot. Moreover, the Government 
received condemnation from the International Labour Organisation in withdrawing 
trade union membership rights at GCHQ. 
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of policy on internal union processes seemed to 
achieve some resonance. Not always, though, did it produce the intended outcomes. 
Such was the case with the requirement for Political Fund ballots, held by many 
unions during the 1980's. Despite early polls suggesting only one or two unions 
would achieve majorities in favour of retaining a political fund, and these only nar-
rowly, results were overwhelmingly in favour. This may reflect not a change of 
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opinion on the part of members but that they were confronted with a "real" decision 
in the ballots forcing them to adopt a more genuine opinion (Roiser and Little, 
1986). Alternatively, the campaigns conducted by unions may have had a sig-
nificant impact (Graham, 1986; Raiser and Little, 1986). 
The possibility that unions can influence members' views in such a way is 
suggested by evidence from Germany. Prior to IG Metall's 1984 campaign for a 35 
hour week a membership survey on attitudes towards working time indicated that 
just 5.3% of the membership supported a reduction in hours. Other information it 
provided facilitated a campaign which assisted in achieving, in some of the ballots, 
over 80% support for strike action (Hartmann and Horstmann, 1987). Two issues 
arise from this. Firstly, such a highly centralised strategy may be neither suited to 
British union traditions or to dealing with issues of control within the workplace. 
Secondly, it suggests the possibility of "tailoring" a campaign to meet particular 
concerns. 
This was the case in political fund campaigns, particularly in relation to the 
Labour Party. A number of unions, including several adopting Political Funds for 
the first time, sought to emphasise that a political fund was required because the 
Government had changed the legal definition of "political activity", including 
within it many existing activities which would otherwise become unlawful to con-
tinue with. In contrast, other unions gave considerable weight to the role of their 
link: with the Labour Party. Differences in campaigning tactics reflected what were 
perceived as being the more persuasive arguments for differing membership con-
stituencies. The Political Fund ballots provided examples of ways in which unions 
responded differently to the same challenge, differences which reflected variant 
traditions of their members. 
It was significant that it was in the area of internal decision-taking that the 
Government seemed to be having some impact upon the general character of union 
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organisation. This was particularly so given that this was potentially the area most 
under the direct control of unions themselves. Furthermore, the character of intra-
union relations may have an important impact upon the degree of commitment held 
by members. From a case study of union organisation in a brewery, Spencer (1985) 
suggests that levels of membership satisfaction and commitment may be factors 
within the control of the union itself. Thirty eight out of forty four members inter-
viewed described their union organisation as "very good" or "good", attributed by 
Spencer to the way stewards discussed issues with members at workplace branch 
meetings, encouraging an active and involved membership. He further suggests that 
the attitudes he found can be the product of recent workplace experiences. 
Research from further afield has drawn similar conclusions. A comparative 
study of trade union members in Sweden and Iowa concluded that a significant 
influence on member's satisfaction with their unions is their perception of member-
union relations and not only bargaining outcomes (Jarley et ai, 1990). Of particular 
importance was the willingness on the part of the union to communicate informa-
tion to members and listen to their views. That this may in tum encourage a higher 
level of membership involvement was suggested in a major study of one NALGO 
branch, in which it was noted, "it was particularly the democratic and accessible 
stewards who were associated with high levels of direct membership participation 
in the union." (Nicholson et ai, 1981). 
Two general conclusions emerge from this discussion. Firstly, compositional 
changes in the workforce are in themselves unlikely to provide the explanation for 
the decline of trade union membership. Their significance lies instead in their 
influence upon the changing, and possibly diverging, characters of collective 
organisation. Secondly, a more widespread experience has been that union 
organisation characterised by inadequate communication is likely to produce low 
levels of member commitment How this is overcome may however reflect other 
differences. 
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Combined together these may create considerable difficulties for unions in 
seeking to reconcile pressures from members which may be very different to those 
to which they are subject from employers. It may well be that many of the debates 
in the 1980's as to whether union decline was a cyclical or secular trend missed a 
significant point, that the period was characterised by early attempts by unions to 
redefine themselves in ways which resolved these contradictions. It may be that an 
attempt to find a universally applicable strategy will prove illusory in the context of 
sectoral divergence. To begin to consider this the following outlines key features of 
alternative strategies being advocated by prominent union leaders. 
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Responses from the Unions 
In the context of these divergencies and pressures, alternative strategies for 
union behaviour emerged during the 1980's. Their structural context, together with 
the sources of support they require, has laid a clear imprint upon them. The follow-
ing discussion does not seek to analyse variant characteristics of union behaviour in 
the 1980's, instead the focus is on key statements made by national unions and their 
leaders and what these suggest about "strategic intent". The strategies need not be 
regarded as mutually exclusive, indeed the ambiguities they can reflect forms an 
important theme for the case study. A basic format for classifying alternatives is 
suggested in Table 2.2. Although it represents a simplification of variants within 
models, there is heuristic value at this stage in clarifying significant distinguishing 
features between them. 
Table ~.~: A basic typology of union strategies 
Sedor Strategy 
Private Manufacturing Market unionism 
Private services Representational 
Public services Professionalising 
Public services Campaigning 
The "Market" or "Business" Union Strategy 
Prominent sources 
of support 
Employers and members 
State: employment legislation 
State: occupational regulation 
Members and service users 
This is the strategy which has attracted some of the greatest interest (Towers, 
1987; McIlroy, 1988; Winchester, 1988; Waddington, 1988). Through its close 
connection with collective bargaining it represents a continuation of the historically 
dominant pattern of union behaviour in Britain. This has provided a clear express-
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ion of, "The raison d'etre of every union ... to exert influence on the terms and 
conditions operating in the labour market." (Muller-Jentsch, 1985). The strategy 
draws considerably upon experiences and traditions identified by Gavin Laird of 
the former AEU: 
The advances we have made were the result of collective effort. 
Paid holidays, sick pay schemes, occupational pensions, are the 
outcome not of benign government but of solid, determined, 
pragmatic trade union/employer negotiations (Laird, 1988). 
The AEU and the EETPU were most closely associated with the model of 
market unionism, two unions which suffered some of the greatest membership 
losses during the 1980's. Their combined membership, omitting TASS, slumped 
from 1,753,174 in 1979 to 1,068,878 in 1990, a 39% decline (Certification Officer, 
1991). That such a spectacularly unsuccessful strategy gained such influence 
reflects the basis of the organisations in the traditional heartlands of trade unionism. 
In the context of the 1980's, the strategy was founded upon an increasing 
need for employer support, although even this can be seen as a continuation of an 
existing trend. "No strike agreements" can be interpreted as extensions to proce-
dural agreements for the resolution of disputes entered into by unions for many 
years. The adoption of single union deals, although not widespread, reflects a 
greater willingness to accommodate to employer desires in order to achieve recog-
nition and managerial support. In this way the strategy represents a shift along the 
continuum described by Muller-Jentsch (1985) towards the "incorporated" trade 
union. 
Some aspects of market unionism are further centralising internal relations of 
power, encouraging a shift towards what Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) describe as a 
"monological" pattern of communication. On the basis of developing forms of rep-
resentative democracy within the union's internal processes, the EETPU claimed, 
"More than any other union, our democratic structure ensures the representative 
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nature of our governing Executive Council" (EETPU, 1988). Representative 
democracy also can support a high degree of central control, as John Edmonds has 
pointed out: 
The AUEW holds to this system most firmly: leaders are 
elected and they do whatever they like until they come up for 
election again (Edmonds, 1985). 
However, where traditions of strong workplace organisation exist, counter-
vailing pressures may constrain such oligarchic tendencies. Equally, elements of 
centralisation and workplace organisation can combine, as in the campaign for 
reduced in working hours in the engineering industry. Divergencies within business 
unionism reflect differences between workers having traditions of organising rela-
tively autonomously and those in "greenfield" sites for whom union recognition 
agreements may have preceded workforce recruitment. The Nissan Sunderland site, 
where the AEU achieved a recognition agreement but obtained relatively few mem-
bers, illustrates the potential significance of this. The maintenance of employer sup-
port can have different outcomes depending upon the character of existing union 
organisation. 
Market unionism continues a strategy which seeks union engagement in 
bargaining over the terms of productivity improvements rather than seeking to 
prevent them (Hyman and Elger, 1981). Data on rising union/non-union wage dif-
ferentials in the 1970's appeared to lend some support to this approach, increasing, 
according to one estimate, from 7.5% in the 1970's to 11.1 % in 1980-83 (Metcalf 
and Nicholl, 1985). More recent evidence suggests a declining differential, but the 
strategy is one which, in David Metcalf s words, concentrates upon the size rather 
than the distribution of the "industrial cake" (Metcalf, 1988). However, changed 
economic circumstances might again alter the basis for this, and future possibilities 
for a re-emergence of industrial militancy in sectors where the strategy has 
developed should not be ignored. 
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A potential for applying this strategy to public services is implicit in the argu-
ment advanced by the Labour MP, Derek Fatchett, that groups such as nurses and 
teachers may stand to benefit from the adoption of "pattern bargaining" techniques 
within a more fragmented system of pay determination (Fatchett, 1989). This 
would suggest the need for a more decentralised system of public service union 
organisation than has tended to be the case in the past, although it may neglect the 
extent to which management seek to controllabcrur costs through the restructuring 
of labour. This possibility forms an important element of the "professionalising" 
strategy considered later. 
At this point, it is important to note that the application of market unionism to 
public services is predicated upon capitalist employment relationships becoming 
increasingly generalised, with the locale of public services being regarded as sec-
ondary. Such a view has also been suggested in statements made on behalf of MSF 
appealing to smaller NHS unions, notably the HV A. These have stressed their pri-
vate sector bargaining experience as equipping them with the expertise to operate 
in an increasingly commercially managed health service. 
Pressures within public service organisations may be encouraging managers 
to act, "as if they were capitalists" (Crompton and Jones, 1984), and in turn encour-
age unions to respond similarly. The potential for this may be considerable, particu-
larly as they start from a position of high membership levels and widespread recog-
nition. What has been frequently lacking, however, has been a strong tradition of 
workplace organisation which might act as a counter-balance to the more 
bureaucratic features of the model. Nevertheless, if the distinctiveness of the public 
services is seen to be diminishing it may be regarded as an appropriate strategy. 
Before alternatives which tend to emphasise a continued distinctiveness are dis-
cussed, attention is given to a strategy which has been advanced most notably in the 
context of private services. 
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The Representational Strategy 
Changing patterns of work created difficulties for extending market unionism 
as many employers outside of existing heartlands showed little willingness to 
respond to union overtures. A notable advocate of an alternative has been John 
Edmonds of the OMB, who has emphasised two important themes. The first has 
been a questioning of the centrality of work in the lives of many union members, 
particularly related to changes in the gender composition of the workforce. Sec-
ondly, he has expressed doubts about the ability of unions to deliver improvements 
to members through traditional collective bargaining. From this assessment flow 
two principal proposals: unions must become advocates as much as bargainers, and 
they must extend the range of services which are offered. While again these are not 
entirely new, they are located within a clearer identification of changing experi-
ences of work. 
A survey conducted for the OMB suggested that whereas men regarded union 
membership as a form of insurance, women wanted a union which would tackle 
problems they faced at work (The Guardian, 8th March 1989). In this, a cor-
respondence can be noted with research evidence referred to in the previous section 
which identified involvement in a wider range of work issues as being of increasing 
importance. Here, however, it arises in a context where: 
Many of the new work groups will only have limited bargaining 
power ... unions will need to develop an extensive network of 
local officials readily available to handle the many problems 
which will be passed on post haste by a multitude of local stew-
ards (Edmonds, 1984). 
The emphasiS upon an advocacy role is closely linked to an extension in indi-
vidual employment rights: 
50 
Our best weapon is to be able to say: "join us, and we will 
ensure that the legal rights that we have helped win will be 
observed by your employer" (Edmonds, 1986). 
Despite the significant differences with market unionism, both strategies can 
imply high degrees of leadership authority. In urging the retention of membership 
balloting for union executives, John Edmonds has argued, "their authority will 
increase, the room to manouvre will increase, and their right to make decisions will 
be seen to be fair." (Edmonds, 1985). Although elsewhere he has advocated initia-
tives such as open meetings and workplace discussion groups particularly aimed at 
involving more women members (Edmonds, 1988), the general emphasis is upon a 
system of representative democracy. As with the application of market unionism to 
new territories, this could give rise to a form of "quasi-participation" in which there 
is a separation of decision-making and participation processes characteristic of 
highly centralised and oligarchic unions (Muller-Jentsch, 1985). 
The distinctiveness of the "representational" strategy is that it seeks to extend 
organised labour beyond its traditional basis. It has in common with some earlier 
approaches to work groups lacking strong collective traditions, an emphasis upon 
seeking a framework of legislative support. A difficulty it faced in the 1980's and 
since has been Government hostility to protection legislation for individual workers 
as well as for organised labour. 
In the longer-term, the future for this strategy will be largely determined by 
the broader direction taken in the restructuring of labour by capital. Political, rather 
than solely industrial activity, will be crucial in this process. Unless the strategy can 
prove capable of recruitment in the absence of legislative or employer support, it 
faces considerable difficulties in the shorter term. Such have been the obstacles 
faced by a number of organisations in this sector, notably the banking unions. 
One response to this has been a widening of the range of services provided to 
individual members. This has in fact been a feature of other strategies also, but it 
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has particular significance in the context of an inability to secure recognition from 
an employer. Some suggestions have been made for the provision of a lower sub-
scription to provide an entitlement to non-bargaining services and advice. In many 
respects this would signify a return to a much older Friendly Society model, 
although in this role the unions would now be competing with a far wider range of 
alternatives. 
In other ways, the strategy may have an unintended applicability to public 
services. Firstly, the character of much of public service trade unionism has long 
given a primary role to advocacy in the activities of union representatives (Watson, 
1988). Secondly, one consequence of the fragmentation of health care services may 
be an increasingly blurred boundary between the public and private sectors. In the 
absence of effective workplace organisation, these influences may further encour-
age a representative rather than bargaining role. 
Market unionism and representative strategies can each be seen as responses 
to changes in the relation between capital and labour which emerge differently in 
different contexts. As such they each relate in some way to aspects of public serv-
ices. Attention now turns to union strategies which have tended to emphasise a con-
tinued distinctiveness of public services. 
The "Professionalising" Strategy 
The potential importance of the content of work has already been noted in 
connection with notions of union commitment. The issue has arisen in the advocacy 
by Trevor Clay, formerly of the Royal College of Nursing of a professional strategy 
for nursing staff, for which it is argued: 
Effective trade unions must be able to address the content and 
objectives of their members' work, not just the terms and condi-
tions. (Clay, 1987, p143). 
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Two aspects of this strategy need to be noted. Firstly, it is accompanied by an 
explicit rejection of, "the historical concentrations on traditional industrial relations 
activity", (Clay, 1988). Instead, it is suggested that this be replaced by the adoption 
of methods used by pressure groups and voluntary organisations. Secondly, the 
proposal has arisen from within an organisation seeking to promote what can be 
described as an elitist occupational strategy. The professionalising strategy has 
been advanced in ways which emphasise its distinctiveness from manual worker 
trade unionism, particularly those characteristics most associated with "unionate" 
behaviour. 
Worker organisation in the public services in the 1960's and 1970's had 
increasingly adopted the dominant model of industrial trade unionism; the process 
was never complete and was highly uneven but was evident in a new willingness to 
take industrial action. Carpenter (1982) however suggests that many nurses may 
have been encouraged to join the RCN in the late 1970's because of their rejection 
of industrial militancy. Given this apparent association between professionalising 
strategies and industrial militancy, it is worth briefly considering experiences of the 
latter during the 1980's. 
In this period many of Britain's most significant industrial disputes occurred 
in the public services. These included the civil service in 1981, the health service in 
1982, teachers in a long-running campaign in the mid-1980's, and ambulance staff 
and local authority white collar workers in 1989. Local authority manual workers 
were almost alone as a major occupational group in taking part in no national 
campaign of industrial action throughout the decade. By the late 1980's there was, 
however, evidence of a shift towards seeking public support through other means, 
as in the campaigns involving ambulance staff and teachers. This was far less true 
of the local authority white-collar worker's dispute, which in some respects can be 
regarded as having achieved greater success than was the case for several of the 
others. 
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Nevertheless, in recruitment terms, a more elitist appeal has proved highly 
successful for the RCN, which by 1990 had become the ninth largest trade union in 
the country. Similarly, the Assistant Master and Mistresses Association now ranks 
among the twenty largest (Certification Officer, 1991). Renewed attention to 
professional concerns has also been evident within some ruc affiliated unions. In 
1988 COHSE created two "professional officer" posts within a newly established 
Professional Department, and a 1989 report of union structure considered the pos-
sibility of providing for differing occupational groups to have their own identity 
within the union. This was accompanied by a suggestion that more encouragement 
should be given to professional organisations to affiliate to COHSE (COHSE, 
1989). 
In discussing strategies designed to extend worker control over the labour 
process Kelly (1988) emphasised the power of capital to obstruct such attempts but 
in the context of services such as health care different considerations may apply. 
However, the manner in which the professionalising strategy has been advanced 
tends not to make it a generalisable one, particularly as it seeks to distance certain 
occupations from the rest of organised labour, rather than establish an alliance. 
A less elitist approach which nevertheless maintains a focus upon issues of 
work content has been suggested in relation to social workers (Joyce et ai, 1988). 
This argues the case for public service trade unions to give greater attention to the 
practice of those delivering services, with more emphasis upon finding new forms 
of local participation. By re-focusing attention on what many public service 
workers may hold in common, engagement in the production of use values, this 
approach has parallels with strategies designed to locate their activity within a 
broader network of social alliances. 
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The Campaigning Strategy 
In a review of the state of British trade unions, Hyman (1989) refers to a need 
to link with other campaigns and social movements. The issue of the general appli-
cation of this strategy, rejected by Kelly (1988), is returned to in the concluding 
chapter. Here the discussion is focused upon its relevance to public services. An 
emphasis upon the need for campaigning activities has arisen in several contexts, as 
when Winchester notes in discussing the strategy advanced by John Edmonds: 
A more extensive trade-union role in campaigns and community 
activities outside the workplace will also be required to offer the 
prospect of collective solutions to the problems of individually 
vulnerable workers and consumers (Winchester, 1988, p516). 
Similarly, Ron Todd of the TOWU has argued, "Co-operation between 
unions and social action groups is what people in the community really need" 
(TGWU, 1988). A focus upon the mutual interests of trade unionists and local com-
munities continues a long-standing, if minority, tradition within British trade 
unions, designed to secure improvement in the "conditions of labour". Recent 
examples of such alliances between trade unions and local communities have arisen 
around campaigns linking the defence of jobs and services. 
One example of such a campaign is provided by a NUPE full time officer, 
who drew the conclusion in the early 1980's that health unions needed to change 
their strategy (Barber, 1982). However, in the wake of the Conservative's third 
consecutive election victory, Fryer noted: 
Trade unions in the public services have not been successful in 
winning public support in defence of public service jobs and 
services. The support must be won if the unions in the public 
services are to pass their most severe test yet (Fryer, 1989). 
A continuing problem has been that only rarely have campaigns produced 
stable or permanent coalitions. One exception to this emerged in London in the 
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fonn of London Health Emergency, formed as a result of earlier individual 
campaigns. A principle objective was to draw together workers and users of local 
health services (Mackintosh and Wainwright, 1987). Support for its activities came 
from several unions, although there was a degree of suspicion among some national 
leaders about some of the political standpoints being taken. Such support was not 
translated into substantial resources, and the campaign's reliance upon GLC sup-
port made its future vulnerable. 
Implications of placing greater emphasis upon campaigns and social alliances 
are suggested in a review of developments within Canadian public sector trade 
unions: 
There is now a consensus among public sector unions that 
widespread popular support for the preservation of public serv-
ices must be developed as a logical adjunct to the bargaining 
process. This means spending substantial amounts of union 
resources on building alliances with consumers of public serv-
ices, community organisations, parts of the women's movement 
and the churches (Calvert, 1990). 
According to another writer, in Canada this has produced a shift towards 
"social unionism" and away from the "business union" model of the USA (Adams, 
1990). Some evidence for a strategic orientation in this direction appears in a dis-
cussion document produced for the COHSEINALGO/NUPE merger talks, which 
emphasise a need to develop connections between providers and users of services. 
Having parallels with the reassessment of work identities noted earlier in relation to 
the representational model, this is placed within a broader discussion of the charac-
ter of public service trade unionism. Referring to the impact of social and economic 
change, the document suggests an: 
increasing complexity of people's social and political identities. 
To a great extent these are still occupational and collective, but 
increasingly they are individual and influenced by factors 
beyond work. Examples include the flourishing of new social 
movements, community groups and voluntary organisations. 
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Whilst many of these have developed outside mainstream 
"politics" and trade unionism, they are deeply connected to the 
work and services provided by those who would be members of 
the New Union (p12-13) ... 
The developments emphasise the need for a changed and wider 
conception of "politics" (p13) ... 
If trade unionism emphasises mutual protection, looking after 
the less fortunate and promoting fairness and justice, this has 
always had a particular significance in public service provision 
(pI5) ... 
This New Union can be the key union in Britain, helping to 
shape policy and service delivery in a whole range of essential 
services (p42). 
(COHSE, NALGO, NUPE; 1990). 
Past failures to effectively develop such an approach may be due to insuffi-
cient attention and resources, or as has been argued by Kelly, the consequence of 
its inherent limitation. Commenting on calls for the greater involvement by unions 
in wider social alliances, Kelly suggests: 
It is more plausible to argue that the mobilisation of wider, pub-
lic support is in fact only a particular strategy appropriate in 
very specific circumstances. As an adjunct to industrial action 
by public sector unions, faced with an employer, ie the State, 
sensitive to public opinion, it may be of some use ... (but) 
Even in the public sector, governments have a history of resist-
ing the most well-organised and supported campaigns (Kelly, 
1988, pII9). 
This statement illustrates two rather different forms which campaigning 
activity may take. The first represents an adjunct to bargaining objectives, exam-
ples of which could include the 1989 ambulance dispute, designed to place political 
pressure upon the Government. A second implies going beyond this, to develop 
new social alliances which involve workers and service users in the joint 
determination of objectives. In this they reflect differences of purpose and not 
solely those of methods. 
In many respects, each of the four strategies discussed here reflect important 
ideological differences alongside those resulting from the impact of their structural 
context. This illustrates how collective organisations can give rise to a range of 
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strategic responses in reply to changing managerial challenges. These are returned 
to again in the case study material, although with a less explicit focus upon the rep-
resentational strategy. This is on the grounds that it can be seen to rely for its full 
expression upon additional protective employment legislation. The main focus 
therefore will be upon possible sources of tension between bargaining, profes-
sionalising and campaigning strategies. For the present, having discussed character-
istics of these alternative strategies, the following chapter provides a more detailed 
focus upon management and trade unionism in the National Health Service. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MANAGEMENT AND WORK ORGANISATION IN THE NHS 
This chapter provides an organisational context for the discussion on NHS 
trade unions in Chapter Four, as well as giving some national background material 
for the local case study material. Although events are dealt with in a largely 
chronological order, this is done in a way to highlight certain themes. The most 
important of these is founded upon a recognition that it is necessary to incorporate 
both "social structure" and "social action" perspectives in understanding organisa-
tions. In particular, and in relation to the arguments developed in Chapter One, cap-
italist social relations provide an important but insufficient explanation for the way 
in which the NHS developed as a service and as an employer. 
To sustain this argument it is necessary to go rather further back in time than 
the period which forms the main focus for this research. This enables the origins of 
what are described as the "first managerial challenge" to be traced, which in tum 
provides the context for examining the emergence of the "new managerialism" in 
the 1980's. Throughout the discussion, attention is given to the role of the state in 
relation to employment matters, particularly concerning pay and initiatives 
designed to raise efficiency and levels of labour productivity. The forms in which 
they came to be adopted within the NHS provide evidence on which to consider 
claims concerning the past or current distinctiveness of health care from the capi-
talist accumulation process. In tum this provides a basis for examining the develop-
ment of NHS trade union organisation in the following chapter. 
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The First Managerial Challenge: the NUS before 1979 
By the late 1970' s several writers were claiming the emerging dominance of 
a new "managerialism", accompanied by increasing central control in the organisa-
tion of the NHS. Yet changes occurring in this period were arguably not so 
dramatic as might have then appeared. An important reason for this, it will be 
argued, was that the state had not gained as much influence over decision-taking as 
the new organisational structures might formally have implied. What had been 
achieved was a highly variable level of central control, an important factor in which 
was the equally variable levels of job control held by different groups of staff. To 
understand why this was so, and the consequences it had for the future, it is useful 
to trace back an early concern of the state, the cost of the health service to the 
Exchequer. 
The impact of early financial restraint 
In an appendix to the 1942 Beveridge Report, the Government Actuary had 
estimated that a national health service might cost around £170 million a year; yet 
in its ftrst year of operation its actual costs were £402 million. Economies intro-
duced at an early stage in the history of the NHS were in 1951 accompanied by the 
imposition of selected charges. Capital spending was also tightly constrained, even 
though the NHS had inherited many old buildings and equipment. In real terms, 
NHS capital spending was 12% less in 1952 than it had been two years earlier. 
Unsurprisingly, charges of ftnancial profligacy were to be rejected by the Guil-
lebaud Committee, established by the Government to enquire into resourcing for 
the NHS. In its report, published in 1956, the Committee concluded that: 
Any charge that there has been widespread extravagance in the 
National Health Service, whether in respect of the spending of 
money or the use of manpower, is not borne out by our evi-
dence. (Guillebaud, 1956). 
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A research paper produced for the Committee, by the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research, had shown that the proportion of national income 
spent on the NHS actUally fell from 3.75% in 1949/50 to 3.25% in 1953/4. Rela-
tively low spending continued throughout the decade, confinned by data produced 
for the 1979 Royal Commission on the NHS. This showed that even though current 
expenditure rose in real terms by 20% from 1949 to 1959, this represented a slight 
fall as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. 
For the purpose of the current discussion, the more significant figure is that 
when the increased spending is deflated by NHS cost increases, rather than by the 
general price index, the rise in spending was 29%. During its early history, the 
"relative price effect" worked to the benefit rather than disadvantage of the NHS. 
The main reasons for this are to be found in expenditure on pay, representing 
as it does such a large proportion of total costs. Gaining effective central control 
over pay had been an important Government objective from the outset. 
Unsurprisingly, it showed little desire to respond to criticisms from the Guillebaud 
Committee that terms and conditions of employment reached through national 
agreements were too inflexible. It was certainly unwilling to support their recom-
mendations of a reduced role for central Government in pay determination, 
accompanied by a greater input from employing authorities. In fact, the 
Government had already acted to impose its authority upon employing authorities 
who appeared reluctant to accommodate to the centralism of Whitley. The 1950 
Regional Hospital Board's Report drew attention to this in the inclusion of a report 
from the Comptroller and Auditor General, which noted: 
Rates of wages for hospital staffs are settled by Whitley 
machinery or by central negotiation ... The Ministry's auditors 
have reported payments in excess of the approved scales and I 
noticed that some hospital authorities had not adjusted, or had 
declined to adjust, excessive salaries when requested by the 
Ministry to do so. (Regional Hospital Boards, 1950). 
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The Comptroller and Auditor General asked of the Ministry of Health what 
action it proposed to take against local hospital authorities who refused to comply. 
(It is worth noting that the largest occupational groups represented on these bodies 
were medical staff, capable of exercising considerable authority). The Ministry 
responded by making it clear that it, "hoped to persuade hospital boards to comply 
by administrative action but, as a number have not, the question of making regula-
tions is under consideration". 
The inference can be drawn that many local hospital authorities continued to 
hold out, as the Minister subsequently issued the 1951 NHS (Remuneration and 
Conditions of Service) Regulations. These, for the first time, stipUlated that pay to 
NHS staff should, "be neither more nor less than the remuneration so approved." 
Pay was to be tightly constrained for most staff groups, including doctors, 
throughout the 1950's. Salaries of NHS administrative staff fell in real terms by 
twenty per cent (Spoor, 1967). 
This early example of Government pay restraint will itself have had a direct 
impact upon cost increases within the service. More than this, there is evidence to 
suggest that it contributed towards staff shortages among certain groups, a frequent 
response to which was the recruitment of less qualified staff. Such substitution by 
cheaper staff formed a further important element in the containment of costs by the 
NHS throughout its early years. This can be illustrated by considering the situation 
in the psychiatric hospitals. 
These hospitals represented a much larger call upon NHS funds than their 
patient numbers implied. In 1949, while accounting for only 2.6% of all patient dis-
charges, psychiatric hospitals contained 42% of all NHS beds, employing 21.5% of 
all nursing staff, and 31.8% of Registered Nurses. Lack of adequate funding led in 
1952 to the Chairmen of the Regional Hospital Boards bluntly describing the situ a-
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tion to the Ministry of Health, "What we need is more money, more buildings, 
more steel and more staff - none of which seems likely to be available". (quoted in 
Webster, 1988). 
In that same year, nearly three thousand psychiatric beds were closed as a 
consequence of the shortage in nursing staff. By 1956, Cabinet minutes record 
observations by a civil servant that conditions in many mental hospitals were, "a 
disgrace" (Webster, 1988). Yet in 1958/59 the average costs per in-patient week in 
psychiatric hospitals were still less than one-third of those in non-teaching acute 
hospitals. A factor in this continued low spending had been that the problem of 
staff shortages was being dealt with through substitution. 
One initiative for this apparently came from the Nursing Standing Advisory 
Committee, which urged a greater use of Enrolled Nurses. This proposal met con-
siderable opposition from COHSE and others who described it as "dilution". But 
although the opposition to enrolled nurses was successful it did not create extra 
recruitment for Registered Nurses. Between 1949 and 1959 the numbers of 
psychiatric nursing staff rose by nearly eleven thousand, an increase of 34%, but 
nearly three-quarters of these were unqualified staff. The proportion of Registered 
Nurses in the total psychiatric nursing workforce, which had already fallen dramati-
cally from around 53% in the 1930's (according to the Athlone Report), to 32% in 
1949, was just 25% by 1959 (Department of Health Annual Reports). 
In contrast, the proportion of unqualified staff, which the Mental Health 
Standing Advisory Committee had argued should be no more than 20% of all nurs-
ing staff (Webster, 1988), had risen to nearly 43%. Survey data for the period 1949 
to 1956 also indicates that most of the newly recruited unqualified nursing staff 
were women (Webster, 1988). In the period before equal pay, as a high proportion 
of the qualified staff had been male this would have further reduced pay costs. 
Given the strength at this time of COHSE within psychiatric hospitals, their 
inability to prevent this substitution must in part be accounted for by the character 
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of what they were seeking to defend, the status of the Registered Mental Nurse 
(RMN). A variety of evidence suggests that this status provides a good example of 
ways in which definitions of skill come to be socially constructed. That three years 
was required for their training may not have been always reflected in the "objec-
tive" skills which many of them possessed. Certainly their levels of academic 
attainment were lower than for other nurses: the Athlone Report indicated that the 
proportion of Registered Nurses in 1937 who had undergone elementary school 
education only was 25% in the voluntary sector, 71 % in the municipal sector, and 
92% in the mental hospitals (Abel-Smith, 1961). 
From the immediate post-war years several accounts exist to suggest a low 
standard of training for RMN's. These include the example of a student RMN who 
spent three years working in the hospital gardens to find himself qualified to take 
charge of a ward (Carpenter, 1988). In 1953 the Oxford Area Nurse Training Com-
mittee observed that, "student nurse training in the majority of mental hospitals had 
been merely a token atlair." (quoted in White, 1985). 
If the pressures for labour substitution came from the impact of central finan-
cial control, opportunities for it were created by the nature of the skill which the 
unions were seeking to defend. The situation was rather different in the general 
hospitals. Here, between 1949 and 1959, the numbers of nursing and midwifery 
staff rose by 39%, an overall figure not very different to that in the psychiatric sec-
tor. The proportion of unqualified staff which this included was however noticeably 
less, rising from 15% to 18% of the total. At the same time, the proportion of 
registered nurses also rose, from 27.4% to 31.2% (Department of Health Annual 
Reports). Some of this difference is attributable to a greater use of part-time staff in 
general hospitals; survey data from the period 1949-56 indicates that of a total 
increase of 12,500 part-time nursing staff, over 82% was in the non-psychiatric sec-
tor (Webster, 1988). Even so, the numbers of full-time Registered Nurses also con-
tinued to grow in the general hospitals. 
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However, two underlying processes were occurring which were to have an 
impact upon staffing in this sector. The flrst of these arose from the non-
reintroduction of educational entry requirements for nurse training which had been 
removed during the war years. White (1985) has argued that the General Nursing 
Council (ONC) acted as an agency for Government recruitment policy in this 
period, participating in the deskilling of nurses. She quotes from a 1957 report of 
the South East Metropolitan Area Nurse Training Committee, which indicated that 
the work pattern of student nurses depended more on the number of ward domestics 
than on their training needs. White argues that the consequence of the open entry 
system was that it brought in an emphasis on the "practical" nature of nursing, with 
any interest in an academic or theoretical basis being actively discouraged. 
The second aspect related to the introduction of Enrolled Nurses into general 
hospitals. While their numbers had not yet reached a significant proportion of total 
staff, patterns for the future were beginning to be shaped in rising recruitment for 
pupil nurse training. This similarly appeared to emphasise the practical character of 
nursing work. The rising proportion of unqualified staff in the psychiatric hospitals, 
together with the "open entry" policy in the general hospitals, each contributed 
towards constraining costs. With such a large proportion of the total staff then 
working in psychiatric hospitals, savings in this sector must be identified as having 
made a substantial contribution to limiting the aggregate NHS pay bill. In addition, 
these changes were beginning to reshape the composition of the nursing workforce 
itself. 
Meanwhile, the "productivity" of staff increased as the number of patients 
being treated was rising. During the 1950's the number of in-patient discharges 
and deaths rose by 35.7%, almost double the rate of increase in the number of nurs-
ing staff of 18.2% (Department of Health Annual Reports). Patient throughput in 
psychiatric hospitals rose particularly dramatically. Between 1949 and 1959 there 
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was a 93% rise in the number of psychiatric discharges, attributable mainly to the 
introduction of chlorpromazine in 1952 and other drugs soon after. 
The extent to which the "drugs revolution" shaped the direction being taken 
reflected above all the dominance of the medical profession. One prominent 
psychiatrist described the new drugs as providing a means for meeting, "the urgent 
need to bring psychiatric treatment back again into line with general medicine." 
(Sargant, 1967, p200). Other therapeutic techniques had been advanced; the 
replacement of the asylums by smaller hostels had been discussed in 1949, and 
experiments with "therapeutic communities" were in progress in the early 1950's. 
The first, however, required more capital, and the second needed far more staff. 
Extending the use of drugs within existing institutions, while being clinically led by 
doctors, proved cost-effective and to that extent met the demands being placed 
upon the service by the Treasury. 
There was a less spectacular increase in patient throughput in the general 
hospitals, rising by one-third from 1949 to 1959 (Department of Health Annual 
Reports). This was due to falling average lengths of stay which were accompanied 
by a shift from longer stay medicine to surgery. To some extent this can also be 
attributed to changes in clinical methods and technique: again doctors were able to 
determine its direction because of their ideological and organisational influence. 
Beyond this was the influence of social changes, and corresponding reductions in 
mass diseases of earlier eras, such as tuberculosis. 
During the 1950's, the Government was able to control costs; only in the case 
of adherence to national pay agreements does it appear to have found it necessary 
to directly and explicitly control action from the centre. The rest it was able to 
achieve indirectly and, most importantly, within the existing relations of power in 
the health service. Early indications of change in this situation began to emerge by 
the 1960's 
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New attention to efficiency in the 1960's 
Numbers of patients being treated continued to grow throughout the 1960's, 
with the figures for deaths and discharges from hospitals in England rising by one-
third, from 3.78 million in 1959 to 5.0 million in 1969 (Department of Health 
Annual Reports). The most significant factor in this was a continuing decline in 
average length of hospital stay. Spending on the NHS continued to increase, rising 
in real terms by 59%, but unlike the situation in the 1950's this now began to 
represent a growing proportion of the Gross Domestic Product. By 1966 NHS 
spending accounted for 4.3% of GNP (Royal Commission, 1979). 
From the available data, the underlying problem appears to have been that the 
"relative price effect" was no longer working to the advantage of the NHS. Costs 
within in it were beginning to rise faster than in the economy as a whole. The con-
sequence was that when the rising expenditure is deflated by an NHS price index 
the real increase, in volume terms, was 29.9%. 
Although this is virtually identical to the increased spending in volume terms 
during the 1950' s, it now involved a much bigger claim on Exchequer funds. The 
difference between the two decades was thus the cost imposed on the Treasury and 
not the real volume of resources available within the NHS. This had particular 
implications as it coincided with early indications of the a slackening in post-war 
economic growth. As a result, the state began to play a new role in examining 
efficiency and productivity within the health care sector. 
The fust indications of this can be traced to the establishment of a committee 
on hospital efficiency in 1959. This was followed by a plethora of "hospital 
efficiency studies", expenditure on which rose considerably, from £18,000 in 
1963/4 to £250,000 in 1966/7 (Klein, 1983). The period has been described as one 
dominated by the, "politics of technocratic change", in which an, "ideology of 
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efficiency" gained dominance (Klein, 1973). In this process several writers have 
applied Alford's model of structured interest groups, with it being characterised as 
one in which challenges to dominant "professional monopolists" were coming from 
"corporate rationalisers" (Alford, 1975). 
Although there is evidence to support such an assessment, as in one historical 
account of Leeds Regional Hospital Board between from 1948 and 1974 (Ham 
1981), the impact of this process should not be over-stated. The biggest challenge 
at this time was being made to groups of staff such as ancillary workers and nurses, 
rather than to doctors. It was a challenge, moreover, having its origins above all in 
state involvement designed to raise levels of efficiency (Carpenter, 1977; Manson, 
1979). One consequence of this was evident in early moves towards a greater 
degree of central directive (Navarro, 1978). Staff groups which were weakest 
within the "matrix of social power" (Offe, 1984), were to be most directly affected 
by the emerging adoption of new managerial systems within this context. 
The impact which "managerialism", founded upon models of rational 
decision-making, had upon the NHS is described by Haywood and Alaszewski 
(1980): 
The traditional view of health care as outside normal economic 
and managerial relations was accordingly replaced by a 
managerial perspective, based on models derived from indus-
trial organisations. (Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980, p33). 
The "injection of capitalist rationality" is described by Fryer et at (1978), 
pointing to 1960's reports on ancillary staff from the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes, and on nursing staff from the Salmon Committee, which criticised the 
quality of existing management within the respective service. Further examples of 
incipient central control in the overall structure of health care include the 1962 
Hospital Plan, in which local services were to be organised around large District 
68 
General Hospitals (DGH), and the introduction by the Ministry of Health nonns for 
lengths of hospital stay (Manson, 1979, p37). 
These, however, cannot be judged to represent a major challenge to medical 
dominance which, if anything, could be seen as being bolstered by the emphasis 
given to the new DGH's. What, however, becomes most apparent from this period 
is that the new emphasis upon efficiency and rationality did not produce the desired 
results in terms of financial savings. Two reasons may be identified as significant 
in this; firstly, an unintended consequence of earlier shifts towards a less qualified 
nursing workforce, and secondly, the limited extent to which managerial authority 
was encroaching upon doctors and choices of clinical technique. 
On the first of these, staff numbers continued to rise during the 1960's. Nurs-
ing staff increased by 38%, similar to the proportionate increase in the preceding 
decade. However, continuing a trend which had begun to emerge earlier, some of 
the biggest expansion occurred among Enrolled Nurses. This continued to reflect 
the "practical" emphasis being given to nurses, as did the fact that the proportion of 
trainee nurses within the total nursing workforce fell from 31.9% in 1959 to 26.6% 
in 1969. Of this latter group, 28% were pupil nurses, training for enrolment rather 
than registration (Department of Health Annual Reports). The dilemma this created 
for funding arose from the fact that, not only were they replacing Registered 
Nurses, but the previously large numbers of very low paid student nurses were 
increasingly being replaced by not quite so low paid Enrolled Nurses. 
Similarly, a traditional practice in many psychiatric hospitals, of patients 
assisting with ward routines became more difficult to sustain. Increasingly, they 
came to be replaced by ancillary staff. Again, though such staff were low paid (in 
1966 male ancillary staff came 123rd in the 129 groups whose earnings were pub-
lished by the Ministry of Labour; NBPI, 1971), they were nevertheless more expen-
sive than the groups they were being used to replace. This inevitably undermined 
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the financial goals which labour substitution, and the new managerial attention to 
work organisation, were seeking to secure. 
Beyond this, relatively little impact was being made upon the authority of 
doctors. One attempt during the decade, through the 'Cogwheel Report', sought to 
introduce more checks upon medical practice but, unlike the case for nursing and 
ancillary staff, doctors secured a large influence in its implementation. New clinical 
techniques were however beginning to emerge which were not subjected to the 
kind of scrutiny being directed towards other staff groups. 
Increasing pressures in the 1970's 
By the late 1960's the once-only impact of substituting high numbers of stu-
dent nurses, and patient labour in psychiatric hospitals, had been felt upon rising 
costs. From this time, an important outcome for total labour costs increasingly 
became the internal composition of the paid labour force. While general trends that 
this took can be identified, and are discussed below, these concealed considerable 
local divergencies. Because of the importance these had for subsequent 
Government and managerial responses, attention must also be given to the charac-
ter of such variations. 
The task of restraining costs was seemingly made harder in the context of pay 
rises achieved by several staff groups in the early 1970's. Each of the two largest 
occupational categories, ancillary staff and nurses, saw considerable improvements 
in their relative pay. Average earnings for male ancillary workers rose from 81.2% 
of average male manual earnings in 1970, to 91.2% by 1975, and for women the 
comparable figures were 99.3% and 120.2% (ASC Trade Union Side, 1984). Some 
of these costs may have been offset; as a study of London hospitals for the period 
1968-74 found, increases in relative pay during the early 1970's was a significant 
factor reducing levels of ancillary staff turnover (Williams et ai, 1979). Nurses 
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achieved substantial pay increases as a result of the 1974 Halsbury award, one 
which since then has frequently been used as a bench-mark by union negotiators. 
As then might be expected, NHS costs continued to rise. From 1969 to 1977 
Exchequer spending on the NHS rose in real terms by 47.5%, continuing approxi-
mately the same annual average increase as in the 1960's, and by 1977 NHS spend-
ing had risen to 5.2% of GNP. However, two points on this need to be noted. Fir-
stly, this was not solely a British phenomena; levels of increase were in fact 
generally greater elsewhere. For example, in France between 1966 and 1977, 
spending rose from 5.1 % to 6.8% of GNP, in West Germany from 4.8% to 8.0% in 
1975 (Abel-Smith, 1984), and in the USA from 6.1 % in 1965 to 8.6% in 1975 (Pol-
litt, 1983). Even though British health care spending was low by international 
standards, by the mid-1970's it created particular difficulties for the state as a con-
sequence of the deeper profitability crisis being experienced by British capitalism. 
Secondly, and at first sight paradoxically, the increases in spending equated 
to an annual average increase in volume terms of 4.1 %, compared to 3.3% in the 
1960's (Royal Commission, 1979). In other words, despite the increases in pay 
achieved by several staff groups, the situation had again been reached in the early 
1970' s where costs within the NHS were rising less quickly than in the economy as 
a whole. A major factor in this must have been the continuing decline in the 
proportion of Registered Nurses, the proportion of which fell from 33.1 % of the 
total nursing workforce in 1969 to 30.4% in 1977. Increasingly they were being 
replaced by a growth in unqualified nursing assistants, the proportion of whom rose 
from 21.5% to 26.9% in the same period (Dept. of Health Annual reports). 
Although the 1960's also saw the growth of new professional groups, in relative 
terms they represented a small proportion of the workforce. The general trend con-
tinued to be towards a less-qualified -or unqualified workforce. 
While these changes in the composition of the workforce helped to contain 
rising costs, new pressures arose from the fact that, for the first time in the history 
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of the NHS, there was a slowdown in the growth in patient throughput. Largely this 
can be attributable to developments in medical techniques which significantly 
increased the number of diagnostic tests and procedures for patients. For example, 
while the number of non-psychiatric discharges rose by less than 9% from 1969 to 
1979, there was a 64% increase in the number of hospital pathology requests (Dept. 
of Health Annual reports). Again, this illustrates the continuing dominance of med-
icine upon the control over clinical techniques. Whatever the merits of the greater 
range of diagnostic procedures, one consequence was an apparent fall in produc-
tivity. 
In this situation, centralising processes within the NHS continued. The 1974 
reorganisation, frequently presented as representing a move towards service 
integration, has also been described as a major centralising project which streng-
thened, "primarily, the class dominance and, secondarily, the professional 
dominance of this system." (Navarro, 1978, p58). 
Its centralising tendencies were evident in changes which occurred in 
proposals for the new structure. The Labour Government's first Green Paper in 
1968 had proposed accountability being between Area Health Authorities and cen-
tral Government, with the addition by the time of the second Green Paper, in 1970, 
of a Regional Health CounciJ, having planning and advisory functions but no 
executive authority. Its role was considerably extended by the time of the Con-
servative Government's White Paper in 1972, which described an intention to 
create, "a clear line of responsibility for the whole NHS from the Secretary of State 
to the Regional Health Authorities and through them to the Area Health Author-
ities, with corresponding accountability from area to region to centre." (White 
Paper, 1972). 
A further example of centralising processes came in the second half of the 
1970's, in the form of new systems of funding allocation. These were primarily 
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designed to counter existing inequalities in the distribution of resources. Wide 
variations in regional funding had their origins in allocations being based upon his-
toric costs, a consequence of which had been to continue pre-NHS disparities in 
funding. The Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) was established as a 
means of moving towards a system of funding based more closely upon current 
need. Other inequalities in resources reflected a long-standing bias in provision 
towards the acute hospital sector, and from 1976 central policy required Health 
Authorities to direct funds to services for the elderly and mentally ill, described as 
the "priority groups". 
Because the RA WP formula was being applied in a period of public spending 
cuts it created considerably difficulties for those areas who were "losers", notably 
London. So far as the shifting of resources to the "priority groups" was concerned, 
Haywood and Alaszewski (1980) suggest that many local obstacles could be used 
to delay its implementation. This suggests some qualification may need to be made 
to Navarro's observation quoted above, relating to the nature of class dominance in 
the restructured health service. 
Undoubtedly, the changes significantly increased business influence in 
Health Authorities, with doctors being replaced by company directors as the single 
largest occupational group among their membership. Nearly half of the Regional 
Chairmen, and one-third of Area Chairman, were from a business background 
(Navarro, 1978). The medical profession nevertheless secured continued influence, 
and veto, through its representation on the new District Management Teams. 
While, personnel specialists emerged for the first time within the new struc-
tures, signalling a recognition of the new industrial relations issues arising at a local 
level, medical staff remained relatively unaffected by such developments. In the 
local "negotiation of order" their influence remained paramount. A consequence of 
this for the internal management of hospitals was described in a DHSS handbook of 
1972: 
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The management arrangements required for the NHS are dif-
ferent from those commonly used in other large organisations 
because the work is different (DHSS, 1972). 
Despite significant moves towards the creation of a more centralised struc-
ture, evidence is available which suggests continuing local divergencies. These 
indicate that many issues continued to be determined locally, and in this reflected 
the combined influence of historic funding inequalities and current power relations. 
An example of this is staffing levels and mixes, illustrated in the data on staffing in 
four selected mental hospitals in the mid-1970's shown in Table 3.1. 
Table ~.1: Staff/patient ratios per 100 resident patients in selected mental ill-
ness hospitals with over 200 beds, 1976 
Qualified 
ENGLAND 30.9 
Mapperly (Trent RHA) 43.8 
Moorbaven (SW RHA) 32.7 
St Edwards, Leek 19.5 
(W Midlands RHA) 
Source: DHSS (1976) 
Nurses 
Unqual. 
26.8 
42.1 
28.4 
19.1 
Domestic 
service 
11.9 
19.7 
12.9 
8.7 
It is interesting to note that variations in staff/patient ratios appear broadly 
consistent across the work-groups. This suggests that while the Treasury had long 
secured control over pay levels, no such central authority existed over the structure 
of the workforce. Moves towards a more uniform level of staffing had been made, 
as with the NBPI Reports on ancillary staffing levels, but the impact of these had 
been relatively limited. In this context, the overall trends in workforce composition 
should be seen as the product of short-term responses to financial pressures and 
labour markets rather than necessarily reflecting strategic intent. 
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By the end of the 1970's, indications of further changes in state policy were 
being signalled. Widespread criticism of the structure of the NHS were reported by 
the 1979 Royal Commission on the NHS, with attention particularly directed 
towards its local organisation. Complaints of "consensus management" creating 
indecision and delay led to the Commission hinting at the possibility of a "Chief 
Executive" role, a solution previously considered and rejected for the NHS on the 
grounds that clinical autonomy made it inappropriate. This issue was not to be 
determined until the 1980's. 
The Royal Commission also directed attention to the structure of the work-
force and numbers and types of staff required, finding little in the way of 
universally accepted staffing levels and mixes. Difficulties this created for attempts 
to rationalise the process of manpower planning were noted by the Royal Commis-
sion: 
It is impossible with our present state of knowledge to say how 
many workers the NHS needs and of what type: roles are not 
always clearly defined, the level of training required may not 
always be clear, and the difficulty of establishing standards of 
qUality ... is reflected in the absence of generally accepted 
staffing standards. (Royal Commission, 1979). 
These issues, the relationship between managerial control and clinical 
autonomy, and the structure of the workforce, were not then resolved by the "first 
wave" of managerialism in the NHS. The extent to which managerial control had 
encroached upon existing patterns of work remained relatively limited. The search 
for new local solutions to these problems was to have particular consequences in 
the context of an increasing commitment to the market as a mechanism for 
efficiency in the 1980's. 
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A "New Managerialism": 1979-91 
The objectives of change since the late 1970's demonstrate considerable con-
tinuity with earlier periods, with issues such as pay determination, the Structure of 
the workforce, and the goal of greater efficiency, being to the fore. The character it 
took was however conditioned by two important influences: increasing financial 
restraint and later a renewed ideological support for market solutions. 
Following the agreement between the Labour Government and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund in 1976 health spending by the late 1970' s was projected to 
rise by just 1.8% a year, the lowest growth rate since 1948 (Navarro, 1978). Ini-
tially these cuts had the greatest impact upon capital spending, a relatively easy 
target as they had been in the 1950's. Despite continuing cutbacks under the Con-
servative Government expenditure continued to grow, rising to 6.0% of GNP in 
1982 (Abel-Smith, 1984). By the later part of the decade this had fallen again, to 
5.2% of GNP (Socialist Health Association, 1988). 
This, together with demographic changes and advances in medical techni-
ques, led the House of Commons Social Services Committee to calculate that by 
1987/88 the NHS needed a further £1.9 billion to maintain the real level of funding 
of 1980/81. Additionally, spending on health care in Britain continued to remain at 
levels lower than in most comparable countries. 
The problems this created for controlling costs on the one hand, and main-
taining output on the other, are discussed below under the following five headings: 
pay determination, restructuring work, management control, privatisation, and 
competition. In many ways these policy issues were closely intertwined, but there 
is value in exploring them separately at this stage in order to clarify issues to be 
addressed within the case study. 
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Pay Determination 
Alongside the desire to hold down public sector pay, the years since 1979 
have been dominated by two sets of concerns relating to pay determination: the 
criteria to be used and the level at which it is dealt with. The former included a 
brief experience of comparability, the extended use of pay review bodies, market-
based arguments and a limited introduction of individual performance review. The 
latter has revolved around questions about more localised determination. These 
questions of "how" or "where" became increasingly inter-connected as proposals on 
pay determination advanced during the decade. 
By 1979 the Labour Government's pay policy had assisted in the creation of 
several earnings anomalies among nursing and ancillary staff. For example, hourly 
rates for domestic staff, relatively low at £1.18, were in fact slightly higher than 
those of a nursing assistant, at £1.15, and represented 91 % of the hourly rate for an 
Enrolled Nurse, and 79% of that of a staff nurse (IDS Reports). When differential 
enhancements are included, such as overtime and weekend rates, the gap could be 
further narrowed. One effect of this was to reduce the cost advantage of the greater 
employment of lower qualified staff evident in much of the 1960's and 1970's. In 
addition, NHS pay appeared not only low in absolute terms but unfair in its internal 
relativities. 
An increasingly untenable policy culminated in the so-called "winter of dis-
content" in 1978-79, which brought into being the intended "standing" Commission 
on pay comparability. While both major political parties committed themselves in 
the 1979 election to accepting the Clegg recommendations, in the wake of the Con-
servative victory the Commission was quickly dispatched. By 1982 the operation of 
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a de facto pay policy in the public sector created a new wave of industrial unrest in 
the NHS. 
The importance of this dispute, which as with the earlier one is discussed in 
Chapter Four, for the present discussion lies in its role in extending the coverage of 
pay review bodies (PRB's) to the majority of NHS staff. Largely this was as a 
result of the establishment of the PRB for Nurses and Midwives. As has been noted 
by the House of Commons Select Committee on Social Services, staff covered by 
PRB's have experienced higher pay increases than have those remaining within the 
purview of Whitley Councils. 
Ancillary staff experienced a substantial fall in their real pay in both relative 
and absolute terms. Average gross weekly earnings for male ancillary staff had 
declined to 71.8% of those for all male manual workers in 1989, compared to 88% 
in 1980. While a hospital domestic CASC Scale 1) saw her basic hourly rate rise 
between 1979 and 1990 by 120%, taking into account the 1980 reductions in work-
ing hours a nursing assistant experienced a 164% increase, and Enrolled Nurses and 
Staff Nurses saw rises of 219% and 220% respectively (IDS Reports). The 
Government's stated intention of linking the establishment of PRB's to "profes-
sional" groups refusing to engage in industrial action, though breached in reality, 
symbolised a desire to fragment the worforce in a way which undermined moves 
towards industrial militancy. 
The Government sought to encourage the PRB' s to take account of market 
factors, as in its evidence submitted for the Nursing and Midwives PRB second 
report which emphasised recruitment as the dominant criteria. In its response the 
PRB cautiously rejected this approach, arguing that several other factors, including 
comparability, needed to be included. Although this limited the scope for 
Government intervention in evaluation criteria, it was able to control the costs of 
awards by staging their implementation, or providing only partial funding for them 
from the centre. 
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An alternative system of pay determination for the NHS came with the arrival 
of general management. From the outset, the pay of General Managers was not 
negotiated through the Administrative and Clerical Whitley Council but determined 
directly by the Secretary of State. In September 1986 a DHSS circular instructed 
RHA's and DHA's to introduce performance pay for the approximately eight hun-
dred general managers at regional, district and unit level from September 1987. Up 
to four per cent of their salary could be awarded each year, riSing to a total of an 
additional twenty per cent over five years (The Guardian, 3rd September 1986). 
In early 1988 the NHS Management Board decided that existing pay scales 
for a further 1,200 senior managers were, "no longer appropriate to these new 
posts", and contracts were offered which included the opportunity to earn perform-
ance related pay (PABB, 201). From September 1989 the maximum performance 
pay for General and senior Managers was increased from four to six per cent of 
their salaries, and the Department of Health considered proposals to extend the 
system of performance pay to a further seven thousand middle managers (P ABB, 
21st February 1989). 
Managers meanwhile continued to have very little direct influence over the 
pay of other staff. Changes were implemented in the mid-1980's to increase the 
involvement of managers in the employer side of Whitley Councils, but these did 
not seek to alter the basic arrangements (Leopold and Beaumont, 1986). By the end 
of the decade a far more fundamental review of pay determination was being con-
sidered in reports produced by a range of bodies, from the Select Committee to the 
National Association of Health Authorities. Mostly these were cautious about 
moves towards more localised systems, with an implicit acknowledgement that the 
many difficulties encountered in arriving at an acceptable national system would 
not be removed simply by changing the level at which these were dealt with. 
Of particular interest among the various proposals was one originally surfac-
ing in a report by the National Association of Health Authorities and later 
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developed by a group of NHS managers themselves. This challenged the basis of 
distinctions based upon existing functional Whitley Councils and separate Pay 
Review Bodies, proposing in their place a single pay spine for all staff. However, 
as this proposal coincided with ones from the Government to allow for the estab-
lishment of "self-governing Trusts" the focus of much of the debate on pay 
determination now turned to question of "where" rather than "how". 
Moves towards more localised systems of pay determination in the NHS have 
been highly constrained by the Treasury throughout its history. A change in this 
might create new opportunities for a more genuine local bargaining, but evidence 
that this is occurring is still limited. One question which the case study explores is 
whether changes in NHS organisation and management are giving rise to a renewed 
impetus for this to gather pace. An important context for this is the nature of 
changes simultaneously occurring in the composition of the workforce. 
Restructuring the Workforce 
The shape of the NHS workforce has changed substantially in the 1980's. 
Many factors have influenced this but particular consideration is given here to the 
impact of competitive tendering and associated policies on the ancillary workforce, 
and the restructuring of the nursing workforce. These changes are related to claims 
about moves towards a more segmented and flexible workforces, again to provide a 
context for some of the case study material. 
The 1980's saw a marked departure from earlier trends towards a stable or 
declining proportion of Registered Nurses and increasing numbers of ancillary 
staff. Data on employment (measured in Whole Time Equivalents) of ancillary and 
nursing staff is shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table ~.~: Changes in the nursing and ancillary workforce, 1979-1989 (Whole 
Time Equivalents) 
1979 1989 % change 
Registered Nurses 94,029 139,011 +47.8% 
Enrolled Nurses 53,813 54,931 + 2.1% 
Other nursing staff 80,740 85,741 + 6.2% 
Ancillary staff 171,896 102,360 
- 40.5% 
Source: DHSS (1990) 
Note: The figures in the table are not adjusted for changes in working hours. The reduction in the 
working week for nurses (from 40 to 37.5 hours) would require a 6.5% increase in WJE's to equate 
to the same staffmg level. A one hour reduction in the working week of ancillary staff would equate 
to a 2.5% increase needed to stay the same. 
Without disregarding the significance of competitive tendering for anCillary 
staff it is important to note that it can not be held responsible for all of the decline. 
Although reductions have been greatest among the groups subject to competitive 
tendering, they have not been restricted to these groups or the time period in which 
competitive tendering was implemented. 
Hospital porters, for example, also experienced substantial job cuts, falling 
from 22,710 (WTE's) in 1984 to 17,205 in 1989, a decline of 24.2%. Total hospital 
ancillary numbers in England also fell by 20,000 WTE's from 1980-84, prior to the 
impact of competitive tendering (Dept. of Health Annual Reports). A notable fea-
ture was that 45% of this reduction occurred in the four London Regional Health 
Authorities and the London Post-Graduate Hospitals, those under most severe 
financial pressure as a result of the RA WP formula. Competitive tendering there-
fore provided an additional pressure upon a group already a target for job reduc-
tions. 
In 1983 Health Authorities were instructed by the Government to invite 
tenders for catering, laundry and domestic services. Response from Health Author-
ities to a Government circular in 1980 requesting them to make greater use of pri-
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vate contractors had been muted, with past dissatisfaction with standards obtained 
and concerns over loss of managerial control being expressed (The Times, 15th 
June 1980). A second circular in 1981 received a similar response, and it was not 
until after the 1982 dispute that the Government felt confident in impOSing its 
policy more firmly. Greater emphasis was however placed on the opportunities to 
continue with "in-house" provision, as long as the competitive tendering process 
demonstrated this to be more cost-effective. 
Job cuts among ancillary staff increased rapidly as a consequence of competi-
tive tendering, as shown in Table 3.3. 
Table J.J: Ancillary staff in England (WTE's) 
1979 1984 1989 % change 84-89 
Total 171,896 152,202 102,360 - 32.7% 
of which: 
Catering 29,815 26,056 18,439 - 29.2% 
Domestic 68,900 61,384 36,582 - 40.4% 
Laundry 8,487 7,563 5,273 - 30.3% 
Source: DHSS (1990) 
Savings from competitive tendering have been estimated at £100 million, 
money which was retained by local Health Authorities. If these represent genuine 
savings, and thus improvements in labour productivity, it is important to recall the 
earlier figures on ancillary staff pay. Claims that joint collaboration in efficiency 
gains provide a basis for improvements in earnings are self-evidently not borne out 
in this case. 
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It can be argued that such neo-classical assumptions do not apply in a context 
where Government funding restrictions, coupled with public expectations about 
service delivery, do not allow for this type of distribution to take place. Bargaining 
is not taking place over the rate of profit but over "efficiency savings" and "cost 
improvements" which became essential for service maintenance. 
It is also important to question the extent to which these savings reflected 
genuine productivity gains. In England during the ten years prior to the introduction 
of competitive tendering in 1983, the average number of available beds per WTE 
domestic staff (the measure adopted by the NBPI to measure productivity among 
that group) fell from 6.2 to 5.2, suggesting a fall in "prOductivity" of 16% (Depart-
ment of Health Annual Reports). Following competitive tendering it is necessary to 
allow for the fact that more staff have been employed with private contractors; for 
example, from 1982 to 1987 the value of NHS external cleaning contracts rose 
from £9 million to £56 million. 
This could represent employment levels of perhaps 2,000 and 9,000 respec-
tively, which added to NHS staffing figures, suggests there were about 70,000 
domestic staff in 1982, and about 50,000 five years later (Department of Health 
Annual Reports). Consequently, the ratio of average available beds to WTE 
domestic staff increased during this period from 4.9 to 6.0, close to the 1973 ratio. 
But any suggestion that this implies a "productivity" increase of about one-quarter 
must be severly qualified. Firstly, the introduction of more intense work practices, 
rather than a more efficient use of inputs, may have been occurring. Secondly, there 
is no guarantee that the same level of outputs has been maintained, with the strong 
possibility that that the process has been associated with cuts in service provision. 
Thirdly, while the 1970's increase in domestic staff occurred in a period when 
nursing staff were simultaneously losing many "non-nursing duties" there is some 
evidence to suggest that competitive tendering has transferred work back to nursing 
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staff (McLeod, 1985). A consequence may have been a divergence in trends, one 
towards an intensification of domestic work around routinised specifications, the 
other towards more flexible arrangements among nursing staff. 
In another sense the example might be taken to suggest an element of con-
vergence in the experiences of manual and professional groups, with each coming 
under increasing managerial control in ways which may be seen to undermine 
claims for distinctive professional opportunities. This might particularly be seen to 
be the case in the context of reassessments of existing divisions of labour in the 
NHS. Strong and Robinson (1988) describe the use by some managers of the term 
"tribalism" to describe fragmented "trades" within the health service, each seen as 
having their own histories and cultures. The word is in fact used by the NHS Train-
ing Authority, which suggested in a 1986 handbook that, "coping with this 
'tribalism' of the Service presents some of the biggest challenges to management". 
A writer on the tasks facing general management has similarly claimed: 
An abiding problem in the NHS is that of demarcation bound-
aries between professions ... The current occupational bound-
aries developed historically and seem to relate less and less to 
current work problems. (Edmonstone, 1988). 
The writer goes on to argue, "There can be no professional 'no go' areas. It is 
managerial imperatives which are paramount." (Edmonstone, 1988). Given the 
nature of power relations within the health service, this was likely to present a par-
ticular challenge to the traditional hegemony of medical staff. But whether it might 
give rise to a more general reaction against encroaching managerial control has to 
be considered in the light of the possibility that it may produce variant outcomes 
for different groups of staff. This can be illustrated with reference to proposals for 
outpatient department nursing. 
These were contained in a 1990 Department of Health Report which urged 
the replacement of qualified nurses with unqualified nurses to save costs. A later 
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report, by the Audit Commission in 1992, found one hospital to have followed this 
route had higher unit costs than another which had instead given new tasks, such as 
the counselling of patients, to the qualified staff. Technological developments in 
other fields has similarly provided scope for new work roles in areas, for example, 
where invasive surgery becomes less necessary. 
Changes such as these might provide examples of what might be described as 
"flexible specialisation", but these have arisen alongside more negative experiences 
of contracting-out and temporary contracts. Although this has not created a clear 
bifurcation between a "core" and "peripheral" workforce, some elements of this can 
be seen. The possibility emerges of a small "elite" of more highly trained staff, such 
as nurses, becoming responsible for organising less trained work groups. While 
some staff may benefit others could be disadvantaged as their tasks become 
increasingly routinised and subject to control. This suggests no simple process of 
flexibility, and whether it is likely to create divergence or convergence between 
staff groups remains to be seen. Whichever is the case it directs attention to the 
processes by which managerial control is exercised. 
Management Control 
In understanding changes in systems of managerial control it is important to 
distinguish between Government rhetoric and reality. This particularly concerns 
claims that changes have resulted in a devolution of authority. Although elements 
of this are evident, the following discussion reviews experiences in the context of a 
continuing trend towards the centralisation of control. 
Within months of the Conservative election victory in 1979, the Government 
was embroiled in a dispute over the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Area Health 
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Authorities. This arose from a decision by Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham 
Health Authority to defy a Government order to implement spending cuts. The Sec-
retary of State issued a Direction under s86 of the National Health Service Act 
1977, transferring the functions of the Health Authority initially to the Regional 
Authority, and subsequently to five Commissioners. 
The High Court later found the Secretary of State, "failed to exercise his dis-
cretion properly and the direction was vitiated by his failure." (The Times Law 
Report, 26th February 1980). Partly this was a technicality over the Secretary of 
State's use of the wrong section of the 1977 Act, but it was also implied that the 
AHA should have been given greater opportunity to explore other alternatives. On 
the day following the High Court decision the Secretary of State announced that the 
Government would not be appealing against the decision, but would introduce a 
clause in the forthcoming Health Services Bill to make compliance with cash limits 
a statutory obligation on Health Authorities (The Times, 27th February 1980). 
By 1982 Health Authorities were instructed to impose "efficiency savings" 
capable of releasing 0.5% of budgets for other uses, later to be redesignated as 
"cost improvement programmes". Each Health Authority was required to include 
details of these in its annual programme. In 1984/85 cost improvements had gener-
ated savings of £105 million, a figure which had risen to £153 million in 1985/86. 
As with the previous efficiency savings, these were retained by the Health Author-
ity. However, the TUC claimed that less than half of the £30 million efficiency 
savings achieved in the first year were attributable to improved efficiency, the 
remainder resulted from cutbacks in maintenance programmes and the like (TUC, 
1984). 
In the periodic appointment of RHA Chairmen in 1982, the opportunity was 
taken to ensure appointees were largely supportive of Government policy. This par-
ticularly affected those who had been seen as sympathetic to the health union's pay 
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campaign of that year, six of whom were not re-appointed. With the introduction of 
competitive tendering in the following year, Government powers were reiterated. 
The Minister of Health, Kenneth Clarke, wrote in October 1984 to RHA Chairmen: 
Some authorities may also have been influenced by the argu-
ment that the circular itself is not a binding direction in law. 
This is quite irrelevant and is not any sudden or unexpected dis-
covery .... we look upon our health authorities as partners ... 
However, we have always expected authorities to follow 
government policies and we are entitled to continue to do so. 
(Health & Social Service Journal, 8th November 1984). 
The extent to which Government was capable of exerting pressure to obtain 
conformity to policy is illustrated in the case of Leeds Eastern Health Authority 
which reversed its opposition to competitive tendering when the Regional Health 
Authority threatened to withhold £1 million growth money and £900,000 of spe-
ciality funding (Health Service Journal, 15th May 1986). Similarly, the City and 
Hackney Health Authority reversed an early policy decision not to introduce com-
petitive tendering following advice from their District General Manager which sug-
gested: 
We are likely to be forced to do so either by the region influenc-
ing our money or by the Secretary of State ordering the health 
authority to do so. (Health & Social Services Journal, 7th 
March 1985). 
Despite such evidence of increasing central directive, it remained the case 
that considerable scope for local variations in policy implementation remained. 
This was illustrated in the case of efficiency savings achieved by individual Health 
Authorities, on which the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee noted in 
1985: 
For both years (ie 1984/5 and 1985/6) the target value of cost 
improvements contained in the individual programmes sub-
mitted by different authorities varied significantly ... it seems 
likely that larger savings could be achieved if all authorities 
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tackled the search for cost improvement with equal vigour. 
(National Audit Office, 1986). 
During this period the Government had sought additional mechanisms 
through which to control local behaviour, in the establishment of two new boards 
following recommendations in the Griffiths Report. These were the NHS Super-
visory Board, responsible for overall strategic policy, and the NHS Management 
Board, responsible for "controlling performance". The former, chaired by the Sec-
retary of State for Social Services, included other departmental ministers, the 
Department's permanent secretary, and chief nursing and medical officers. The 
Management Board, while including DHSS officials, was strongly influenced by 
managers from outside: its first Chair was Victor Paige, the Director of Personnel 
was Len Peach (from the non-union IBM), and the Director of Finance was Ian 
Mills (from Price Waterhouse accountants). 
This appeared to be a structure designed to distinguish between the strategic 
and the operational, but by 1986 tensions appeared. In June of that year Victor 
Paige resigned as Chair of the Management Board, complaining about Ministerial 
interference in his work. Len Peach was appointed acting Chair, but it was not until 
October that a permanent replacement was found. The possibility of further conflict 
between appointees and Government was removed by the appointment of the 
Health Minister, Tony Newton, with Roy Griffiths as Deputy Chair (The Guardian, 
3rd October 1986). 
Before long, critical voices were being raised within the NHS about the 
increasing centralisation of control. At a meeting of the fourteen Regional Chairs in 
December 1986, the Wessex Regional General Manager complained in a confiden-
tial paper that Government control of the Management Board, and increasing cen-
tralisation within the NHS, were threatening to erode the power of Health Author-
ities (The Guardian, 29th December 1986). By June 1987 the Director of the 
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National Association of Health Authorities was complaining that lines of com-
munication were developing between General Managers, through regional 
managers to the NHS management Board, detracting from their accountability to 
local Health Authorities. He claimed General Managers were being seen as, "a 
more direct and efficient means for ensuring the implementation of central policy." 
(The Guardian, 18th June 1987). 
While these criticisms were emphasising the threat to Health Authority 
powers, a different line was maintained by Victor Paige in a paper for the House of 
Commons Social Services Committee. In this he again criticised the degree of 
Government control, but argued instead for an independent corporate body to 
manage the NHS (The Independent, 4th June 1987). Although this was to be closer 
to what eventually emerged, changes were introduced in a way which ensured con-
tinuing control from senior politicians and civil servants. 
Throughout this period further pressure was being applied to general manage-
ment at a local level to operate on a more commercial basis. An example of this 
came in an announcement from the DHSS in 1987 that Health Authorities were 
required to raise funds through "income generation", expected to generate £20 mil-
lion in 1988-89, rising to £37 million over three years. In April 1988 Health 
Authorities were instructed by the DHSS Income Generation Unit: 
To prepare action plans which will identify and pursue those 
business opportunities which will enable them to capitalise as 
quickly and profitably as possible on their local resources. 
(Quoted in Socialist Health Association, 1988). 
By 1989 a highly centralised structure had within it an increasingly commer-
cial ethos. At this time came a further change, designed to establish mechanisms for 
overseeing implementation of the White Paper, Working for Patients. A Policy 
Board, Chaired by the Secretary of State for Health and responsible for NHS 
strategy and objectives, replaced the Supervisory Board. A new NHS Management 
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Executive, responsible for operational matters, was also established in the place of 
the Management Board. Of particular interest is the fact that the composition of the 
Policy Board, responsible for strategic objectives, now also ret1ected business 
experience. The Department's Senior Nurse, who had sat on the Supervisory 
Board, was taken off (though this decision was subsequently reversed), and the 
Chief Medical Officer was given a seat in a personal capacity only. New members 
include Sir Graham Day (Chair of the Rover Group and Cadbury Schweppes, and 
former chief executive of British Shipbuilders), Sir Robert Scholey (Chair of 
British Steel) and Sir Kenneth Durham (Deputy Chair of British Aerospace). The 
involvement of business people was an extension of a process long evident; what is 
new was the strategic rather than purely operational role they were given. 
General management at local level provided a vital piece in the "chain of 
command" from the Policy Board, through Regional and then District General 
Managers. No longer was the NHS to be regarded as different from other work 
organisations, as had still been the case in the early 1970' s. Instead, as Roy Grif-
fiths observed: 
We have been told that the NHS is different from business in 
management terms, not least because the NHS is not concerned 
with the profit motive and must be judged by wider social 
standards which cannot be measured. These differences can be 
greatly overstated. The clear similarities between NHS manage-
ment and business management are much more important 
(Griffiths, 1983). 
Taken together, the cost improvement programmes, competitive tendering 
and income generation schemes were by 1989 producing annually recurring 
savings of at least £300 million. While representing a relatively small proportion of 
the total NHS budget, in the context of Government failure to match funding to 
increasing demand it represented a vital means of obtaining resources for growth at 
local level. The fact that it had taken ten years to arrive at this stage is itself indica-
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tive of the difficulties the centre continued to experience 10 controlling local 
activity. By altering the "matrix of social power" (Offe, 1985) from the top, 
however, the Government had still not been able to guarantee absolute compliance. 
Managers were forced to confront existing identities and culture if they were to 
succeed in asserting their authority. 
Commenting on this problem, one writer on general management has sug-
gested that managers will need to secure local "alliances" in order to achieve their 
objectives (Thompson, 1987). While reference is made in this particular case to the 
public and users of health care, there has been little evidence of this having 
occurred. Nevertheless, the notion may remain a useful one in considering how 
managers seek to build support for their action at a local level, including the role of 
alliances within the service as well as outside of it. 
Attempts to reshape the basis upon which the local negotiation of order 
occurs have arisen in the context of two further important elements of policy; 
privatisation and the injection of competition. Although closely linked, they are 
considered separately in order to clarify important points of difference. In discuss-
ing privatisation a broad definition is adopted, to include a range of attempts to 
alter the character of paid employment in health care, including an increasing 
reliance upon unpaid domestic labour as well as an extension to the role of the pri-
vate sector. 
Privatisation 
Moves towards privatising services continued throughout the 1980's, from 
contracting out of services to the growth of private hospitals and nursing homes. 
Following the introduction of competitive tendering, although many services were 
won "in-house", contracts gained by the private sector were also considerable. The 
value of external contracts for catering, laundry and domestic services rose from 
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£16.7 million in 1983 to £110.6 million in 1990 (Department of Health, Annual 
Reports). Numbers of nursing staff employed in private hospitals and homes also 
rose, in the case of qualified staff from 30,000 to 36,000 in the single year of 1987 
to 1988. Interestingly, the increase in the number of unqualified nursing assistants 
was even greater, rising from 33,000 to 43,000 (Mackay, 1989). The introduction 
of competitive tendering has already been discussed, here attention is given to the 
private hospital sector and the transfer of work from paid to unpaid labour. 
Substantial Government encouragement has been given to the private sector, 
through for example the removal of development restrictions and the granting of 
tax relief to some private health insurance policy holders. One consequence has 
been that 17% of all elective (ie non-emergency) surgery is carried out in private 
hospitals (HMSO, 1989).Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of private health 
insurance during the early 1980' s was not sustained. A factor in this was that the 
recruitment from social classes III and IV, more likely to experience worse health, 
was pushing up costs and hence premiums (Loney, 1986). 
A notable aspect of the growth in acute private hospitals in the 1980's was 
the trend towards concentration of ownership, with the number of major operators 
being reduced to a small number of large companies. Coinciding with this, the 
Government actively encouraged joint schemes between Health Authorities and the 
private sector. However, the removal of pay bed restrictions, together with "income 
generation" requirements, also served to encourage Health Authorities to compete 
for private work themselves. Increasing amounts of private work were being per-
fonned within the NHS, with the income it generated rising by 19% in the year 
1990-91 alone (The Guardian, 2nd April 1991). 
Overall, developments in the acute hospital sector suggest not so much an 
outright privatisation, as an incremental blurring of boundaries between the public 
and private sector. This has served to constrain a larger scale growth in acute pri-
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vate hospitals. A more direct encouragement to involve the private sector is evident 
in the care of patients discharged from hospitals under "care in the community" 
policies. There has been substantial growth in private nursing and residential 
homes, encouraged by their eligibility for DSS benefits. In turn this created its own 
financial pressures for the Government, intended to be resolved through proposals 
to direct new money through local social service departments. These will operate as 
"purchaser" rather than as direct "provider", with requirements imposed upon them 
to purchase predominantly from the private sector. 
Care in the community pOlicies have also involved privatisation from the 
public to the domestic sphere. Attempts to deal with problems arising from the past 
underfunding of services for the elderly, mentally ill and mentally handicapped 
imposed considerable financial demands on the NHS. DHSS data indicates that 
spending on hospitals for the mentally ill and mentally handicapped had risen from 
10.2% of total hospital revenue expenditure in 1964/65 to 17.2% 1979/80 (Depart-
ment of Health Annual reports), and in the context of increasing financial 
stringency these services attracted renewed attention as a potential source for 
savings. 
One means for this was created in new opportunities to transfer work from 
paid to unpaid domestic labour in conjunction with moves away from large institu-
tions. A survey conducted by the DHSS in 1980 had concluded, "the 'cost-
effectiveness' of a package of community based services often depends greatly 
upon the presence of informal care.' (DHSS, 1981). The way in which costs could 
be transferred from the state to the family was illustrated in evidence given by the 
Disablement Income Group to the Social Services Select Committee. This sug-
gested that a family caring for a mentally handicapped member might lose £1,600 
in earnings a year, and add 8% to their weekly household spending plus about 
£3,500 required for capital expenditure during the mentally handicapped person's 
life (HMSO, 1984). 
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The consequence, as the Select Committee's report noted, was that, "the bur-
den of care falls largely on the young person's mother and results in marked finan-
cial, physical and emotional costs". (HMSO, 1984). The extent to which 
responsibilities have been transferred from the public to the domestic sphere is evi-
dent in data from the 1985 General Household Survey, indicating there to be six 
million informal carers of elderly or disabled relatives and friends. Of these, almost 
1.5 million spend twenty or more hours a week providing unpaid help, and over 
one-half of the total have not had a break of longer than one day. 
Privatising work within the family has represented an essential element in the 
Government's programme to contain costs within the health sector while 
simultaneously encouraging the growth of the private sector. This has created twin 
pressures for managers in many ways comparable to those in the private sector 
more broadly. The first has been to identify "core" activities upon which to con-
centrate and those which can be divested, the second has been a greater awareness 
of comparative costs elsewhere. Each of these received further encouragement by 
policies designed to create a more competitive environment for health service 
organisations. 
Markets and Competition 
An increasing role for markets was identified towards the end of the decade 
against the background of a growing financial crisis. Widespread staff protests over 
funding shortages occurred in 1988, and in October of the same year a survey by 
the National Association of Health Authorities found that one-third of Authorities 
were contemplating cuts in services. Only the announcement of an extra £2.2 bil-
lion by the Secretary of State in November eased the pressure. Within the 
Government interest was turning to more fundamental reform, founded upon per-
ceptions expressed in a document produced by the Centre for Policy Studies, "It is 
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not so much a lack of finance as the vastness of the organisation and the lack of any 
competition which is making the NHS squeak and groan". 
Neo-classical assumptions underlying such claims suggest that competition 
provides an effective solution to problems of variable productivity. This has been 
identified as a long-standing issue within the NHS, one to which competitive 
tendering had earlier been directed. However, while competitive tendering has 
undoubtedly reduced costs, it is less clear whether this has involved a narrowing of 
the range which the theory would imply. Data from five selected hospital cleaning 
services indicates that despite overall reductions in costs, relative costs per square 
metre between hospitals remained virtually the same after tendering (Sheaff, 1986). 
This suggests that the prime incentive was the achievement of financial targets. 
Renewed financial pressures provided the opportunity for advocates of 
greater competition to urge its extension. This included the American health econo-
mist, Alain Enthoven, who on a visit to Britain in 1985 suggested that the origins of 
wide variations in performance between different hospitals and districts lay in the 
absence of incentives for efficiency. His proposed "internal market" within the 
NHS was designed to provide such competitive incentives (Enthoven, 1986). At the 
time these proposals gained little support, and interestingly were rejected by the 
NHS Management Board in December 1986. The main advocate of Enthoven's 
ideas on the "internal market" was David Owen, who has described his unsuccess-
ful attempts to persuade the Government to accept them (Owen, 1988). The initial 
disinterest in the proposal was reversed when it came to be embraced by the 
Cabinet sub-committee established to identify solutions for the NHS. 
The system proposed in the 1989 White Paper involved a separation of the 
role of purchaser and provider in a "mixed economy" of health and social care. Pur-
chasers for social care are social services department, while the purchasing of 
health care is split between District Health Authorities and GP fundholders. 
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Changes in provider arrangements included the provision for the establishment of 
"self-governing NHS trusts". The language used by Government Ministers to des-
cribe the degree of competition which is intended has at times changed, but 
however "managed" the market may be, it appears to represent a major break from 
previous systems. 
Following in the wake of earlier changes to managerial systems and culture, 
the greater autonomy enjoyed by NHS Trusts might be expected to reinforce com-
mercial pressures. Some indications have appeared that NHS Trusts may seek to 
enter the market for private health care, particularly as economies of scale within 
the NHS make comparative prices favourable in its direction. For example, charges 
for a private tonsillectomy and associated treatment are £480 at the Freeman NHS 
Trust in Newcastle, compared with £1,100 at a Nuffield Hospital (The Guardian, 
18th May 1991). 
An assessment that such examples of the commodification of health care 
within the NHS is removing any remaining distinctiveness it may possess must 
however be qualified. Firstly, it remains considerably restricted in scope for chang-
ing product lines in response to relative rates of profit. Secondly, unlike many pro-
duction companies, it cannot simply transfer production elsewhere in search of 
cheaper labour or whatever. Thirdly, in the event of market failure, cessation of 
production remains as much subject to political factors as to economic ones. 
This would imply that despite the sequence of changes reviewed in this chap-
ter, a case remains for continuing to treat health care organisations differently in 
analytical terms. The extent of change should not be understated, but it is difficult 
to conclude that it has wholly transformed the nature of social relations within 
health care services. As one writer has observed: 
Within the NHS, while there will be systematic efforts to 
impose and extend "managerialism", it too will comprise com-
plex and contradictory elements, and these will continue to be a 
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source of internal conflict. Structures of control and manage-
ment methods originating in the private sector will continue to 
be imposed on the NHS, but their implementation will be con-
tentious and partial. (Flynn, 1992, pI94). 
In many respects, the centralising tendencies suggest that a strengthening of 
managerial control, within a more competitive market environment, have been 
largely designed to weaken both professional and trade union sources of control 
and influence. Implications this may have for local managerial behaviour, and the 
character of responses to which they give rise from unions and other organisations, 
are considered in more detail in the case study material. To provide a further con-
text for this Chapter Four traces the development of trade unionism in the NHS. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF NHS TRADE UNIONISM 
At the time of the establishment of the NHS, trade unionism was relatively 
weak: within it, particularly when compared with other parts of the public sector. 
The origins of this weakness lay in structural and ideological features of pre-NHS 
organisation which provided the basis for a contrasting array of staff organisations, 
reflecting both sectoral and occupational distinctions. Important in this were differ-
ing definitions of purpose. 
The first part of this chapter explores elements of earlier traditions by com-
paring the influence of industrial models founded upon collective bargaining with 
those of "professionalising" models. The major content of the chapter is then used 
to explore aspects of NHS trade union organisation from 1948 to 1979. This is 
organised in two sections, dealing with the period of union decline, from 1948 to 
1965, and union growth, from 1966 to 1979. The final part considers the impact of 
developments in the 1980's. 
Pre-NHS Trade Unionism: 
Industrial and Professionalising Strategies 
An obvious focus for discussing the relationship between industrial and 
professional models is nursing, particularly in the experiences of the National 
Asylum Workers Union (NAWU) and the College of Nursing. These two organisa-
tions, based within psychiatric hospitals and general hospitals respectively, provide 
examples of very different traditions, one which could be described as unionate, the 
other as professionalising. 
98 
The heartland for pre-NHS health service trade unionism had been 
psychiatric nurses. It was among these staff that the National Asylum Workers 
Union (NAWU) had been established in 1910, gaining national recognition ten 
years later. It negotiated with the Mental Hospitals Association, although the 
national minimum rates were unevenly adopted, only gaining general observance 
by 1939 (TUC, 1981). 
In the local authority hospitals, trade unions had experienced little success in 
recruiting nurses, and for them no national negotiating machinery existed until 
1939. Some ancillary staff were covered through local authority agreements. Col-
lective agreements were virtually unknown in the voluntary hospital sector where 
there were few union members (TUC, 1981). 
Explanations which have been offered to account for the level of unionisation 
among psychiatric nurses have included the existence of a higher proportion of 
male staff, the stronger discipline held by matrons in other hospitals and a stronger 
association with professional rather than manual worker's attitudes in other hospi-
tals (TUC, 1981). Added to this should be the role of occupational class itself. 
Although the role of gender has often been referred to, its actual influence is 
questionable. To give two examples from areas near to that in which the case study 
was conducted; in a dispute at Exeter Asylum the majority of strikers were women, 
while male staff continued to work during a dispute at Bodmin Asylum (Carpenter, 
1988). As Carpenter points out, a decline in the proportion of women members 
occurred as men with trade union backgrounds were recruited into psychiatric nurs-
ing in the 1930's, when it became the Mental Hospital and Institutional Workers 
Union. While this may have reinforced the predominance of the bargaining model, 
it should also be noted that this period coincided with the adoption of a more mod-
erate approach by the union. 
Very evident at this time were social class differences between entrants to 
psychiatric and general nursing. Some indication of this is provided in data on 
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educational qualifications of nurses collected for the Athlone Report of 1937, 
which showed that in 1929 only 17% of probationer nurses in voluntary hospitals 
had finished schooling at elementary level, compared to 94% of probationer mental 
nurses (Abel Smith, 1961). 
If gender provides an inadequate basis for explaining the character or density 
of unionisation in mental nursing, there remain the explanations based on job con-
trol, particularly in the role of matrons, and on professional ideologies. The first of 
these would seem to correspond with Bosanquet's assessment that industrial rela-
tions in, "psychiatric hospitals have always been different", because their staff 
enjoyed a greater degree of job control than was the case for others (Bosanquet, 
1982). 
However, there may be a danger of inverting the causal relationship here. At 
the time of the formation of the NAWU, mental asylums were frequently run on 
dictatorial lines with power vested in the medical superintendent. Rule books 
detailed what staff could and could not do. One superintendent, for example, wrote 
just before the First World War that unions in psychiatric hospitals would be 
tantamount to "mutiny". Without disregarding the influence of other factors, a sig-
nificant aspect seems to have been the rejection of a professionalising strategy by 
the founders of the NA WU for having failed them. The formation of the NA WU 
was itself prompted by dissatisfaction with the Asylum Workers Association 
(A W A), a professional organisation dominated by superintendents and senior 
nurses (Carpenter, 1988). 
The turn towards bargaining for improved conditions of employment brought 
the new union into conflict with the existing power relations. Several early episodes 
of NA WU activity were directed towards challenging aspects of the dictatorial 
regimes within asylums. Many of these are described by Carpenter (1988): for 
example, seeking the abolition of fines for disciplinary offences (Cardiff, 1911), 
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opposition to a policy preventing female nurses from working on male wards (Hull, 
1916) and a strike following the dismissal of the Branch Secretary for "insolence" 
to the Medical Superintendent (Exeter, 1919). This adoption of a more unionate 
identity corresponded with similar developments elsewhere in this period. The 
rejection of a professionalising strategy as a means of extending job control must 
be seen in the context of the class background of many psychiatric nurses. 
As was noted above, that of general nurses in the voluntary hospitals was 
very different. Among this group the more prominent organisation, the College of 
Nursing, was established in 1916 having as its principal objectives the promotion of 
education and training of nurses, explicitly rejecting any comparison with a trade 
union. In 1926 the College opposed a Labour Party policy document on· nursing 
principally because of a sentence which read: 
the only way in which nurses can deal effectively with their 
conditions, and exercise any sort of equality in bargaining 
power, is for the profession to be organized on Trade Union 
lines. (quoted in Abel-Smith, 1961, p132-33). 
Opposition from the College was only defused following a suggestion by 
Beatrice Webb that the words, 'Trade Union' be replaced by, 'purely vocational'. 
Nor were their objections purely based upon the methods of trade union bargaining. 
The College also opposed legislative intervention, as in the case of a parliamentary 
bill presented by Fenner Brockway MP in 1930. This was intended to introduce a 
minimum wage and maximum hours for nurses. In its response, the College stated 
in its journal: 
As long as we take pride in being a 'profession' we. must go to 
work by the voluntary method ... Would doctors, artlsts,,Profes-
sors or university students call in the law to regulate thelf hours 
of study or service? Would they not rather evolve a co~e of con-
duct for themselves, .and from within, as all profesSlOns have 
done before them? (quoted in Abel-Smith, 1961). 
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The significance of this statement lies in what it illustrates about the particu-
lar character of the professionalising strategy being adopted. This was seeking to 
emulate the experience of perceived "successful" professions. The founders of the 
NAWU rejected such a strategy for having failed them, whereas leaders of general 
nursing believed it to represent a viable and appropriate method. 
It faced, however, two major problems. Firstly, it was seeking to identify 
itself with professions whose dominance was achieved in historically highly 
specific circumstances (Johnson, 1972). Secondly, although gender may not ade-
quately explain the growth of trade unionism in psychiatric nursing, the dominance 
of women in general nursing further weakened its opportunities to assert itself as a 
profession. Instead, the gender-structuring of paid employment in health care 
tended to emphasise the "hand-maiden" role of nursing. 
While the NA WU had secured several bargaining gains, the limited success 
achieved by the College had caused it to weaken its opposition to involvement in 
issues concerning pay and conditions by the 1930's. By the time of the estab-
lishment of the NBS, the RCN was able to secure a majority of the staff side seats 
on the Nurses and Midwives Whitley Council. The distinction it had earlier drawn 
between professional status and remuneration was being called into question, yet it 
remained as a source of influence over the character of collective organisation 
within the newly formed NBS. 
The NA WU and the College had each constructed their definitions of purpose 
differently. This had reflected their contrasting class composition, and the occupa-
tional identities to which these gave rise. In turn these were sustained and rein-
forced through socialisation experiences within the workplace. Contrasting charac-
ters of the organisations mirrored those in occupational identities and the ideologies 
surrounding them. Instrumentally, the professionalising strategy proved less suited 
to the changing environment yet elements of its character remained. 
102 
Decline and Growth of NHS Trade Unionism: 1948-1979 
Trade Union Weakness (1948-1965) 
In the early years of the NHS, nursing trade unionism remained concentrated 
in the psychiatric hospitals. The largest organisation here was the Confederation of 
Health Service Employees (COHSE), formed through a merger of the Mental 
Hospital Workers Union (MHWU; formerly the NAWU) and the Poor Law 
Workers Association (PL W A). The latter, the smaller partner, provided a member-
ship base within the ex-municipal hospital sector where local authority unions, 
including NUPE and NALGO, were also organising. Trade unionism had still made 
few inroads into what had previously been the voluntary hospital sector. 
Significantly, despite the extension of collective bargaining machinery as a 
result of the establishment of the NHS, overall the period was one of decline in 
aggregate union membership and density. To a considerable extent this may have 
been a result of the fact that the most rapid employment growth was occurring in 
the previously least organised sectors. In addition, the highly centralised industrial 
relations machinery left little scope for local involvement. This structure had 
developed in the period immediately prior to and during the Second World War and 
largely formed the basis for the new Whitley Councils. The range of issues subject 
to central determination is evident in the fact that of an average of 120 Ministry cir-
culars sent out each year in the 1950's, one-half related to Whitley Council matters 
(Klein, 1983). 
One issue upon which the staff organisations had been able to achieve some 
influence concerned the role of the General Whitley Council. They ensured the 
rejection of Ministry proposals to grant powers for determining all pay and condi-
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tions issues to this Council, instead this was to be under the control of separate 
functional Councils (TUC, 1981). This suggests that individual occupational 
identities were being rigorously defended. 
Given the extension of institutional support in this period, why did unions 
experience such difficulties in recruiting among the newly expanding sections of 
the workforce? One factor is likely to have been the very limited extent to which 
institutional incorporation had developed locally. Even where central directive was 
designed to encourage greater local consultation, the impact appears to have been 
limited. One circular, issued to Hospital Management Committees in 1950, urged 
the establishment of local Joint Consultation Committees, but these enjoyed little 
apparent success (Miles and Smith, 1969). This is attributed to lack of commitment 
among hospital managers, lack of training for representatives, insufficient central 
support, and above all, the refusal of doctors to participate. JCC's were mentioned 
for the last time in a Ministry circular in 1952 (Dimmock, 1977). 
Allied to this, Carpenter (1988) suggests that COHSE's difficulties in making 
inroads into general nursing were significantly affected by the RCN influence in 
training schools. COHSE's ability to recruit among general nurses only gathered 
pace once it attracted members in more senior grades. Furthermore, COHSE did 
not attempt any significant recruitment in general hospitals in the 1950's, at one 
stage seeking separate Whitley Council arrangements for psychiatric hospitals 
(Carpenter, 1988). This suggests the significance, not merely of institutional sup-
port for bargaining purposes, but of a more general incorporation into the prevail-
ing organisational culture. 
Remaining with the example of nursing trade unionism, this point can be 
illustrated by considering contrasting responses by COHSE and the RCN to the 
problems of staff shortages described in the previous chapter. Firstly, it is worth 
noting that minutes of the General Nursing Council from the 1940's record opposi-
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tion from the nursing associations to the "open entry" system to aid recruitment, but 
support from both employers and unions (White, 1985). This illustrates the extent 
to which different definitions of purpose int1uenced the character of responses. 
Similarly, in their responses to nursing staff shortages in the 1950's, COHSE 
sought a solution through improvements in earnings, while the RCN showed 
greater concern with issues concerning the content and delivery of nursing work. 
Neither, strategy, however was to prove successful in the context of financial 
restraint on the one hand, and the state of the external labour market on the other. 
The first nationwide demonstration of industrial militancy in the NHS arose 
in 1956, originating in a claim submitted by COHSE for an additional "psychiatric 
lead" payment as their solution for tackling the problem of staff shortages. The 
strike reportedly involved forty institutions and ten thousand workers (The Times, 
17th February 1956 and 8th March 1956), but the dispute was unsuccessful. This 
led COHSE to tum its attention to securing an alternative objective, the payment of 
overtime rates. A claim for this was eventually submitted to the Industrial Court, 
but was also rejected. This was followed by a period of unofficial industrial action 
including sit-down strikes (quoted by Webster, 1988, from Cabinet and Ministry 
papers of the period). 
Despite this "willingness to act", the under-funding of mental hospitals pre-
sented a major obstacle to COHSE in securing its bargaining objectives. The 
industrial pressure COHSE was able to apply proved no more successful in altering 
this state of affairs than had the appeals from Regional Chairmen for more 
resources for the mental hospitals, described in Chapter Three. With conditions 
within psychiatric hospitals not yet having caught major public attention, the 
powers of each within the matrix of social power appeared relatively weak. 
Somewhat more success initially seemed to have been gained by COHSE in 
its opposition to the Government's own response to nurse shortages, the recruit-
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ment of Enrolled Nurses. Although this solution received support from the Nursing 
Advisory Committee, it had been rejected from within the mental hospitals them-
selves. Opponents included both COHSE and the psychiatrists body, the RMPA 
(Webster, 1988). This alliance of opposition must be judged to have been sig-
nificant in making it successful, illustrating the extent to which local health systems 
were able to operate with some autonomy, particularly where there was a con-
gruence of interests within the locally negotiated order. Yet, without further fund-
ing, the opposition to Enrolled Nurse recruitment had the unintended consequence 
of increasing the recruitment of unqualified nursing staff. 
COHSE's failure to achieve its pay objectives, and ultimately exert control 
over job entry, provided an early portent of the difficulties facing "industrial 
militancy" within the NHS when confronted with an unresponsive Government. 
However, little more in the way of success could be claimed for the response 
adopted by the RCN to the problems of staff shortages. If COHSE's response indi-
cated the dominance of wage bargaining objectives and "industrial militancy", the 
RCN continued to show a desire to 'professionalise' nursing with a greater focus 
upon forms of work organisation. 
Urging the recruitment of more domestic orderlies and clerical staff to release 
nurses, particularly night staff, "for their real nursing duties", (RCN, 1958, p8), the 
RCN sought a strengthening of the position of Registered Nurses through improve-
ments in nurse training and education. By the end of the period, the RCN was 
proposing that trainee nurses should have full student status, nursing schools should 
become more independent from hospitals and provide a more academic education. 
This echoed several points which had been made in the 1947 Wood Report on 
nurse training, but with an equal lack of success. 
The one element in the RCN policy which was of course adopted was the 
increased recruitment of less qualified staff. As the proportion of Registered Nurses 
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within the workforce declined, so too did the organisational base of the RCN. In 
contrast, despite its initial objection to Enrolled Nurses, COHSE proved better able 
to recruit them, together with other staff entering the service at the time. COHSE 
voiced a strong objections to a later RCN 1964 report which recommended that the 
place of learner nurses on the wards should be taken by Enrolled Nurses and a new 
"ward assistant" grade (RCN, 1964). The RCN was now accused by COHSE of 
elitism in reinforcing divisions between Registered and Enrolled Nurses. This was 
despite the fact that, not many years earlier, the recruitment of Enrolled Nurses had 
been described as a policy of dilution by COHSE. 
While neither of the strategies adopted by the RCN and COHSE achieved its 
original intended purpose of maintaining the position of Registered General Nurses 
and Registered Mental Nurses respectively, COHSE went on to demonstrated an 
ability to respond to the changing composition of the workforce. This laid the basis 
for future recruitment opportunities. In championing the interests of the newer 
recruits into nursing against the alleged elitism of the RCN, COHSE also came to 
argue the case for the practical nature of nursing. On one occasion, its General Sec-
retary objected to the influence of American nursing and particularly the model of 
"nurse consultant", arguing that, "nursing education must be related to what hap-
pens in the wards". (quoted in Carpenter, 1988, p322). 
The traditionally more industrial character of COHSE was better suited to 
the changing workforce than was the professionalising strategy of the RCN. Their 
relative success in this sense can be judged, not in terms of their impact on events, 
but the extent to which they each proved capable of accommodating to them. 
Meanwhile, early managerial changes were beginning to further alter the 
social relations within which health unions operated. At first these coexisted with 
earlier forms, as illustrated in the example provided by Carpenter of a strike in the 
early 1960's by a group of hospital domestics protesting at the lack of consultation 
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over the implementation of a productivity scheme. The strike was brought to a 
speedy end by the matron persuading them to return to work (Carpenter, 1988, 
p325). The demise of the matron was formalised in the restructuring of organisa-
tional control proposed by the Salmon Report, into whose recommendations the 
RCN appeared to have some influence but was virtually ignored by COHSE. 
In one sense the Salmon Report appeared to respond to some of the RCN's 
concerns, in particular in noting, "a seeming inability on the part of nurses to assert 
the rights of their emergent profession" (Salmon, 1966). In recommending new 
management structures as the solution, it created new nursing hierarchies which 
further bureaucratised workplace relations without, however, achieving the 
organisational influence its proponents had desired. 
It was in this context that concerns over pay began to assume increasing 
importance. Pay restraint had exacerbated problems of staff shortages and the level 
of staff grievances: in 1962 a proposed pay offer of 2.5% led to a series of public 
protests and the organisation of a ballot on industrial action by COHSE, with the 
RCN also playing a prominent role in separate activities (Carpenter, 1988, p31O-
315). Despite the willingness of the RCN to take a higher profile on pay-related 
matters, COHSE became more visible outside of its traditional heartlands, with 
much of its activity now being centred around general nurses. Membership rose and 
its composition changed as the recruitment of more general nurses also raised the 
proportion of women members. 
If the catalyst for the introduction into general nursing of more traditional 
forms of trade union organisation was Government incomes policy, this operated 
upon a nursing workforce which was changing in social composition and wit-
nessing the decline of traditional forms of authority epitomised in the role of the 
matron. The restructuring of the workforce within more bureaucratised workplace 
relations seemed to be favouring organisations having a more unionate character, as 
the basis for a professionalising ideology was being undermined. 
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Trade Union Growth (1966-1979) 
The dramatic change in union membership figures from the mid-1960's has 
prompted several explanations, including the impact of Government incomes 
policy (Bosanquet, 1982), deskilling among nurses (Bellaby and Oribabor, 1977), a 
more bureaucratised management (eg Carpenter, 1977), and the related aspect of 
managerial sponsorship. Less attention has been given to the underlying shifts in 
workforce composition, particularly the recruitment of more less qualified and 
unqualified staff. 
The secondary nature of unions reflected these changes, alongside of which 
this period saw the character of union behaviour changing in two important ways. 
The flrst was in a growing, though highly uneven, willingness to adopt industrial 
action; and the second was a limited, and again uneven, development of local 
activity. However qualifled, both signified a gradual adoption of a more generalised 
unionate character. Health services still however provided a contradictory fleld for 
recruitment, as was shown in the early 1970' s when COHSE chose expulsion from 
the TUC over registration under the Industrial Relations Act rather than risk being 
threatened in recruitment by the RCN. Nevertheless, it is important to give some 
attention to ways in which the character of health service trade unionism was 
changing in these two areas during this period of membership growth. 
Industrial Militancy 
An evident change in this period was the increased manifestation of industrial 
conflict. In 1966 there were just two industrial stoppages recorded in the NHS, 
causing an average of 0.69 lost days per 1,000 staff; in 1973 eighteen recorded 
stoppages caused an average loss of 117.8 days per 1,000 staff (Klein, 1983). Of 
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course the level remained considerably less than in the economy as a whole, and 
concealed considerable local diversity, but nevertheless signified a growing will-
ingness among broader groups of NHS staff to take industrial action. 
In some respects, 1973 can be taken as a watershed (eg Bosanquet, 1982; 
Dimmock, 1977). It represented, in Bosanquet's words, the breakdown of the "old 
colonial system" of NHS industrial relations. The ancillary workers strike of that 
year provided a symbolic break with previous character and practice, even though 
the ancillary workers themselves gained less than had been hoped from the wage 
dispute. 
During the following twelve months, many groups of NHS staff were to 
embark on industrial action, including nurses in COHSE and NUPE in the period 
before and during the Halsbury review. The RCN, while still rejecting industrial 
action as such, threatened to operate as an agency to supply its nurse members who 
would resign from the NHS. 
The organisational culture was changing. In contrast to Carpenter's earlier 
description of the role of a hospital matron defusing a stoppage, one hospital 
administrator, writing in 1974, described local attempts to get porters to accept a 
"small routine job", previously performed, which had inadvertently been omitted 
from the bonus scheme specifications: 
the workers' representatives refused to agree and countered 
veiled threats with rather less veiled threats of industrial action. 
(Gorham, 1974). 
When threats of industrial action spread to the medical profession during the 
junior doctor's dispute in 1976, a former editor of The Lancet complained about 
the, "conversion of junior hospital doctors to the methods of militant trade 
unionism." (Fox, 1976). "Militant trade unionism" appeared in many ways to be 
delivering the goods, although as it was noted in Chapter Three, the impact of 
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rising wages was to an extent contained as less qualified staff were recruited into 
the workforce. The apparent success of the "industrial militancy" model must be 
largely attributed to its ability to impose political pressure on the Government as 
distinct from its economic consequences. An important illustration of this emerged 
in the occasional use of industrial action for non-pay and conditions objectives. A 
notable example of this occurred in 1976 when workers at Charing Cross Hospital 
in London took the illegal action of withdrawing services from thirty one private 
patients, setting in train a significant crisis for the Labour Government (Klein, 
1983). According to one contemporary newspaper account, Labour Ministers had 
not until then believed that the Government had any hope of phasing out pay beds 
in the face of medical opposition (The Observer, 7th July 1974). This episode 
served to emphasise both the highly political context in which health service unions 
operate and ways in which this could be deployed for non-bargaining, as well as 
bargaining, objectives. 
However, the potential impact of industrial action in imposing political rather 
than economic pressure had yet to be fully tested. Meanwhile, there appeared to be 
other immediate benefits for those organisations involved. As one writer observed: 
There is clear evidence of a correlation between COHSE 
militancy and improved recruitment into the union during the 
early 1970's. (Taylor, 1980). 
By 1979 a different picture was emerging. Pay restraint, together with some 
improvements in earnings for lowest paid workers, gave rise to several anomalies 
as differentials were squeezed and the pressure for larger pay increases become 
unstoppable. The so-called "winter of discontent", although subsequently entering 
the mythology of the right, presented starkly the potential consequences of indus-
trial action in areas such as health services. Carpenter (1982) suggests that the 
dramatic growth in membership experienced by the RCN from the late 1970's may 
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largely be a product of the rejection by many nurses of the method of industrial 
action. In demonstrating a "willingness to act" through industrial action, health 
workers found themselves in danger of withholding, not surplus value from the 
capitalist, but the use value they produced. 
Local Union Activity 
Rising membership created new pressures for the existing organisational 
structures of trade unions. The membership of COHSE had increased from just 
54,000 in 1960 to 68,000 in 1965, then soared to 167,000 in 1975 and 216,000 by 
1980 (Winchester, 1983). Alongside this, moves towards more local activity 
emerged as unions gained a more formal role through the introduction of proce-
dural agreements for grievances and disciplinary matters. Although their adoption 
was slow it contrasted with the very limited impact of Joint Consultative Com-
mittees in the 1950's. 
Within a still highly centralised Whitley Council system, it created the basis 
for a predominantly representational, rather than bargaining, role for local stewards. 
As Winchester (1983) notes, the first significant focus for workplace bargaining 
came with the introduction of ancillary bonus schemes, designed to link pay and 
productivity. The still relatively slow pace at which change occurred is illustrated 
in the fact that the first national agreement providing for recognition of stewards 
and provision of facilities for union representatives was not reached until 1971 by 
the Ancillary Staffs Council. Not until 1976 was agreement on these reached 
through the General Whitley Council. 
The gradual shift towards more localised bargaining encouraged moves 
towards a more decentralised structure within the unions. This suggests some sup-
port for Clegg's model of the influence collective bargaining structures have upon 
union behaviour, although the purpose stated by COHSE for introducing a steward 
112 
system in 1972 included not only negotiations for incentive bonus schemes but also 
the need to communicate with members: 
Deductions of contributions at source (DOCAS) meant that 
branches were in danger of losing contact with their members 
while PBR meant that there was a pressing need for workplac~ 
union representatives to determine the implications of these 
schemes and control their introduction to ensure the maximum 
benefit to members. 
There were additional factors which lay behind the decision to 
provide a highly localised, effective, and flexible services for 
members of the Confederation ... the Donovan Commission, 
reported in 1968 on the importance of the 'informal' structure in 
industrial relations, as well as the 'formal' structure provided, in 
the case of the NHS, by the Whitley Councils. At that time there 
was no 'informal' structure in the NHS. (COHSE, 1976). 
The organisation which went furthest in seeking to adapt organisationally to 
the new situation was NUPE. Data from the survey of NUPE in 1973/74, although 
drawn not just from its NHS membership, provides some indication of the changing 
local organisation in the early 1970's. In 1970, 39% of branches had no stewards 
and a further 26% had three or less: by 1974, only 11 % of branches had no stew-
ards and 56% had four or more. This development of steward organisation was not 
necessarily accompanied by greater branch involvement in wider union affairs: in 
1973 51 % of branches sent no delegate to the National Conference for example. 
But the most significant result for the present discussion is that over one-third of 
branches stated that neither the Branch Secretary or stewards met management on a 
day to day basis to discuss members' grievances or problems (Fryer et ai, 1974). 
Many stewards seemed to be purely a means of communication between 
members and the Full Time Officer. This in fact was virtually the defined role for a 
steward within the COHSE Rule Book: 
(to) make representation to the immediate departmental head 
and report to the branch secretary. Further representation must 
only be taken through the normal branch procedures. (COHSE, 
1976). 
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While union organisation was nevertheless decentralising, it faced a situation 
in which decisions within the NHS were shifting to the centre. Developments by 
the late 1970's were to create new demands upon local union organisation as the 
imposition of cash limits began to have their effect. Initially, the greatest impact 
was upon capital spending, but those areas which were "losers" under the RA WP 
formula found themselves with additional difficulties. This gave rise to a series of 
locally based campaigns to defend services particularly in London; the Elizabeth 
Garrett Anderson Hospital, Plaistow Maternity Hospital and Bethnal Green Hospi-
tal, among others. In all these cases there were attempts to join with users of the 
services in the local community. 
Workers elsewhere were at this time experiencing the problem that industrial 
action could prove to be a less effective weapon against closure and redundancies. 
While in all cases convincing arguments could be mounted on the social and eco-
nomic impact of job losses upon local communities, health service workers were 
able to draw on community defence for the services themselves. The campaigns 
nevertheless had mixed outcomes, a notable success being the EGA, buts its partic-
ular circumstances were unique. While these experiences did suggest that health 
workers might have alternative forms of action available to them, their success was 
not guaranteed. 
By the end of the 1970's, health service trade unionism had gained a very 
high level of membership density, a degree of local organisation, and experience in 
industrial militancy and campaigning. The unevenness within this needs to be 
stressed, but despite this a more generalised unionate character had developed than 
had hitherto been the case. The character had emerged as a product of the experi-
ences of the previous fifteen years, and some early indications of its limitations 
were to be subjected to many new challenges in the 1980's. 
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New ChaJlenges in the 1980's 
The 1980's has witnessed a dramatic shrinkage in much of the post-war 
"heartlands" of trade union organisation within the NHS as elsewhere. As the last 
chapter showed, the large mental hospitals of the 1950's and 1960's have all but 
disappeared with moves to "care in the community", and the growth in the ancillary 
workforce of the 1970's has been more than reversed under the impact of competi-
tive tendering and efficiency savings. In contrast, and unlike earlier periods, the 
proportion of Registered Nurses in the NHS workforce has grown. 
Significantly, overall levels of union membership and density have not been 
altered by these changes. Its character, however, has changed considerably. The 
organisation which has succeeded in making by far the greatest membership gains 
has been the RCN. COHSE's membership has remained relatively static, while that 
of NUPE has declined, although much of this may have occurred in local author-
ities. 
Health unions faced a particular dilemma in the 1980's. Power within the 
NHS was being shifted towards the centre, but this was as a means of putting pres-
sure on local managers to obtain savings and operate more commercially. This sec-
tion briefly describes ways in which unions sought to respond to this new situation. 
The first part considers changing experiences of national pay campaigns during the 
decade, followed by a short account of one union's review of its own organisational 
structure. Some final comments are made on prospects for health service trade 
unionism in the 1990's. 
The Changing Character of National Activity 
If the ancillary workers strike of 1973 had been a watershed in the breakdown 
of the "old colonial system", the national pay campaign of 1982 created a hiatus in 
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the hitherto ongoing development of 'unionateness'. The campaign had united 
almost all groups of staff around a common claim and was coordinated at national 
level through the rue and its Health Service Committee. Lessons had been learned 
from 1979, with the 'TUC Code of Conduct' guaranteeing emergency cover, and 
successful efforts were made to maintain public support. Tensions emerged as 
some local areas were accused by management of failing to meet this Code, and, 
under the influence of an earlier Government circular, 'If Industrial Relations 
Break: Down', some managers were showing a willingness to adopt a tougher line 
by sending workers home when not working normally. 
The dispute was long running, and brought to a head the problem of mount-
ing industrial action designed to put political pressure on the Government when the 
Government was prepared to see it through. Calls for escalation were resisted by 
the ruc, and eventually the Government succeeded in achieving separate settle-
ments for different groups, promising pay review mechanisms for nurses and some 
others. The 1982 campaign was to be the first, and possibly the last, of its type. 
No further national campaign of industrial action was to launched until the 
ambulance dispute of 1988-89. To a considerable extent this reflected the perceived 
outcome of the 1982 campaign, in addition to which was the more general 
demoralising effect of the outcome of the miners' dispute of 1984-85. 
The impact of new management systems and policies also had their effect on 
the focus of union activity, which frequently shifted to a local level. For ancillary 
workers attention turned to the consequences of competitive tendering, for which 
negotiations were necessarily local. Some notable examples of industrial action 
occurred over its introduction although the most prominent, those at Addenbrookes 
and Barking Hospitals, related to changes in employment conditions with existing 
contractors. Generally, few NHS -ancillary staff seemed prepared to risk strike 
action on this issue so soon after the 1982 dispute. 
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Although several writers, as well as unions themselves, pointed to a need for 
involvement in the specification process in order to gain some influence over the 
level of service, most evidence suggests little success in this was achieved. Instead, 
unions were more likely to find themselves able to engage in a degree of bargaining 
over the conditions of employment for in-house tenders designed to compete with 
outside contractors (Sheaff, 1988). This suggested that, for ancillary workers at 
least, the distinctiveness of health care from the private sector was diminishing. 
Nurses came to the fore in 1988, in several areas of the country being 
involved in disputes arising from the application of clinical grading. With the 
taking of limited action being designed primarily to secure public support, con-
siderable attention was drawn to the issue. The award led to thousands of local 
appeals, and a corresponding increase in COHSE's membership has been attributed 
by its General Secretary to this dissatisfaction (Labour Research, 1989). 
The national ambulance dispute in 1989 broke this more localised trend. 
Union leaderships sought to run it very differently from earlier campaigns, with 
greater emphasis upon media coverage and parliamentary lobbying, although at 
times this generated friction with some local representatives. 
One other group of NHS staff began to take a new interest in industrial rela-
tions during the 1980' s. The introduction of stewards in the British Medical Associ-
ation, albeit under the title of Place of Work Accredited Representatives, and the 
appointment of regional industrial relations officers, may imply a perceived waning 
of traditional sources of influence as a consequence of changes in management 
organisation. 
Much of this suggests not the demise of bargaining over pay and conditions 
so much as a change in its form, from industrial militancy principally designed to 
impose political pressure on the Government, to a combination of more localised 
bargaining and public campaigning. With managerial changes tending to diminish 
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much of the organisational distinctiveness of the NHS, and with issues and disputes 
increasingly emerging at a local level, new pressures were being placed upon exist-
ing union organisation. Despite tentative moves towards forms of local organisation 
in the 1970's, the presence of continuing deficiencies was evident in an organisa-
tional review conducted by COHSE. 
Reviewing Union Organisation: the case o/COHSE 
Several pieces of evidence suggest that workplace union organisation 
remained relatively weak in many parts of the health service (Watson, 1988; Cohen 
and Fosh, 1988). There continued to be a dominance of representational over 
bargaining activities, extending to the role of Full Time Officers, as one NUPE 
FTO described: 
The greatest proportion of my time is spent on individual 
grievances and disciplinary matters. In areas where organisation 
is weak we are really acting as shop stewards ... The job is 
more case-work than organisation. It shouldn't be but it is. 
(Watson, 1988). 
The following considers a report produced by COHSE in 1988, COHSE: 
Building For The Future (COHSE, 1988), intended to address perceived 
weaknesses in organisation. This describes how the diversification of health care 
has widened the range of problems with which the union structure must cope in a 
fonn which does, "not provide a favourable base for strong trade union organisa-
tion." The report notes that apart from the introduction of the steward system, 
COHSE's structure remained largely unchanged during its period of membership 
growth and a continuing theme is that the nature of current changes in health care 
require stronger local union organisation and greater membership participation. 
A branch survey conducted for the report indicated that 37% of branches had 
no functioning Executive or stewards committee, and of those that had, 32% did 
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not use agendas or keep minutes. Encouragement is given to the holding of work-
place meetings for specific issues or work-groups, and the use of branch newslet-
ters designed to improve communication with members. The possibility that the 
union may lose contact with its members and their needs emerges as a significant 
source of concern in the report. This is attributed to the pressures arising from the 
rapid membership growth of the 1970's upon the existing organisational structure. 
In commenting on the union's high turnover rate, the report notes that, "A 
frequent complaint from members who have left COHSE was that contact with the 
branch was very limited." The report recommends an increased role for stewards, 
although the branch survey also found that over 40% of stewards and 23% of 
Branch Secretaries had attended no stewards course. 
Two essential requirements are identified by the report: effective local 
organisation capable of responding to increasingly diverse bargaining needs, and 
increased member loyalty. In the long term, the former is seen as the route for 
achieving the latter, but in the short term the mechanism for this is absent. To cope 
with immediate pressures several short term aims are suggested. These included the 
establishment of an accurate membership system to improve communication with 
the members and ascertain their needs, the direct mailing of a relaunched journal to 
members, and encouragement to members to pay their subscriptions by direct debit. 
The report adds, "These aims are fully consistent with our long term objectives of 
decentralisation and devolution". 
Nevertheless, they represent centralised solutions to a problem which is 
identified as being essentially one of insufficient local involvement. This highlights 
the difficulties facing health service trade union organisation in responding to the 
new demands created by the changes of the 1980's. The creation of Unison, as with 
union mergers more generally (Undy et ai, 1981), similarly represented a 
predominantly centrally-initiated development. While these were concerned with 
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organisational adjustment to the changed environment, the character of health serv-
ice trade unionism might be expected to derive mainly from the more commercial 
climate operating at a local level. 
Prospects for the Future 
As with the conclusion on trends in NHS organisation and management in the 
previous chapter, the possibility of alternative scenarios is apparent. One might be 
that all work groups become increasingly subject to commercially-derived pres-
sures, encouraging the wider adoption of bargaining methods, with a focus 
primarily at local level. This is suggested in predictions that groups such as nurses 
will have a stronger labour market position, enabling them to use local bargaining 
to their advantage (Fatchett, 1989). 
Alternatively, the gulf between staff groups may widen, with some being 
more subjected to market pressures than others. Managerial challenges to the exist-
ing division of labour create threats for some staff but in doing so present 
opportunities for others. This has had a particular significance for nursing in which 
the long-standing calls for a more academic basis to its education has seen some 
realisation in the introduction of Project 2000. Some staff groups may stand to gain 
from the consequences of managerial attempts to weaken medical dominance. 
At the same time, the reform of nurse education has been encouraged by 
demographic changes, particularly the lower number of future school leavers, and 
the proposals have been accompanied by others on the introduction of the new 
grade of Health Care Assistants. In this context, the possibility of Registered 
Nurses forming a diminishing proportion of the workforce again re-emerges. This 
time the RCN have appeared to recognise the potential impact this could have upon 
their own recruitment opportunities, and have debated whether to allow Health 
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Care Assistants into its membership. Opponents of this policy within the RCN 
argued that it would undermine the organisation's claim to being the professional 
organisation for qualified nurses. Whatever the outcome of that debate, it illustrates 
how benefits arising from restructuring work may be tenuous. 
This raises the possibility of a further alternative, that of giving greater 
priority to issues concerned with services. Possibilities for this are suggested in a 
report in the British Medical Journal which suggested that an outbreak of food 
poisoning in a London hospital suggested it may have been influenced by staffing 
cuts brought about as a consequence of competitive tendering. As noted earlier, 
ancillary unions generally gained little involvement in the specification stage; 
alliances with other staff groups around issues of service quality might make this 
more likely. 
Allied to this is the issue of public alliances, although difficulties in extend-
ing these into permanent coalitions have already been noted. Instead, they have 
more frequently been of an ad hoc type surrounding a particular issue. A challenge 
this poses for unions is whether an increasingly commercialised environment 
diminishes rather than extends the opportunities for developing this strategy. 
One conclusion which can be drawn from the earlier review is that support is 
lent to the observation by Bain (1973), that both professional and trade union 
organisations can be regarded as seeking to regulate jobs in the collective interests 
of their members. In the changed National Health Service, can this best be achieved 
through closer association with the employer in the process of achieving efficiency 
gains, or does the continued distinctiveness of public services call for a qUalita-
tively different approach utilising broader alliances? Is it possible to incorporate 
elements of both or are they mutually contradictory? The case study material is 
designed to examine these issues,. for which some background material is intro-
duced in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PLYMOUTH HEALTH AUTHORITY IN CONTEXT 
A single District Health Authority was selected as the location for what are in 
effect a series of case studies. These provided some diversity to illustrate a variety 
of processes and influences, while having sufficient homogeneity to make such 
comparisons meaningful. The inclusion of different occupational groups is intended 
to allow the relationship between general processes and specific outcomes to be 
considered. This provides the basis for what Stoecker (1991) refers to as the struc-
tural boundaries of the case study, which is further described in terms of the nature 
of the locality; its economy, employment and trade union movement, as well as the 
Health Authority itself. 
Before this is done a second point made by Stoecker on the case study 
method is relevant to note. This derives from the distinction drawn by Roy (1987) 
between functional logic and historical logic. The former is seen as too frequently 
degenerating into teleology, making it necessary to look at the past if processes of 
causality are to be identified. From this, Stoecker concludes that the case study 
must combine its structural boundaries with historical boundaries, again influenced 
by the theoretical issues underpinning the research. The historical boundaries for 
this research is the period 1981-1991; a period which encompasses several changes 
which may illuminate the analytical question concerning the distinctiveness or 
otherwise of the health service. Although most of the detailed case study material 
relates to the second half of the period, some earlier background information is 
included where this is necessary to provide an adequate context. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the relevant structural and historical 
boundaries for the case study. It is organised in three sections; the fIrst of which 
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locates the case study material within its wider local economic and social context. 
The second looks at aspects of the organisation and management of the Health 
Authority in terms of what these suggest about the scope and nature of change in 
the 1980's. Following the theme of the "secondary nature" of trade unions, the 
character of local health service trade unionism is considered in the final section, 
together with aspects of the institutional industrial relations context in which they 
operate. While this distinction is drawn from earlier debates described in Chapter 
One, the empirical evidence described indicates a close relationship between the 
two. This provided an important reason for structuring most of the material around 
specific episodes, and more detailed contextual material for these is reserved for the 
appropriate chapter. 
Economic and Social Characteristics of the Area 
Changes within the local economy have been reflected in the changing com-
position of the workforce, in tum altering the character of local trade unionism. In 
1966, 33.2% of the workforce within the Plymouth 'travel to work area' were 
employed in manufacturing; a figure close to the national average. By 1984, the 
proportion had declined to 28.7% of the 113,000 people employed, and for the ftrst 
time a bigger proportion worked in 'other services' than in manufacturing. Despite 
this, the decline in 'manufacturing' employment had been much less than had 
occurred nationally in this period. 
The continuing importance of manufacturing employment reflected the 
dominance of the naval dockyard in the city. Plymouth has been a major naval base 
since the sixteenth century, and this has had an impact on many aspects of the local 
economy and culture. In 1961 the dockyard employed nearly 19,000 workers, 
providing almost one in ftve of all local jobs. Over 15,300 of these jobs remained 
by 1981, although by 1984 this had fallen to 13,000. 
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From 1984-87 employment in 'shipbuilding/repair' (mainly the dockyard) 
fell by over 25%; when the current round of redundancies are completed employ-
ment will be little more than 5,000. This does not preclude further reductions aris-
ing from the Government's defence review. One consequence has been that 
between 1984-87 Plymouth was the only major town in the South West to experi-
ence a net fall in employment. 
During the same period, 'producer services', such as banking, insurance, 
finance and other business services, have not grown as elsewhere: 3% in Plymouth 
compared to 15% in the UK, and 17% in the South West. In addition, Plymouth has 
been one of only two major South West towns to experience a fall in employment 
in 'high technOlogy' industries. These factors have contributed to making public 
services dominant in employment terms. With nearly 6,500 people working in the 
NBS, and with the growing private provision of health care, local health services 
now rank as the biggest source of employment in the area. 
The historic dominance of the dockyard can be identified as a factor con-
tributing to a generally low level of wages within the area. Chalkley (1983) sug-
gests that in the immediate post-World War Two period, the Admiralty may have 
discouraged the development of alternative employment sources. He quotes from 
the 1943 plan for the city's rebuilding after the wartime destruction: 
In all sea-port and shipbuilding towns a reservoir of labour is 
always desired and industries likely to compete for this reser-
voir are not especially encouraged (Plan for Plymouth, 1943, 
p25). 
Local wages have continued to bear a closer relationship with the 
predominantly rural area of Devon and Cornwall than with those of other cities of 
comparable size. In 1990 a study by Glasgow University of the thirty eight largest 
cities in the United Kingdom ranked Plymouth bottom in average earnings; men's 
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earnings were 10.6% less than the national average and those of women were 8.6% 
less (Plymouth City Council, 1991). 
The character of local trade unionism is also founded upon the historic 
dominance of the dockyard in the city, as has been much of the nature of local 
Labour pOlitics (see for example, Beck, 1974). For many years the key economic 
issue for the city has been levels of Government spending on the navy; other ques-
tions of economic and social policy have rarely achieved a comparable sig-
nificance. Opening his account of the Fine Tubes strike, Tony Beck suggests: 
By 1950 an industrial relations pattern had been fairly well set 
for the next fifteen years: a quiescent dockyard, grossly con-
servative leadership, and a generally low level of consciousness 
and organisation amongst an inexperienced 'green' workforce 
(Beck, 1974, p13). 
By the late 1960's the area experienced, albeit on a smaller scale, the wave of 
industrial militancy which had developed nationally. Disputes occurred in some of 
the local factories which had moved to the area in the 1950's. Companies involved 
included Tecalamit and, mostly famOUSly, Fine Tubes. By the early 1970's limited 
industrial action was occurring in the dockyard. Undoubtedly, these changes had an 
impact upon local organisation: for example, the new TGWU District Secretary 
who came to Plymouth in the year following the end of the Fine Tubes strike was a 
Communist Party member from the West Midlands. 
The dominance of dockyard trade unions continued to be evident, for exam-
ple in the composition of the local Trades Council. Although this general influence 
has in latter years been changing with shifts in employments towards public serv-
ices, these lacked the cohesion and identity that the industrial dockyard trade 
unionism possessed. Despite their numerical strength, public service unions have 
not achieved a comparable institutional or cultural influence. 
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Organisation and Management in Plymouth Health Authority 
Plymouth Health Authority (PHA) covers over six hundred square miles, and 
provides services for a population of over four hundred thousand. It includes the 
urban area of Plymouth, with a population of over two hundred thousand, as well as 
towns, villages and rural areas of West Devon and South East Cornwall. 
Substantial changes are occurring the pattern of local health service provi-
sion, including the closure of several older hospitals and the expansion of the newer 
District General Hospital, Derriford. Alongside this increasing concentration of 
acute hospital services, older psychiatric institutions are being replaced by smaller 
units and non-residential services in the community. In many cases this is also 
involving a transfer of responsibility away from the Health Authority. 
The following provides a selected account of the impact of managerial 
changes, described in Chapter Three, upon local NHS organisation. Its structure 
follows that used earlier, considering the "first wave" of managerialism in the 
1970's, and the "new managerialism" of the 1980's. This provides some general 
indications on how far these changes altered the basic character of local NHS 
organisation. 
The First Managerial Challenge 
Evidence from Plymouth Health Authority tends to confirm the rather scepti-
cal approach to the impact of early managerialism suggested in Chapter Three. A 
continuing tradition of "administration" is evident throughout much of this period, 
with "managerial" decision-taking being limited. This can be illustrated by con-
sidering two areas, both of which have relevance for later comparisons: capital 
development proposals and staffmg levels. 
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Problems associated with the first of these was most clearly evident in plans 
for a new district general hospital. The very rust capital investment for this was 
made prior to the establishment of the NHS, during the period of municipal control 
of hospitals. A site for a new hospital, at Derriford on the northern outskirts of the 
city, was bought by Plymouth City Council as far back as 1946. Greater central 
control provided through the establishment of the NHS, and particularly the early 
capital constraints, prevented any early development in the 1950's. 
Nor was it only in major development proposals that centrally imposed finan-
cial constraint was evident. Examples from two existing hospitals, Greenbank and 
Devonport, indicate other problems to which this gave rise. In the case of the for-
mer, complaints in the late 1950's that operating facilities were inadequate and 
dangerous mounted, with allegations that these were responsible for the death of a 
patient. Eventually Government approval was granted for the building of a new 
operating theatre at Greenbank in the early 1960's. At this same time a Government 
inquiry was launched into Devonport Hospital, following the deaths of five patients 
in 1962 due to inadequate sterilisation of operating theatre equipment. The sub-
sequent report placed the blame upon the combined effect of poor equipment main-
tenance and lack of staff training. 
By the mid-1960's, hopes were being raised that the city would soon be get-
ting its new hospital at Derriford. As reported in a local newspaper at the time, 
"hopes were high despite the Government's economic squeeze", that work on the 
new hospital would start in 1970 (Western Morning News, 20th August 1966). 
However these hopes were to be proved unfounded, and it was not until 1971, a 
quarter of a century after the site had been purchased, that Ministerial approval for 
development was finally secured. 
The hospital eventually opened in 1980, initially replacing services provided 
at Devonport Hospital. Further expansion since then has continued with the transfer 
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of services from other older hospitals. This process is expected to continue, with 
the prospect of it eventually providing twelve hundred beds putting it among the 
half-dozen largest hospitals in the country. 
At the same time that progress on Derriford Hospital was beginning to be 
made issues relating to staffing levels, particularly among nurses, came to the fore. 
For example, in 1974 against an establishment figure of two thousand nursing staff 
in the District there were one thousand eight hundred nursing staff actually 
employed, ten per cent fewer. Shortages were particularly acute at Devonport 
Hospital where there were fifty one nursing staff compared to an establishment fig-
ure of ninety. The response of local administrators to staff shortages was to identify 
them as evidence of a problem requiring resolution at national level, with the cause 
being publicly identified by local NHS administrators as the low level of nurse pay. 
The District Administrator is reported in a contemporary local newspaper report as 
saying, "We earnestly hope that when Lord Halsbury's report on nurses pay is pub-
lished soon that recruitment will increase" (Western Evening Herald, 7th Septem-
ber 1974). 
Not only was the total nursing workforce below that regarded as necessary, 
its composition reflected national trends described earlier. Particularly this was the 
case in a declining proportion of Registered Nurses. Against a funded figure of two 
hundred and sixty five Registered Nurses in the city's general hospitals in 1974, 
there were two hundred and seventeen employed; over eighteen per cent fewer. In 
contrast, the number of unqualified nursing staff, at one hundred and thirty two, 
slightly exceeded the funded figure of one hundred and twenty eight. 
While the Halsbury award appears to have provided a short respite, the prob-
lem of shortages of qualified nursing staff was soon to return. Against a back-
ground of local media reports of planned ward closures as a consequence, one 
hospital administrator was reported as saying, "(We are) reaping the consequences 
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of a lack of money limiting training intakes three years ago" (Western Evening 
Herald, 2nd August 1979). 
In overall terms, by the close of the 1970's there is relatively little evidence 
of a sustained managerial challenge at the local level. Areas of change were 
beginning to become evident, as with ancillary staff bonus schemes, but in 
Plymouth these were only very slowly being introduced. Many administrators had 
themselves been appointed "through the ranks", and appeared to show an identity 
with other staff. Authority had been traditionally vested in medical consultants and 
hospital matrons, and while the structures had changed much of the ethos surround-
ing this had survived. 
Local administration rather than management was the order of the day. 
Organisational changes notwithstanding, much of its distinctive culture continued 
to reflect a broadly common identity with the delivery of health services, mostly in 
the context of relatively small, older hospitals. More obvious challenges to each of 
these came in the 1980's. Much of the more detailed case study material is 
designed to explore how far this altered the nature of work relations and the charac-
ter of trade unionism, the following provides a briefer contextual background for 
this. 
The New Managerialism 
Of the changes occurring in the 1980's, the introduction of general manage-
ment was highly significant but not all important. Arguably its greatest role was in 
further strengthening central control over the direction and character of local 
responses to centrally imposed objectives. Before its introduction, several centrally 
inspired policy developments were beginning to shape local health services and 
industrial relations within them. Most notable among these were the effects of 
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efficiency savings, competitive tendering and community care policies. All of these 
are described in more detail in later chapters and here it is simply necessary to note 
two general points. 
Firstly, the introduction of all these policies came during the period of "con-
sensus management", and moreover at a time when many individual managers were 
the same people who had been influential in the 1970's. Foremost in ensuring their 
implementation was the pressure of financial constraint. 
One consequence of this was that community based services for the mentally 
ill and mentally handicapped were planned on the basis that they would cost no 
more than existing services. This decision was to have major implications for the 
development of these services and was the basis for much subsequent conflict 
between managers and unions described further in Chapter Seven. The significant 
point here is that financial constraint had an important impact upon local 
managerial culture preceding the introduction of general management. 
Secondly, the early implementation of these policies had greatest impact 
upon the organisationally weakest groups within the health service. Only later were 
stronger groups more directly affected and it was in this process that general 
management played a more important role. 
General management was introduced in 1985 in Plymouth based around two 
units, general hospitals and community services. This distinction was based upon 
existing divisions although it was to have further implications later, for example, in 
relation to different bargaining structures. At this point in time the most obvious 
impact came with substantial changes in senior management personnel. Several 
new appointments were made from outside the District although all of the new 
people came from within the NBS. External appointments included a new District 
General Manager, previously a Treasurer in another Authority, a newly styled 
Director of Manpower, and both of the two unit general managers. Some more 
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limited continuity remained, for example, the previous Chief Nursing Officer 
remained as Chief Nursing Adviser, but these were relatively marginal. 
The introduction of general management coincided with an ambitious target 
for its cost improvement programme. Plymouth Health Authority's 1985/86 Annual 
Programme identified a target for the subsequent two years which equated to about 
two per cent of its cash limit of £58 million in each year. No longer was it simply 
the case of adopting centrally set targets; these were now being raised further. 
Moreover, the 1987/88 Annual Programme reported that the target for 1985/86 had 
actually been exceeded by a further one per cent of the cash limit. This was 
attributable to greater efficiency savings and throughput than anticipated. The latter 
reduced average costs and subsequently counted as a cost improvement. The main 
changes contributing to the large efficiency savings were two developments, the 
introduction of a "cook chill" catering system and a reorganisation of nurse rotas. 
Because of their significance these changes are examined in more detail in Chapter 
Six. 
By the later 1980's, general managers appeared willing to explicitly embrace 
some of the more radical proposals being put forward for the National Health Serv-
ice. The Authority's District General Manager was reported as saying in respect of 
utilising private provision of health services: 
If the private sector can do it better and more cost-effectively, 
then I don't see that we should have any political dogma that 
says it is not an appropriate thing to look at and do (The Guard-
ian, 12th November 1988). 
Local managers showed themselves increasingly willing to operate alongside 
commercial operations. The Authority's computer services were put out to a private 
company, as was the organisation of the "nurse bank", responsible for organising 
temporary relief cover. A private company, ABC Ltd, was even established by the 
managers themselves to be involved in income generation schemes. The most 
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locally controversial decision was to replace an elderly care hospital with beds 
leased from a private company, and again because of the significance of this it is 
considered in more detail later. 
Such evidence of a willingness, indeed enthusiasm, to embrace the private 
sector undoubtedly marked a substantial change. However, while in this sense it 
might be taken as evidence of public service managers increasingly acting "as if" 
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they were capitalists, important elements of the distinctiveness of health services 
remained. Ways in which these influenced the outcomes of particular processes are 
looked at later, more generally it is worth noting that by the late 1980's managers 
and the Health Authority were prepared to express increasing disquiet to the 
Government about spending levels. In a confidential response to the 1989 White 
Paper the Authority stated: 
The Government has given no commitment in the White Paper 
to increase the level of resources invested in health. This is 
despite overwhelming evidence that we as a nation spend rela-
tively less of the national wealth on health services. This raises 
doubts as to the Government's commitment to the National 
Health Service .... the present level of unmet demand is too 
high for the public to tolerate. (PHA, confidential response to 
Dept of Health, 1989). 
By this time the Authority's managers were claiming increasing difficulty in 
identifying further sources of efficiency savings or cost improvements. In fact, 
early management justifications for seeking hospital self-government gave con-
siderable emphasis to the alleged advantages for obtaining additional resources. In 
this, the new era of management echoed earlier complaints about the difficulties of 
obtaining capital within the NHS. It was claimed by local managers that self-
governing hospitals would be able to have greater access to capital and on more 
favourable terms. In addition, considerable emphasis was placed by the managers 
on the greater flexibility such a move would have upon employment and staffing 
issues. Again, this had been an area under strict central control since 1951. 
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A paper summarising a private discussion of Health Authority members and 
managers on the Government's 1989 White Paper stated: 
The emphasis given to the principle of competition is, however, 
overstated. . . The advantages of self-government lie in 
increased independence and flexibility rather than in competi-
tion. (PHA, internal document, 1989). 
This highlighted the way in which general management, encouraged to 
behave more commercially, was operating still in a highly centralised structure. 
This confirms the continuation of the NHS as a highly political system in which 
control by the Treasury has mostly been paramount. It also illustrates the con-
siderable change occurring in managerial attitudes over the course of a decade or 
so. In the late 1970's issues concerning capital developments and staffing shortages 
had not been seen as amenable to local resolution: by the late 1980's managers 
were seeking greater autonomy in order to tackle them. This, however, is not the 
same as a wholesale commodification of health care services. 
Before returning to this point in considering individual episodes, the follow-
ing reviews aspects of the organisation of local health service trade union organisa-
tion and industrial relations. Whereas in earlier chapters an attempt was made to 
consider institutional and wider social influences separately, these are brought 
together in this account as a means of illustrating aspects of inter-relationship. 
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The Character of Local Trade Union Organisation 
Much of the character of local union organisation reflected its secondary 
nature, derivative of the social relations of which it is a part. These are not, at least 
directly, organised by capital so much as the occupational division of labour within 
health care. The distribution of staff across occupational groups in the mid-1980's 
is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table ~.!: The composition of the workforce in Plymouth Health Authority in 
1984 (in Whole Time Equivalents) 
Medical & dental 
Nursing & midwifery 
Prof supp to medicine 
Pharmacists 
Technicians 
Opthalmology 
Scientific staff 
Admin & clerical 
Works craftsmen 
Works officers 
Ancillary 
TOTAL 
175 
2846 
219 
14 
211 
4 
22 
642 
98 
21 
971 
5223 
In many ways the distribution of membership between organisations reflects 
occupational boundaries. For example, NALGO is the predominant organisation 
among administrative and clerical staff, as is MSF (from ASTMS membership) 
among professional and technical staff. Some other staff tend by and large to be in 
the particular organisation representing that group, such as health visitors, occupa-
tional therapists and midwives. Works department staff remain largely with the 
union representing their own trade. These groups however do not form a major 
focus for the current study. 
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But descriptions of patterns of membership say little about the form which it 
takes. For this to be understood it is necessary to deal briefly with significant tradi-
tions upon which these have drawn. The organisation having the longest and most 
readily identifiable local history is undoubtedly COHSE, based originally within 
the mental illness services. For example, the Moorhaven branch of COHSE is 
recorded as affiliating. as the then NAWU, to the Plymouth and District Trades 
Council in the 1920's soon after the General Strike. 
The post war years appear to be characterised by close co-operation between 
the union and the hospital management. Throughout much of this period, and 
before, the most notable union representative at the hospital was Claude Bartlett, 
president of the National Asylum Workers Union and later of COHSE for over one-
third of a century. He also became the last ever lay Chairman of the roc. Although 
achieving no grade higher than a staff nurse at Moorhaven Hospital, Claude Bartlett 
was to sit on the Royal Commission which led to the 1959 Mental Health Act. He 
in many respects reflects a combined identity of trade union bargaining and wider 
job-related concerns. This involved a close incorporation into the locally negotiated 
hospital order, an indication of which appears in comments made by Moorhaven' s 
Physician Superintendent in 1959: 
The hospital is proud of the honour of having the Chairman of 
the General Council of the roc on its staff. .. on many occa-
sions he has been of great help to the administrative staff of this 
hospital. The award of CBE to Mr Bartlett in the New Years 
Honours of 1960 is richly deserved (Moorhaven Hospital 
Annual Report, 1959). 
The success which COHSE achieved at Moorhaven was not matched in the 
general hospitals. Interviews with a Branch Secretary of Devonport Hospital in the 
1940's and 1950's revealed outright opposition, particularly from the hospital 
matron, to union organisation. This was illustrated in one war time episode when a 
young nurse, a union member, requested leave to marry her fiance who was briefly 
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returning from the front. The nurse had her request to the matron refused unless she 
left the union. 
The 1960's appears as a period of transition in two respects. As elsewhere, 
recruitment began to develop in the general hospitals but at the same time, and 
certainly by the early 1970's, the degree of organisational incorporation in the men-
tal illness services seems to have waned. In creating the beginnings of a new 
climate in the general hospitals the early managerialism may also have created new 
and alternative opportunities for individuals wanting greater responsibility within 
psychiatric nursing. 
Within the general hospitals, managerial sponsorship, though it may not have 
been the only cause of this change, undoubtedly left its imprint upon union charac-
ter. Two examples can be used to illustrate this, one drawn from ancillary staff and 
the other from general nursing. On the first, according to one local manager, the 
GMWU and COHSE were encouraged by management in the 1970's who saw the 
growth of ancillary worker trade unionism elsewhere and associated outbreaks of 
militancy with the presence of NUPE. This encouragement of union growth was 
associated with the development of a personnel function within the District, and 
can be seen as reflecting a form of incorporation rather different to that which ear-
lier prevailed within Moorhaven. It was founded upon bargaining relationships with 
administrators, even if primarily representational in content, rather than being a part 
of more distinct hospital identity and ideology. 
A closer form of this was more evident in the case of the RCN in the 1970's 
which grew among general nurses. Despite a rising membership, local organisation 
was weak; its organisational influence derived to a large extent from the support of 
senior nurse managers. Much of its organisational activity locally had been associ-
ated with "professional" concerns; including the arrangement of seminars and the 
like. By the early 1980's some of the most notable local activists were nurse 
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managers. For example, in one year the local branch was represented at the annual 
conference by three male "career" nurses; a director of nursing services, the nurse 
personnel officer and a young charge nurse who was seen by many to be aspiring to 
career advancement. In other words, the form of managerial support which encour-
aged the RCN was substantially different from that which had "sponsored" ancil-
lary worker unionisation. 
At the same time, the 1970's had seen a considerable formalisation of joint 
consultative arrangements involving all staff organisations. This included the estab-
lishment of a Joint Consultative Committee, and a parallel Health and Safety Com-
mittee, providing important vehicles for formal management-union relations. To a 
large extent they also encouraged a separation of bargaining activities as a special-
ism, both for managers and union representatives. These arrangements were largely 
unhindered by the 1979 industrial action, of which very little occurred in Plymouth 
health services. 
The influence of District level bargaining procedures was evident in the form 
that subsequent union organisation took. For example, in the late 1970's separate 
COHSE branch organisation at Moorhaven and in Plymouth general hospitals 
ended, with the creation of a single "group branch" covering the Plymouth Health 
District. This merger was actively encouraged by regional COHSE officers on the 
grounds that it made better sense for union organisation to correspond with NHS 
organisational structure. Critics within COHSE of this process suggested it had 
more to do with reducing the number of Branch Secretaries with whom the regional 
office needed to maintain contact. Whatever the case on this, its effect was to rein-
force the focus of much union-management relations at the level of district admin-
istration in which a relatively small number of union representatives were involved. 
The COHSE branch merger was accompanied by a continuing decline in 
union activity in its earlier stronghold at Moorhaven. At one point in the 1970's a 
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dissatisfied COHSE nursing steward left with a group of members to join the 
GMWU. These in fact appear to have rejoined COHSE, not least because in 1980 
the Moorhaven COHSE members reformed a hospital based branch. In any case, 
the GMWU, which had been effective principally in recruiting ancillary staff 
throughout the district, had a similar lack of active involvement. Most representa-
tive activities fell to a single convenor. 
These district-wide arrangements were, however, to come under considerable 
strain in the early 1980's. Highly significant in this were changes within the unions 
but which can be seen to have been prompted by influence of external changes. 
This included new groups of staff joining the workforce and union Full Time 
Officers seeking involvement in what had predominantly been a lay system of rep-
resentation. 
An important example of the first of these came as a consequence of the eco-
nomic recession, specifically in the closure of the Plymouth Fisons factory in 1981, 
a plant having a strong GMWU base. Several of the workers, including stewards, 
gained employment in Plymouth Health Authority at this time. These brought with 
them a different experience of trade unionism than that of most other stewards, 
having greater expectations for the role of workplace bargaining and being unused 
to the centralism of Whitley. 
A second source of change arose within COHSE with the new development 
of mental handicap services. No traditions of local union organisation existed 
within mental handicap services given their relative newness. COHSE immediately 
achieved a dominant position in the new units, partly as a result of new qualified 
staff coming to the area who were already COHSE members. One consequence of 
qualified staff having to be recruited from outside the area was that the new mental 
handicap service gained a higher proportion of younger members than might other-
wise have been expected. 
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The senior nurse for mental handicap was both fairly young and a COHSE 
member himself. Despite the more fragmented basis of the new units, this sector 
sustained a far stronger union organisation than was the case at the single site 
Moorhaven hospital at this time. The degree of concentration of workplace struc-
ture is clearly only one factor to take into account in explaining union decline. One 
consequence was that it brought into the local COHSE branch predominantly 
younger members, many of whom had experience of union activity. 
Together, these two changes brought new activists into two of the largest 
unions. In voicing criticisms of many elements of the existing consultation and 
bargaining relations, some support was received from other members who 
described it as being, "too cosy". This in itself may not have altered the state of 
affairs for some time, had it not been for Full Time Officers taking a role. 
This came about as a result of a dispute over claims that the constitution of 
the joint consultation machinery prevented attendance by Full-Time Officers. As a 
consequence of the membership growth in the 1970's, more full-time officers had 
been appointed by TUC unions and they now began to take a greater interest in the 
joint consultation forums than appears to have been the case at their inception. In 
particular, they began to raise concerns about the quality of some of the agreements 
which had been reached. The issue came to a head at one particular meeting of the 
Health and Safety Committee in 1981 when three full-time officers from COHSE, 
NUPE and GMB arrived to present objections to aspects of a newly drafted acci-
dent report form. 
Several representatives on the staff side from non-TUC affiliated organisa-
tions objected to their presence, and the issue of full-time officers right to attend 
was then put to a vote. In itself this appears to have been an unusual procedure as 
most issues had been resolved consenSUally. Because of the larger number of smal-
ler non-TUC affiliates, most of whom did not have full-time officers at local level, 
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a majority of the staff-side determined that they did not wish full-time officers to be 
in attendance. 
The issue drew a new line between ruc and non-TUC affiliates but also 
broughtlO the surface concerns among some sections of union membership that the 
existing arrangements were unsatisfactory. It is possible that the issue might have 
been resolved relatively smoothly had it not been for the fact that it coincided with 
the beginnings of the 1982 health service pay claim. The ruc unions at a national 
level were seeking to co-ordinate their activities but in Plymouth the JCC reached 
an informal agreement with management on avoiding any disruption. This created 
further grounds for opposition from within ruc unions, and extended the issue 
beyond that of procedural revision to the JCC constitution. 
Two developments occurred as a result of this. Firstly, representatives of 
ASTMS, which had always objected to sitting down with non-ruc affiliates, 
together with COHSE, GMWU and NUPE, organised an ad hoc "Joint Action 
Committee" to co-ordinate industrial action. Secondly, internal Changes occurred 
within certain unions. Most notably this was the case with the replacement in the 
GMWU of the existing convenor by the former senior steward from Fisons. Less 
acrimonious changes occurred in COHSE, with the Chair of the Action Committee 
being elected Branch Secretary. The former GMWU convenor responded by using 
the local media to accuse new GMWU and COHSE activists of importing 
unwanted militancy into local industrial relations. 
For much of 1982, attention was focused on the pay campaign. This was the 
first significant occassion in which Plymouth health workers had taken part in such 
a campaign, let alone one so prolonged as this was to be. At least in the short term 
it gave rise to new levels of member activity, particularly among ancillary member-
Ship. It was among this group at the new Derriford Hospital that the GMB estab-
lished a strong basis. The hospital, lacking the localised traditions of older hospi-
tals, provided the site for much of the industrial action during this year. 
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This process of internal union change was however a very uneven one. Not 
all ruc affiliates were involved in the Action Committee, and some, notably 
NALGO, were highly critical of some of its actions. On one occasion a group of 
cardiac technicians, who were NALGO members, were disassociated by their 
branch secretary for industrial action they took. The group then left NALGO to join 
ASTMS. 
Despite the unevenness of its impact, the 1982 dispute brought the "old 
order" to an end. It had brought to the surface a number of underlying changes 
which were taking root. However, the dispute ended with an outcome which 
delivered least for the ancillary workers who, in Plymouth, had been the most 
active participants. Moreover, by 1983 many of them faced the imminent imple-
mentation of competitive tendering. In this situation some form of negotiating 
machinery had to be re-established. 
Despite the frictions between TUC affiliates themselves during the dispute, 
some of which had maintained an involvement in the JCC, support was won from a 
majority to establish a Joint Trade Union Negotiating Committee (JTUNC) 
representing ruc affiliates only. An approach was made to management for recog-
nition which was refused on the grounds that the Authority wanted to meet staff 
representatives within a single body. The response of the TUC affiliates was to 
refuse to participate in what by now had become a virtually irrelevant committee, 
and instead proposed to take every matter to management through individual 
organisations. 
This non-participation in the Joint Consultative Committee placed increasing 
burdens upon district personnel staff. As a result of this it seemed at one point that 
an agreement to give de facto recognition to the ITUNC had been reached with the 
District Personnel Officer. This was however over-ruled by the District Manage-
ment Team. Eventually a compromise was reached that established a Joint Con-
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sultative Committee (lCC) to include all staff organisations, providing within its 
constitution for sub-committees: in practice the only sub-committee to operate was 
the JTUNe. The latter met management on a monthly basis, with bi-monthly meet-
ings of the lCe. TUC affiliates saw it as an opportunity to reach agreements 
through the lTUNC which would then require only formal ratification at the lCe. 
By now, objections to attendance by Full Time Officers had faded away. 
Problems were nevertheless experienced with the new arrangements. The 
first arose as a consequence of senior district managers and two Health Authority 
members attending the lCC, whereas the management side meeting the lTUNC 
was composed of the District Personnel Officer together with middle-ranking 
managers. This frequently led to an inability of the management side to reach 
agreement. An additional difficulty experienced by the ]TUNC arose as a con-
sequence of its Secretary having considerable difficulties obtaining time-off to 
carry out the duties required. This was compounded by the fact that in 1983 he was 
elected as an SOP County Councillor for which he required further time off. 
In this case the difficulties were not created by senior district management 
but his own manager who was a medical consultant. The problem led to the 
registering of a dispute by the lTUNC unions, eventually heard at regional level. 
While an apparently satisfactory compromise was reached, in practice the difficul-
ties continued. The impression was created that the consultant who was head of the 
department concerned was unwilling to be instructed on the matter, particularly 
from personnel managers. It indicated again the tendency towards seeking 
managerial support for sustaining union organisation in the context of more hostile 
internal sources of authority. 
However, the basis of this support had primarily been from personnel 
officers. The situation was to change again with the arrival of the new general 
management structure. It was made clear that the management side intended to 
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have one forum for consultation and negotiation, and within a year agreement had 
been reached to disband the JTUNC and a single Joint Committee for Consultation 
and Negotiation (JCCN) was established. This time there was little resistance from 
the TUC affiliates. 
An underlying reason for this was that institutional mechanisms were reflect-
ing changed relationships between unions and different groups of managers. An 
illustration of this is provided by the GMB, which unlike many other of the staff 
organisations defined itself almost exclusively in a bargaining role. The GMB had 
by now frrmly established itself at Derriford Hospital, and was benefiting as serv-
ices transferred there. GMB health service members, who had been part of the 
union's general branch were now transferred into a new health service branch. This 
was used to try and overcome what it had perceived as a reluctance by some health 
staff to join what they saw as an "outside" union. In this it appears to have enjoyed 
some success, for in addition to recruiting the majority of ancillary staff at Der-
riford the union began to attract many nursing assistants as well as some qualified 
staff. 
The GMB however did not make bargaining its sole concern. It, more than 
any other organisation, sought to gain members interest in other ways; family fun 
days, social evenings, raffles and suchlike. Yet, its focus within the workplace upon 
bargaining activities meant that it developed relationships principally with the new 
general managers. 
In contrast, organisations which had relied upon support from other sectors of 
management found themselves increasingly vulnerable. This was particularly the 
case for the RCN and COHSE. The extent of nurse manager involvement within 
the local RCN created tensions which in some cases proved irreconcilable. Most 
notable was that of the Director of Nursing Services referred to earlier, who 
eventually resigned over a refusal to implement what he saw as unacceptable cuts 
in the nursing budget. He later became a full time officer with the RCN. 
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The continuing impact of this pressure upon the RCN remained evident. as in 
1990 when a Trust application was being made by management. an RCN poster 
appeared in local hospitals stating: "Do not wear the opting out badges. You could 
be disciplined by management". At the same time several individual RCN represen-
tatives have been willing to speak out publicly on their concerns over funding, 
staffing levels and other issues. It was however apparent that support from nurse 
managers no longer meant as much as it had previously. 
The changing relationships between unions and general management were 
consequently reflected in the new consultative and negotiating systems. What was 
new was not the presence of accommodation but rather the form that it took. The 
only staff organisation which did not take up their seat on the newly established 
JCCN was the BMA, representing the hospital doctors. This reflects the distance 
which the BMA has traditionally kept from other staff organisations. In August 
1989 however the medical staff indicated that they would take up their seat, largely 
as a consequence of the local proposals arising from the Government's White 
Paper, but in practice this did not happen. 
Before leaving the issue of the relationship between bargaining structures and 
the character of union organisation one further example illustrates its sometimes 
complex nature. This case concerns St Mary's Hospital, Launceston, referred to in 
more detail in Chapter Eight. Most of the staff in the hospital are COHSE mem-
bers, the majority having had long periods of employment in the hospital. Although 
employed by Plymouth Health Authority, because of the structure of COHSE 
branch organisation they are members of its Cornwall Branch. That branch covers a 
very large geographical area in which transport facilities are not good. Union 
activity in the Cornwall COHSE Branch appears to be mainly within the larger 
hospitals in the county, at least so far as the presence of branch officers and stew-
ards is concerned. 
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Membership of the Cornwall branch reflects an identity with the county even 
though the employer since 1974 has been Plymouth Health Authority. A further 
factor may be the reluctance of branch organisations to encourage a transfer of 
members elsewhere when this will have an impact on levels of branch funding. The 
consequence was that the branch of which the St Mary's staff were members was 
not formally represented on their own employer's bargaining structures. One result 
of this was that the full time officer came to playa particularly important role. It 
nevertheless illustrates how identities can sometimes be generated from a variety of 
sources, not always corresponding with bargaining units. 
This review has suggested the importance of unions establishing support 
from sections within management, with the particular group being involved varying 
at different times and for different organisations. It was also noted how the intro-
duction of general management appeared to cut across existing networks and 
require the establishment of new ones which recognised and accommodated with 
its presence. Before leaving this general introduction one other point is worth 
highlighting, concerning the role of activists within the unions. 
GMB organisation at Derriford appeared to suffer when the union appointed 
its Health Service Branch Secretary as a part-time officer, while retaining part-time 
employment with the Health Authority. Eventually he left the area to take up a full-
time officer post and the branch organisation seemed weaker as a result. Similarly 
in COHSE, throughout the early 1980's problems were experienced in maintaining 
the single District branch, with most dissatisfaction being expressed by those out-
side of the general hospital sector. In 1986 the COHSE branch divided into a com-
munity services, comprising mental illness, mental handicap and elderly services, 
and a general hospital branch. These broadly corresponded with the new general 
management units. This development appeared, in the case of the community serv-
ice branch, to stimulate activity but this was not the case for the general hospital 
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branch. The division of the branch had resulted in most activists being in the com-
munity services branch and it was at Derriford that its organisation was weakest. 
COHSE involvement in the general hospitals therefore placed a heavy reliance 
upon the full time officer. 
To recognise the role of key individuals is not to reduce explanation to that 
factor alone. Such people seemed most important where they were part of an 
identity built around a clear definition of purpose. In this they played a vital role in 
expressing and articulating concerns of members. How such concerns came to be 
related to objectives, and how these were defined, is an important theme in the 
individual episodes in the following chapters. 
These episodes are used to explore themes identified earlier. In approaching 
the question as to whether or not health services are becoming less distinctive, 
attention is given to the NHS as a political system, the nature of negotiated order 
within it and the scope for conflict and accommodation. This is used to consider 
examples of union behaviour which relate to the alternative strategies described in 
Chapter Two. An important question is whether these represent complementary or 
alternative strategies, and for this reason the chapters are structured around the 
dominance of bargaining (Chapter Six), the relationship between bargaining and 
professional issues (Chapter Seven), and the relationship between bargaining and 
campaigning (Chapter Eight). The representational strategy is not discussed sepa-
rately for the reason given earlier, that its full expression requires additionallegisla-
tive support. Nevertheless, within many of the issues considered the role of individ-
ual representation arose as an important factor. The main focus, however, is not 
upon this but the extent to which bargaining, professional and campaigning 
strategies can be judged as mutually supportive or exclusive. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF PAY BARGAINING 
The historic dominance of collective bargaining within British trade unionism 
has already been noted, together with its emergence as an influential feature of 
health service trade unionism. Although here it was of a form highly constrained by 
the centralised Whitley Council system, efficiency drives linked with incentive 
bonus schemes, as encouraged by the National Board for Prices and Incomes in the 
1960's, provided an early stimulus for more localised negotiations. The main direct 
impact of this was nevertheless restricted to ancillary staff. 
Developments occurring within the NHS described in Chapter Three have 
substantially increased the pressure for effiCiency and labour productivity improve-
ments. As was also noted, the major consequences have been felt by ancillary staff 
although other indications suggest a widening impact. These developments give 
rise to two principal questions. Firstly, it is important to test the proposition that 
these changes are constraining local managers to act "as if' they were capitalists in 
their control over labour. Secondly, if this is the case, is it reducing the distinctive-
ness of the labour process within health care in ways which make the adoption of a 
more bargaining-based model more relevant for wider groups of staff? 
These general questions provide a guiding theme to much of the case study 
material in this and the following two chapters; here the focus is principally upon 
ways in which managerially inspired changes designed to improve efficiency were 
responded to by unions. Given the general impact of policies such as these upon 
ancillary staff this group provides the main focus. A specific example of change is 
selected, that which produced the highest level of efficiency savings, the introduc-
tion of technical change in the catering service. To enable wider comparisons to be 
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drawn some attention is also given to an attempt to raise efficiency in the organisa-
tion of nurse work rotas. For comparative purposes they have the advantage of each 
being hospital, rather than community, based. 
The two examples provide an opportunity to compare the relationship 
between the character of trade unionism in the two groups on the one hand. and the 
forms of institutional support provided by management on the other. In this. the 
focus seeks to move beyond a dichotomy between industrial relations bargaining 
systems and sociological aspects of union character to identify the importance of 
each and their inter-connections. 
The discussion focuses upon both processes and outcomes. The particular 
processes being examined in the two cases are slightly different but have in com-
mon the relationship between formal institutionalised bargaining and other ways in 
which order comes to be negotiated within the social relations of the hospital. This 
issue is approached by looking at how the policies originated, the initial response of 
unions and how this came to change in each case. Outcomes are considered in 
terms of what was achieved. but also in what the forms of accommodation which 
were reached suggest about the nature of workplace bargaining in the health service 
today. In particular, has an increased role for commercial factors weakened the 
unions or have they been strengthened by the opportunity for a more genuine 
bargaining rather than predominantly representational role? 
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Efficiency, markets and technology: 
the case of ancillary staff 
Technological change in the delivery of catering services occurred under the 
twin pressures of financial restraint and competitive tendering. In place of the tradi-
tional system of catering, which had been dispersed throughout the District with all 
hospitals having their own kitchen facilities, the new system involved food being 
prepared in a Central Production Unit (CPU), chilled and subsequently delivered to 
outlying hospitals by refrigerated lorries. Much of the initial stimulus for manage-
ment interest in the system came from the threat of competitive tendering. Indeed 
the senior manager most closely involved in its implementation later claimed that, 
"Plymouth decided upon a delivered meals service in response to the challenge of 
HC(83)18" (Health and Social Services Journal, 24th January 1985). 
"HC(83)18" was the Government circular which required of health author-
ities that they "market-tested" catering, domestic and laundry services via the 
mechanism of competitive tendering. Given its role in influencing management's 
plans, it is useful to briefly identify some aspects of the local Health Authorities 
response to the policy. The reply of Plymouth Health Authority to the 
Government's original consultative circular, DA(83)14, had included the comment 
that, "It is in broad agreement with the principal thrust of the circular, ie to ensure 
that support services are provided in the most effective manner". However, it went 
on to suggest: 
A straightforward cost comparison is not the only criterion 
Health Authorities should use. The ability to purchase a sub-
stantially improved level of service albeit at a slightly higher 
cost should also be considered (internal Health Authority 
paper). 
Doubts about the quality of service which might result, particularly from the 
use of private contractors, is very evident in this response. So too, according to one 
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personnel officer in the Authority, it lay behind the brief which managers had been 
given: to ensure that services remained in-house. The significance of this is particu-
larly important in the context of the view which seems to have been taken by some 
senior Health Authority members about wages within the NHS. It may have been 
the 1982 pay dispute itself which brought this to the fore, as illustrated in the fol-
lowing extract of a letter sent by the Chairman of the Health Authority to the 
JTUNC soon after the competitive tendering policy had been announced: 
It seems to me that competition is beneficial and in this case has 
brought to light one or two interesting aspects of our wage 
structure. During the industrial action some time ago I heard on 
the radio that it was the view of Trade Unions that the condi-
tions of employment of workers in the Health Service compared 
ill with the rest of the community. It would now appear that our 
staff are apprehensive that there are other people outside who 
are prepared to do the work they do for markedly less. 
The significance of this lay in the signal it sent that existing internal wage 
structures were to be closely examined in the process of competitive tendering. It 
was in this area that some of the greatest effects of the new cook-chill catering 
service were eventually to be felt. Before describing how this came about it is 
important to note some significant features of the existing catering workforce. 
Of the total workforce throughout the district of one hundred and eighty nine, 
the overwhelming majority, seventy nine per cent, were women. In tum, slightly 
over half of these women worked part-time. Union organisation was patchy. Staff 
in the larger hospitals had been involved in taking industrial action in 1982, and a 
legacy of this had been the involvement of several representatives, most of whom 
were young male cooks. Although union membership tended to be high, throughout 
the service as a whole levels of involvement were (with this main exception) 
generally low. Virtually all staff were members of either COHSE or the GMB, the 
latter being strongest in the main Plymouth hospitals which were most closely 
involved in the negotiations. 
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Details of the proposed operation of the new system became available in 
1984 in a management consultants report commissioned by the Health Authority. 
The immediate response from the unions was to find ways of resisting its introduc-
tion in the light of the substantial threat to jobs which it represented. Management 
responded to this fear in two ways. Firstly, it was argued that with competitive 
tendering now on the horizon it was essential to have "in-house" services operating 
effectively. A second claim from management was that the new service would pro-
vide, "the opportunity for the NHS to increase the skill levels and career prospects 
of its catering staff' (Health and Social Services Journal, 24th January 1985). 
The unions nevertheless initially maintained a position of opposition. This 
period was characterised by joint union involvement in a lobbying exercise 
designed mainly to persuade Health Authority members rather than senior manage-
ment. It was accepted that the jobs argument alone was unlikely to be persuasive 
for this group, and emphasis was instead given to aspects of food hygiene and 
safety. A report detailing alleged potential microbiological and other hazards was 
produced and sent to Health Authority members. 
It would be wrong to see this as a cynical use of safety issues as a covert 
attempt to protect jobs as there was a genuine distrust of the new technique. 
However, the arguments proved unsuccessful. Significant in this was the fact that 
the Authority's own senior microbiologist argued that, with adequate control meth-
ods, the system presented no additional risk of food contamination. This also 
proved to be an important factor in reducing the ability of the unions to attract the 
concern of the local media. 
With this reassurance the Health Authority was unwilling to forgo the level 
of savings involved which were substantial. Although the proposed system required 
a large capital investment, equivalent to one-third of the Health Authority's annual 
catering budget, it was expected to reduce annual catering costs by eighteen per 
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cent. In this context the unions found themselves finally unable even to secure the 
support of the ruc nominee on the Health Authority. The phase of opposition 
came to an end. 
Union attention turned instead to negotiating over the introduction of the new 
system. The implications of the new service for jobs were profound: an overall 
reduction in staff numbers by twenty five per cent was to be accompanied by addi-
tional reductions in hours of work as well as other changes in grades and earnings. 
Having failed in their opposition to the system, many union representatives did not 
feel they were likely to achieve any significant change in the numbers of jobs being 
lost: this after all provided much of the justification for the system. Instead, most 
attention turned to pay arrangements within the proposed system. 
Having a significant effect upon later developments, early negotiations 
centred around the staffing arrangements for the CPU. For management this was 
the fulcrum around which the new system was to be built, while simultaneously 
being the work-site promising the highest potential earnings for staff. Once union 
opposition to the plans had been withdrawn management demonstrated a con-
siderable willingness to provide facilities, in the form of time-off and the like, for 
union representatives to participate in negotiations. The initial focus upon the CPU 
was further encouraged by the fact that opportunities within the Unit would be 
largely restricted to qualified cooks, who provided the most prominent catering 
union representatives during negotiations. During this process the new GMB Secre-
tary was highly involved, drawing upon his experiences of more localised bargain-
ing. 
The process of focusing early negotiations upon the CPU influenced the final 
outcome because of the existing structuring of labour, both by capital and by gen-
der. The former showed its presence in the influence of the external labour market, 
while the second was evident in the internal composition of the workforce. The two 
processes operated in mutually supportive ways. 
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The negotiations concentrated upon what were to become the "elite" jobs: 
about fifteen cooks who would be responsible for cooking meals for all hospitals 
throughout the District. An immediate problem confronting both managers and 
union representatives arose from the intention to operate the CPU during day-time 
from Monday to Friday only. Given that a major element of earnings for many 
ancillary staff derives from enhanced rates for evening and weekend working, 
management recognised potential recruitment difficulties which it was keen to 
resolve as quickly as possible. 
External labour market factors came to be considered because management 
were aware that the staff who were being sought would have alternative 
opportunities available to them, particularly employment in local hotels. Much of 
the very early negotiations had the resolution of this problem as their objective. 
One other hospital in the country was identified that had already introduced a 
similar system, the London Hospital at Whitechapel, and management organised a 
visit with union representatives to jointly investigate how they had dealt with this 
problem and others. 
On return to Plymouth, neither managers or unions were impressed with the 
solution they had found in London. There the hospital had overcome the recruit-
ment problems of keeping the CPU staff on the low-paid ancillary staff scales by 
transferring them to grades on the Administrative and Clerical Council grades. This 
solution was not acceptable to the Plymouth management, who felt it was likely to 
cause difficulties with the Department of Health, and the unions, particularly those 
representing ancillary staff, were equally unimpressed. 
As it was to be another two years before the Ancillary Staff Whitley Council 
considered an agreement for cooks working in cook chill systems, the problem 
remained to be resolved at local level. After considerable negotiations a local 
agreement was reached. This involved placing CPU staff on a high grade within the 
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Ancillary Staff scales and in addition to guarantee them a thirty per cent bonus pay-
ment. For management this was acceptable as it produced an overall earnings 
which reflected their readings of the local labour market, a view later conflrmed in 
an interview with the new catering manager appointed from the private sector to 
introduce the new system. For the unions it was acceptable as it would maintain, 
and even enhance, existing levels of earnings. 
This issue having been resolved a further important question concerning the 
CPU remained outstanding: the method of selecting the flfteen staff to work within 
it. It is interesting to note that management were prepared to accept even this, to a 
limited extent, as a negotiable issue. Throughout, the unions had linked this to their 
negotiations on earnings, a stance which received considerable support from the 
fact that the cooks who would be eligible to apply were stating that they would not 
do so until an acceptable procedure was adopted. This solidaristic stance was at the 
same time highly sectional in being restricted to a comparatively small section of 
the catering workforce. 
Inevitably, there were many more cooks working throughout the District than 
the new system would require. Management demonstrated a willingness to adopt a 
joint approach with the unions to determining a broad set of criteria for selection 
while maintaining the flnal right to decide. After considerable negotiations a for-
mula was devised that would give weighting to length of experience, qualifications, 
and flnally an interview on which a union representative was invited to attend as an 
observer. 
The relative weighting to be given to experience and qualifications was to 
have considerable implications for the outcome. The existing workforce contained 
many female cooks who had been in the service for long periods of time but held 
minimal formal catering qualifications. These were more frequently possessed by 
younger cooks who in the majority of cases were male. Management were insistent 
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that the new posts demanded skills for which a higher grade of City and Guilds 
qualification was to be required, and the formula for appointment was weighted 
accordingly. 
Although the initial demand for this came from management it was largely 
acceded to by the unions without accompanying calls for the release of staff for fur-
ther training. Although there would have been difficulties in this, created by pres-
sures to get the system operating quickly and smoothly, it also tended to strengthen 
the chances for the cooks who had been most involved throughout. It has also to be 
said that many of the longer-serving female cooks had worked for many years in 
smaller, outlying hospital kitchens, and appeared less interested in the opportunities 
offered by the CPU in any event. This is difficult however to disentangle from the 
nature of union organisation which was strongest in the larger hospitals and in 
which male cooks were prominent. 
The negotiating emphasis upon the CPU was however leading to some 
expressions of dissatisfaction from other staff, notably some of the unqualified 
catering assistants who were predominantly female. The view was expressed by a 
group of catering assistants at one hospital that while a lot of time was being spent 
discussing the cook's posts, very little was being directed to addressing their own 
future. The reply of the GMB Secretary on one occasion when this was asked, and 
this seemed generally acceptable to other representatives, was that it was important 
to get good agreements in place for the cooks in order that others could follow in 
their wake. 
Whatever the intentions in adopting this process, it was not to be reflected in 
the outcome. Two aspects were important in this. Firstly, despite the claims for the 
new system that it would improve career opportunities and skill levels it was in fact 
to create a more segmented workforce than had been the case previously. This can 
be illustrated by comparing the composition of the workforce by ASC grade before 
and after the introduction of cook-chill, shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table ~.!: Composition of catering workforce by ASC Scale before and after 
the introduction of "cook chill" 
ASC 
pay group 
1-4 
5-8 
9-12 
13-16 
% 
before 
59.8% 
31.2% 
6.9% 
2.1% 
% 
after 
79.0% 
4.5% 
12.0% 
1.5% 
The increase in the proportion of staff in the bottom four ancillary grades, 
from nearly sixty per cent to almost eighty per cent, had particular impact upon 
women who filled the majority of these grades. Ninety two per cent of posts at 
these grades had been occupied by women under the previous system. This bifurca-
tion of the workforce reflected the fact that the new technology had been intro-
duced in a way which involved enhanced skills for some and deskilled others. The 
consequences of this upon earnings was to become even greater when it came to 
negotiating bonus payments for staff other than the CPU cooks and it became evi-
dent that different considerations would apply. 
Under the previous catering system, all staff had been covered by a tradi-
tional incentive bonus scheme, giving them a bonus payment of either ten or fifteen 
per cent, varying slightly between hospitals. Management now argued that the 
imminent threat of competitive tendering precluded the continuation of that level of 
bonus. This was despite the fact that agreement had already been reached on an 
automatic thirty per cent bonus payment for CPU cooks. 
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Negotiations produced an agreement that bonus payments for non-CPU staff 
would in future depend upon savings achieved within the allocated budget. One 
GMB Full Time Officer involved in the negotiations described this in terms of it 
being a form of "profit sharing". While it provided an opportunity for retention of 
some bonus payment which would otherwise have been difficult to secure, it 
underlined the different status of the two groups of staff. 
A final element of the package arising from this phase of negotiations con-
cerned redundancy terms for staff leaving the service as a result of the change. 
Within the NHS, redundancy payments are covered by national agreements reached 
on the General Whitley Council and it was agreed by management to supplement 
these with additional local payments. While the amounts involved were not sub-
stantial it nevertheless represented a further symbolic departure from national 
agreements. The willingness with which the more localised bargaining was 
embraced was uneven between unions, with the GMB being generally more 
enthusiastic than was COHSE. This very much reflected the role of local officials, 
both lay and full time, and their respective experiences and traditions. In terms of 
the outcomes which the negotiations produced, there were several examples of 
improvements over the national agreements, but this involved a highly uneven dis-
tribution of benefits. 
The attentions of the unions now turned to the individual representation of 
members affected by the new system, a role with which the majority were much 
more familiar. Having reached agreements on all of the major substantive issues 
involved, the process of placing individual staff within the new structure proceeded 
relatively smoothly. 
Could the outcome have been any different? In addressing this question it has 
to be recognised that the unions would have faced a major difficulty had they had 
sought to utilise the stance taken by cooks to delay progress on implementation 
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until the concerns of all staff had been fully addressed. Management were prepared 
to concede on the payment for CPU cooks because of the recruitment problems 
they recognised would otherwise be faced. At the same time, a prime motive factor 
behind the whole system was the potential it offered for efficiency savings: 
recovering some of these for the benefit of staff for whom recruitment was not seen 
as a problem may have proved far more difficult. 
To an extent the local NHS managers can be regarded as having to act on the 
basis of capitalist rationality, and this provided the context within which bargaining 
could occur. The existing gender-structuring of the workforce was then reinforced 
in the new structure. Nevertheless, once the unions had dropped their opposition 
management were willing to provide considerable support for them to participate in 
negotiations. It is impossible to judge whether this would have been any different 
had it occurred after the introduction of general management, although it is worth 
noting that the lead manager responsible went on to a far more successful career 
within it than did many of the other local administrators of the time. Although 
preceding it, the management style which was adopted was closer to that of general 
management than with its predecessor. 
While it would be wrong to see these processes and outcomes as automatic it 
cannot be denied that the bargaining goals of the unions, largely reflecting the main 
sources of active involvement and support from within their memberships, rein-
forced the impact of other pressures such as the influence of external labour 
markets. Member involvement was variable throughout the negotiations, and at an 
early stage those principally involved were those most likely to be seeking jobs 
within the CPU. With new possibilities for local negotiations come many of the 
limits of traditional collective bargaining, particularly its frequently highly sec-
tional character. 
Nevertheless, in the context of renewed efficiency drives within the NHS it 
may offer an important model for the future. Before considering how general its 
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application may be the following provides an alternative account of changes to con-
ditions of employment brought about under the same financial pressures. Despite 
this similarity, both the processes and outcomes to which it gave rise were to be 
considerably different from the experience in the catering service. 
Efficiency, staffing and labour costs: 
the case of nursing 
This section describes experiences arising from management attempts to 
change nurse work rotas in the general hospitals. It is a shorter account than the 
preceding one largely because there was far less in the way of structured negotia-
tions around specific bargaining objectives. Related to this, and perhaps represent-
ing the most important difference, the distinction between phases of opposition to 
the change and negotiations over the terms of its introduction were less clear cut. 
The cook chill catering system had been introduced prior to general management, 
in contrast, the teeth of the new general managers were cut in changing nurse work 
rotas. Yet the origins of the change lay in an earlier and very different source. 
Nurse staffing levels in local hospitals had been considerably below those 
regarded as necessary for much of the 1970's. This was a view taken not only by 
the unions and by 1979, as was noted in Chapter Five, temporary ward closures 
were being announced as a consequence. By the following year the implementation 
of the Clegg award for nurses, with its reduction in the working week from forty to 
thirty seven and one half hours, put further pressure on the system. Complaints 
about levels of staffing continued. 
In 1984 the Health Authority appeared to accede to these claims in a decision 
to commission an independent report into levels of nurse staffing within the Dis-
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trict. Several methods of measuring nurse staffing levels have been developed and 
nurse managers and staff organisations were apparently involved in the selection of 
the method to be adopted. The system that was chosen was one known as the "Tel-
ford" method, a system which makes considerable use of the perceptions of 
required staffing levels by nurses themselves. The study was protracted as it 
involved visits to all wards. and discussions with individual members of the nursing 
staff on levels of nursing activity and their perceptions of need. 
When the report was published it concluded that levels of nurse staffing were 
substantially below that which was required, by over three hundred throughout the 
District. This appeared to confirm the claims which had long been made by the 
nursing unions, by many nurse managers and indeed by several hospital administra-
tors themselves. However, by now the era of efficiency savings had arrived. In this 
context there was little likelihood that the Health Authority would find the 
resources necessary for such an expansion. 
Instead, the initial response from the Health Authority involved a criticism of 
the methods of the Telford study on the grounds that it was too subjective. The 
unions were able to counter this with the response that it was the Authority itself 
which had originally commissioned the report and its method, and it was rather late 
in the day to question its legitimacy. These however had more the character of 
debating points in the context of very real financial constraint. Meetings were held 
with the unions. on one occasion very unusually attended by Health Authority 
members themselves, to consider what action to take in light of the report's recom-
mendations. but very little was done in the short tenn. In effect, whether by inten-
tion or otherwise. the problem remained one for the incoming general management 
to pick up. 
This brought with it a very different approach to the problem. By 1986 the 
management were arguing that the problem was not one of there being too few 
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nurses but rather that existing ones were being ineffectively employed. The focus 
of attention was shifted to the afternoon "overlap" period between the early and late 
shifts, which it was claimed was too long. Cutting this overlap would allow the 
morning duty to start earlier and the late duty to finish later, with a further con-
sequence of a shorter night duty. This in turn would mean fewer night staff would 
be needed, or, as was proposed, the same number of night staff would work more 
but shorter shifts. On average this would mean one extra night duty per fortnight. 
Not only did this solution reduce the claim for extra nurses, it did so in a way 
which made the largest contribution to the Authority's efficiency savings second 
only to the introduction of the cook chill catering system. 
From the outset, the unions adopted a policy of outright opposition to the 
proposal. Arguments were put forward that the overlap was a necessary period in 
which the slightly more generous level of staffing enabled a variety of tasks to be 
completed. For this some evidence was used from nursing research literature, but 
this type of "professional" argument was not to the fore. Two possible reasons for 
this are worth noting, firstly concerning the role of nurse managers, and secondly 
the nature of pressure from members themselves. 
The period was one in which nurse managers were still establishing their 
relationship with general management. As was mentioned in Chapter Five, one 
Director of Nurse Services, an active RCN member, had already resigned in protest 
at what he saw as unacceptable levels of resources for nursing. Few others would 
be prepared or able to adopt such a course even had they desired to do so. This 
meant they had to negotiate a relationship with general managers which recognised 
the new sources of authority. 
The second factor concerned the response from nursing staff themselves. This 
tended to emphasise the impact the changes would have upon their existing condi-
tions of employment. For example, many day staff objected to proposed rotas 
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which could mean finishing work at 1O.OOpm one night and starting again at 
7.30am the following morning. However, the strongest resistance came from night 
staff who objected to working the extra night for the same level of pay. 
These two factors combined to create most emphasis being placed upon the 
impact of the change on conditions of employment. This however created a poten-
tial difficulty for the unions in maintaining their opposition to the plan. Although 
this had the apparent support of members, with conditions of employment issues to 
the fore it became inevitable that pressures would arise to negotiate over the terms 
of change. This was in fact how management responded, signalling their intention 
to proceed with implementation of the changes while being prepared to negotiate 
its introduction. 
The unions entered into talks with management without renouncing their 
opposition to the intentions, as had effectively been the case with cook-chill. A 
consequence was that management did not appear to regard this as a serious inten-
tion to negotiate around the principle of the change. In any event, little emerged 
from the talks in the way of mutual agreement. 
At this point the tactics being adopted by management began to change. 
Whereas with cook-chill a willingness had been shown to hold back until key 
aspects had been negotiated, management now announced their intention to imple-
ment the change regardless of agreement with the unions. This was a very real 
departure from any previous practice and no doubt reflected managerial intention to 
secure the perceived available savings. The announcement was accompanied by a 
new tactic of approaching individual members of staff to accept the change in 
working hours. 
It is impossible to judge precisely what happened but there were numerous 
complaints of intimidation by managers of individual staff. Certainly many individ-
ual nurses have expressed the view that they felt pressurised by management to 
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accept the changes. This included some instances when individuals reported that 
they had been told that refusal to accept the changes could result in their dismissal. 
It was certainly the case that on several occasions staff were interviewed by 
managers without the presence of a union representative. Management denied that 
this was their intention, but there nevertheless appeared to be at least some occa-
sions when managers arrived at unusual times during the night and interviewed 
staff when no representative was available. The issue created considerable anger, 
and led to an explicit management statement that all staff had the right to be 
accompanied by a union representative if this was their wish. 
By this time some individuals had agreed to accept the changes, and although 
the unions argued this had been under duress this did not alter the fact that accept-
ance of the changes had gained a foothold. This situation gave rise to a period of 
some recrimination and conflict within and between the unions. From many mem-
bers came criticisms of the unions for their lack of assistance, while several union 
representatives expressed their frustration that individual members were pres-
surised into accepting the change. These problems were compounded by the genu-
ine communication problems which existed as several hospitals across different 
sites were involved involving a work-group providing a round-the-clock service. 
The level of membership involvement was rising, particularly as measured by 
attendance at meetings to discuss the issue, but this was by now at a relatively late 
stage. In this climate some nursing staff sought advice outside of the unions by 
going to local solicitors. Unsurprisingly they received a legalistic interpretation of 
employer's abilities to alter individual contracts of employment, and the difficulties 
faced by individuals resisting this. 
The role of the nurse managers had become a significant issue. They were 
major actors in the process and their role created considerable anger among many 
union representatives. Several expressed a feeling of betrayal by nurse managers 
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with whom they felt good working relationships had previously existed. Others 
stated they experienced a different relationship with nurse managers during this 
period even though in many cases they had known them for several years. Com-
ments were made that many nurse managers were seen to be doing the "dirty work" 
for general managers in trying to get the plan implemented. This had particular 
relevance in the context of union attempts to argue the potential clinical dis-
advantages of the change which was felt to be undermined by the stance taken by 
nurse management. Similar in some ways with the issue of food hygiene in relation 
to cook-chill, "professional" objections proved harder to sustain in the absence of 
support from what might be seen as legitimate authorities. What made this case 
rather different was a greater expectation that such support would be forthcoming. 
In what was becoming an increasingly chaotic situation a further problem 
emerged for the majority of unions. This was still at the time when the TUC unions 
were meeting management separately, and it now became evident that the RCN 
were already engaged in talks with management. The division between the ruc 
unions and non-affiliates had not been an issue with the catering staff, but here it 
created additional problems in what was already a confusing situation. Further to 
this, unlike the situation in the catering service where the GMB had been dominant, 
nursing union stewards and full-time officers were generally not so enthusiastic or 
comfortable with more localised bargaining. 
Nevertheless, a local agreement was finally reached by the JTUNC and 
management which, as in the case with catering staff, went outside of provisions 
within the Whitley Council national agreements. It was wholly related to providing 
a compensation payment in return for staff acceptance of the change, with payment 
being based upon flat rate payments of £200 for unqualified staff and £400 for 
qualified staff together with supplements for service of five years or over and for 
night staff. 
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The range of total individual compensation payments was between £200 and 
£1,000, although it is worth noting that the agreement provided slightly better terms 
for qualified compared to unqualified staff, as in the differential flat-rate payment. 
For the Authority the total cost of the compensation package was estimated to come 
to £352,300. While this was a substantial sum it had to be set against the ongoing 
savings the changes were expected to secure. 
Even with this agreement, some groups of staff refused to accept the change. 
However, this left them in the position whereby any future job move would require 
them to accept the change but without any compensation payment. Although the 
number of groups refusing was relatively small, they did indicate that in the face of 
refusal there was little in the way of counter sanction that management possessed. 
Whatever suggestions of dismissal may have been made, it would have been 
inconceivable for a Health Authority to sack virtually its entire nursing workforce. 
The potential basis for resistance would appear to have been far stronger on 
this issue than had been the case for cook-chill yet this did not on the whole 
materialise. Of greatest significance in this was the character of union organisation 
and the role of nurse managers. The two were closely related as the episode marked 
a period of transition in which nursing became subject to the scrutiny of the new 
managerialism in a way that it. had not hitherto. As the example of the seeking of 
legal advice illustrated, many nurse union members did not demonstrate the same 
reliance upon collective action as had the cooks who refused to apply for posts 
within the new catering service until agreements had been reached. Deficiencies in 
union organisation and communication reflected, rather than caused, this lack of 
collective identity. 
In tackling the organisation of nurse work rotas, general management showed 
itself to be increasingly acting "as if' capitalists and, in many respects more sig-
nificantly, nurse managers found themselves accepting the same logic if resources 
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were to be released for the services they deemed necessary. In this situation the 
unions were unable to sustain an effective collective response. The final bargained 
outcome, compensation for the tenns of change, suggested increasingly similarities 
with the situation facing ancillary workers. A major difference had been that the 
unions had not been provided with the same measure of institutional support from 
management as had been the case in the catering service. This reflected the fact that 
there the principle of change had been accepted and attention could tum to the 
terms of its implementation. 
Opportunities and limitations in local bargaining and representation 
Before leaving these examples of responses from unions where outcomes 
involved negotiated arrangements over the tenns of change, two general points can 
be emphasised. These relate to the new opportunities which managerial changes 
created for local bargaining and the limits under which this existed. Processes in 
each case were fundamentally shaped by definitions of union purpose and the 
objectives these were designed to secure: ultimately these were shown to be the 
protection of tenns and conditions of employment. New opportunities for their 
more localised detennination were evident in each of the changes, yet the outcomes 
to which they gave rise were highly uneven both between and within the two 
groups. 
In appearing to reduce the distinctiveness of NHS industrial relations many of 
the more generally experienced characteristics of collective bargaining came to be 
felt. Above all this included the sectional differences it can contribute towards. The 
particular pattern they took in these cases reflected a variety of influences in which 
a crucial role was the character of union organisation, in terms of the nature of col-
lective identity and the fonn of its relations with sections within management. The 
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episodes nevertheless suggested the possibility that an increasingly bargaining-
based strategy, in the changing context of the NHS, requires a willingness to 
accommodate with general management in certain of its objectives. 
These two episodes can in this sense be seen as illustrative of a "new realist" 
approach, but as such also indicate the difficulties of converting a tactical response 
into an overall strategy. This became increasingly evident in the period following 
the introduction of cook chill in 1984 and the changes to nurses hours in 1986. 
Growing difficulties were experienced by the Health Authority in identifying fur-
ther scope for efficiency savings and the Authority observed: 
It is generally accepted that the cost improvement schemes 
which are relatively more straightforward in management terms 
to implement have already been dealt with satisfactorily within 
this District. (Plymouth Health Authority, Annual Programme 
1990/91). 
Despite this, the Plan is forced to acknowledge: 
It is likely that in future years the only source of finance for 
developing services will be that which can be generated inter-
nally from reviewing existing services. (Plymouth Health 
Authority, Annual Programme 1990/91). 
By that time only £507,000 of a cost improvement target of £924,000 for 
1990/91 had been positively identified, and the Authority imposed a one per cent 
levy on pay budgets by increasing the vacancy/staff turnover factor. This was a 
straightforward cut, producing an anticipated saving of £800,000, rather than a gen-
uine effiCiency improvement. A consequence of this renewed fmancial stringency 
came in further evidence of divergence between staff groups, which can be briefly 
illustrated by returning to the example of the new bonus arrangements which had 
been agreed for those catering staff not working in the CPU. 
In subsequent negotiations surrounding competitive tendering the formula 
which had been reached for catering assistants, based upon the achievement of 
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additional savings from within the catering budget, had been extended to apply also 
to domestic assistants. This was to create considerable variations within this group 
of staff. For example, in 1989/90 the in-house hotel services contract (including 
domestic and housekeeping services) at Plymouth General Hospital was underspent 
by £23,745, mainly attributable to the reduced consumption of materials, while that 
at Derriford was overspent. The new bonus agreement meant that £17,000 was 
divided among staff at Plymouth General in bonus payments while staff at Der-
riford received no bonus payment. Although some Health Authority members were 
suggesting that the bonus arrangements be scrapped altogether to increase savings, 
this was resisted by managers who clearly saw them as having been an important 
factor in achieving consent. 
While this attitude illustrates the potential for a more market-based bargain-
ing strategy, the uneven impact which it had and the variable extent to which it was 
embraced by different groups of members suggest other difficulties. The group 
which demonstrated the strongest, and most successful, commitment to a bargain-
ing strategy, the cooks in the larger hospitals, were predominantly male. In con-
trast, most other staff, including catering assistants, cooks in the smaller hospitals, 
and the majority of nursing staff, were female. Although the more unionate 
bargaining strategy appeared more effective in protecting job interests an important 
factor in this was the scale of savings which management were determined to 
achieve. 
Two possible interpretations might be placed upon these outcomes. The first 
is to emphasise the possibilities localised bargaining create for achieving benefits 
for members which, however limited and uneven in their distribution, nevertheless 
represented a real improvement upon that which would otherwise have been avail-
able. In these terms it represented a necessary and rational accommodation with the 
new realities of health service management. The second is to focus upon the limita-
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tions which market-bargaining possesses in extending and deepening divisions 
within the workforce. 
However, the obstacles which union opposition faced were not exclusively 
the product of managerial intent to secure efficiency savings. This determination 
was matched by an inability on the part of the unions to secure sufficient 
"legitimacy" for their own opposition. Such legitimacy would seem most likely to 
arise where issues were directly concerned with matters of service provision and 
where staff were able to claim some degree of 'professional status'. To explore 
these possibilities further the following chapter looks at examples where manage-
ment sought to alter planned developments in mental illness and mental handicap 
services and the implications this had for service delivery and employment. . 
These examples provide an opportunity to consider whether the relationship 
between bargaining objectives and service issues can be different to that which was 
identified in the issues considered here. They offer a means of assessing how 
realistic it is to expect unions, "to address the content and objectives of their mem-
bers' work, not just the terms and conditions" (Clay, 1987, pI43). In particular, 
they can be used to consider whether 'professional' strategies rather than 'market 
unionism' might prove more suited to some work groups within the health service. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BARGAINING AND PROFESSIONAL STRATEGIES 
In the episodes described in the previous chapter unions were unsuccessful in 
resisting the implementation of change designed to raise efficiency and labour pro-
ductivity. Both episodes were ones in which management proved capable of claim-
ing that the proposed changes would be able to deliver the same outputs as before, 
but requiring fewer inputs. This weakened the basis of union resistance and encour-
aged attempts to negotiate over the terms of change. The fact that the outcomes of 
these were variable, in large part reflecting the character of union organisation and 
the nature of alliances it was able to form with sections of management, was noted. 
Where these were based upon older relationships, as was the case with nursing, 
these seemed less durable than was the case with newer forms of accommodation 
with general managers. These seemed prepared to support a new bargaining rela-
tionship founded upon an implicit acceptance of management's "right to manage". 
A question which this raises is whether or not the same would apply in the 
context of changes designed to secure a change in outputs as well as inputs. In 
terms of the health service as. a producer of use values, would this create greater 
opportunities for unions to influence the broader direction of change beyond its 
impact upon pay and conditions? 
In Chapter Two reference was made to a strategy of trade unionism which 
emphasised professional objectives, with it's status as such, rather than as an exam-
ple of extended collective bargaining, being implicitly based upon claims to spe-
cialist expertise and knowledge. Without entering the wider debates here concern-
ing the notion of professionalism it can be treated as a particular strategy for gain-
ing occupational control and as such possesses something in the way of a distinct 
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identity. The two examples in the previous chapter suggested very minimal 
opportunities for union involvement in job content where major pressures for 
change were operating, and the discussion in this chapter develops a rather different 
direction by looking at possible scope for union influence in the planning of service 
delivery and related employment matters. This is designed to explore two issues: 
the extent to which health care retains a distinctiveness irrespective of a tendency 
for the labour process to become increasingly analogous with that of a capitalist 
enterprise, and how far staff claiming professional status may be more successful in 
countering such a shift. 
This chapter examines managerial intentions to alter agreed service develop-
ment plans in services for the mentally ill and mentally handicapped, with the dis-
cussion structured around separate treatment of the two services. However, it is 
useful to introduce this with a very brief summary of their background for although 
the two services developed very differently historically they were each to become 
subject to policies designed to transfer care into the community. Of more sig-
nificance still for the current discussion, these policies were to be implemented in a 
period of severe financial constraint. 
Local services for the mentally handicapped developed late in Plymouth. The 
origins of this lay in the nineteenth century with the building of an asylum at Star-
cross near Exeter, the Royal Western Counties Hospital. This was for patients from 
throughout Devon and Cornwall, and it provided most of the NBS facilities in the 
two counties until its closure in 1985. The development of Plymouth NBS facilities 
did not begin until 1978. In 1979 a plan was agreed by the then Devon Area Health 
Authority which envisaged local NHS provision of one-hundred residential places 
and forty additional day places by the end of the 1980's. These were to be provided 
in four community units, and towards this objective two community homes were 
opened in 1981 with forty residential and twenty-five day places being provided by 
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1983. By this time local NHS managers in Exeter were accelerating plans for the 
closure of Starcross. Interestingly, this was to give rise to very different develop-
ments in Plymouth and in Exeter. Discussion in this chapter focuses upon the for-
mer, although some comparisons with Exeter are drawn in the final chapter. 
Plymouth services for the mentally ill have traditionally been based at Moor-
haven Hospital, situated on the edge of Dartmoor ten miles from the city. Develop-
ment of community-based services started as far back as 1957, at a time when there 
were over eight hundred patients in the hospital. This figure had been reduced to 
five hundred and fifty four in 1977. By the late 1980's less than two hundred 
patients were accommodated at the hospital, and closure is planned by 1993. 
In each of the services there were relatively long-standing plans to replace 
traditional institutional care with services based in the community. A significant 
difference was that for mental handicap services the original time-scale for service 
developments was altered by decisions by Exeter Health Authority. An important 
factor held in common by both services, and which was to prove of crucial sig-
nificance, were policy decisions by Plymouth Health Authority that service devel-
opment was to be contained within the levels of existing spending on the services. 
In relation to mental handicap services, this was the stated intention of Plymouth 
Health Authority at least as far back as 1983: 
The cost of replacing the existing service for Mentally Hand-
icapped people with a community based service is intended to 
be self-financing. That is, the costs of the new service should 
not be greater than the cost of the current service (PHA District 
Treasurer's Office, November 1983). 
Similarly, on proposals for services for the mentally ill it was stated in the 
following year: 
The plan is self financing in revenue which will be provided 
from the rundown of services at Moorhaven while capital will 
be provided by deferring large upgrading schemes which were 
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planned for Moorhaven Hospital (PHA Strategic Plan, 1985-
94). 
These fmancial objectives, arguably above all else, shaped both future service 
development and the nature of conflict with the trade unions. Two points are 
noteworthy here. Firstly, this policy preceded the introduction of general manage-
ment; the influential factor was the pressure of financial constraint. Secondly, it 
was a policy which was shortly to come under fire from the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Social Services which protested: 
A decent community-based service for mentally ill or mentally 
handicapped people cannot be provided at the same overall cost 
as present services. The proposition that community care could 
be cost-neutral is untenable .... Proceeding with a policy of 
community care on a cost-neutral assumption is not simply 
naive: it is positively inhumane. (House of Commons Select 
Committee on Social Services, January 1985). 
Yet this was precisely what Plymouth Health Authority was seeking to 
achieve. Before long it became apparent that one consequence would be a revision 
of earlier service development plans. The following explains two aspects of this; 
fIrstly, on the impact of proposals to delay the implementation of elements of the 
plan for mental illness services, and secondly, a more fundamental reconsideration 
of the direction to be taken in mental handicap services. Discussion on the former 
begins with an account identifying aspects of the social relations on the wards as 
these formed an important element in the local negotiation of order. 
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Defending jobs and services: mental illness services 
Work relations on the wards 
Mental illness services at Moorhaven are divided into three sectors; acute 
psychiatry, rehabilitation and elderly care. The following discussion concentrates 
on the first two of these; acute services being broadly defined as catering for people 
with an immediate onset of a serious psychiatric disorder, and rehabilitation provid-
ing for those who are not experiencing such a crisis but are considered to need 
ongoing clinical intervention and support. In practice the difference may not be so 
clear-cut as this distinction implies. 
Though located within the same hospital the two services differed con-
siderably in character. On entering the respective wards the most immediately 
visible difference was that staff working in rehabilitation were not required to wear 
uniform, although this was expected of female staff in acute services (a policy 
which was subsequently changed). This distinction nevertheless symbolised an 
underlying difference in conceptions of the relationship between nurses and 
patients. In tum it became apparent that this reflected what might be regarded as 
broader ideological differences between the senior medical and nursing staff in the 
two sectors. 
In the case of acute services this could be described as being "orthodox", with 
a more "challenging" model being proposed within rehabilitation. To this extent the 
hospital provided confmnation of Strauss's (1963) original account of the negotia-
tion of order within a psychiatric hospital. Differences between the two sectors, 
while not being absolutely clear cut, were important in shaping future develop-
ments. 
Within the rehabilitation service a new senior nurse had been appointed in 
1983 who was quite young and articulate, and strongly committed to a new style of 
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community-based psychiatric service. Around the same time a consultant was 
appointed, also young and willing to be innovative. When nursing vacancies arose 
the senior nurse appeared keen to appoint, and later promote, younger and 
enthusiastic staff. In contrast, the senior nurse within the acute service, who was in 
his fifties, could be better described as being part of the" old school". A similar des-
cription could be applied to the acute service consultant; in fact the eventual 
removal of the requirement to wear uniform came only when a new consultant was 
appointed. 
The developing rehabilitation service aimed to be flexible in its approach. Its 
stated policy objective was to base service provision upon an assessment of indi-
vidual needs, requiring a range of staff to work together on a multi-disciplinary 
basis. A further aspect of this was a redrawing of some traditional work routines, 
one example of which was an agreement reached on staff duty rotas allowing 
"internal rotation", (that is, the working of mixed duties of nights and days instead 
of one or the other). This agreement was reached informally with staff in the serv-
ice rather than being arrived at through the formal negotiating mechanisms 
described earlier. 
A more traditional model of work relations was evident within the acute serv-
ice. For example, one student nurse who had experienced work on both acute and 
rehabilitation wards remarked that nursing staff on the former appeared to be more 
subservient to medical staff. There were occasional exceptions, as when a deputy 
Charge Nurse objected to the diagnosis of someone as mentally ill by a junior doc-
tor to be over-ruled with the words, "Well I'm saying he is". During a discussion of 
this episode some nurses on the ward expressed resentment that a junior doctor, 
with possibly six weeks training in psychiatry, could over-rule a nurse with over a 
decade of relevant training and experience. However, this discussion appeared not 
to be taken any further: there did not seem to be a belief that their nurse manage-
ment would take up such concerns. 
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In fact, those nursing staff who seemed most dissatisfied with subservience to 
doctors also seemed most critical of their own nurse management. The deputy 
Charge Nurse referred to above later resigned feeling aggrieved that he was not 
being given promotion opportunities despite being more highly qualified and expe-
rienced than some who were. 
The comparison of the two services, and the nature of nursing within them, 
suggests the influence of senior medical staff is of considerable importance in set-
ting the context for styles of nursing practice. In tum, senior nurse managers were 
able to take opportunities for innovation or to accommodate to the status quo. An 
important consequence of the differences which were evident between the two sec-
tors was that staff, despite the fact that they worked in the same hospital, seemed to 
hold little in the way of a shared sense of identity. This provided the context for the 
impact in early 1989 of funding pressures within mental illness services. 
Threats to service developments 
One consequence of these financial pressures was a decision in March 1989 
by the Health Authority's Mental Health Implementation Group to freeze nurse 
staffing levels within the rehabilitation service at eighty one whole time equi-
valent's. This meant that a further nine WTE posts which were needed during 
1989/90 were not to be filled until resources were identified. 
The senior nurse within rehabilitation believed that without these additional 
posts it would not be possible to proceed with the original service plan, claiming 
that one of three options were available until the extra posts were funded. Firstly, to 
stop all referrals to the rehabilitation service; secondly, to redesign the planned 
residential service; or thirdly, to return to a service based on residential care. He 
argued that the latter, other considerations apart, could ultimately prove more 
expensive. 
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Details of management discussions were leaked, with the suspicion among 
many managers that the senior nurse was responsible. Within a week a joint meet-
ing of all nursing members in the rehabilitation service was organised by COHSE 
and the RCN. A genuinely strong sense of feeling existed, which in some respects 
seems out of proportion to what was actually being proposed which involved no 
immediate job cuts. The strength of feeling among the nursing staff must largely be 
attributed to a view that the future development of a community-based service 
might be in danger. So far as jobs were concerned, it was the defence of future ones 
rather than the protection of existing ones that was at issue. 
Fonnal negotiations with general management now brought into play the 
infonnal agreement which had been reached with the senior nurse on flexible work-
ing. While this had been introduced principally on grounds of service need, it also 
produced some financial savings. Staff now threatened to withdraw from their 
infonnal agreements on flexible working unless the additional funding was pro-
vided for the development of the service as originally planned. The Unit General 
Manager was infonned by the COHSE full-time officer that unless this occurred 
the withdrawal from the flexible working agreement would commence on Tuesday 
4th April. 
Shortly before this date a meeting was convened between the Unit General 
Manager, the COHSE Full Time Officer and the Branch Secretary, details of which 
were reported to a further COHSEIRCN members meeting held on the evening of 
3rd April. For reasons which remain slightly unclear, but apparently relate to a per-
ceived opportunity for further negotiations, the meeting agreed to suspend the with-
drawal from flexible working for two weeks pending further discussion. A further 
letter was then sent to the Unit General Manager, again in the name of the COHSE 
Full Time Officer, seeking a commitment from management on the following 
points: firstly, 87.09 WTE nursing posts to be fully funded from 5th April 1989; 
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secondly, 96.0 WTE nursing posts to be fully funded from 5th April 1990; thirdly, 
for the final plans for the rehabilitation service to go ahead as agreed; and fourthly, 
for the rehabilitation service to stay within the NHS. 
The reply from the Unit General Manager gave a clear commitment on the 
first of these, although this included two converted domestic posts which, it was 
stated, had the agreement of the senior nurse. No such guarantee was forthcoming 
in respect of the additional posts for 1990 on the grounds that the amount of growth 
money was at that stage unknown. On the final plans for the service, the Unit Gen-
eral Manager remarked that there seemed to be some confusion as to what these 
might be, suggesting that COHSE and the RCN indicate how its members inter-
preted them. Finally, the Unit General Manager was not prepared to guarantee that 
the rehabilitation service would stay within the NHS, pointing out that the 
Government's response to the Griffiths report on care in the community could alter 
existing arrangements. 
While the reply fell considerably short of what had been sought it had gone 
some way to reducing the original causes of anxiety. As this occurred in the context 
of very tight NHS financial constraint at this time, mid-1989, the staff protests can 
be regarded as achieving some success. That two of the additional nursing posts 
were to be funded in effect by reducing domestic staff posts was deemed acceptable 
indicates the boundaries between the two groups of staff as well as the fact that 
protests were founded upon issues relating to the quality of nursing services. 
In negotiating terms it might be felt that at this point the unions should have 
grasped the concession offered by management. What in fact appeared to develop 
was a growing confusion over what objectives were being pursued. When the con-
tents of the Unit General Manager's reply were conveyed to staff a view seemed to 
prevail that further discussion was warranted to try and gain some extra ground. 
However, talks at a subsequent meeting of union representatives appeared to make 
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little progress in terms of what direction this should take. There then followed a 
period of apparent inactivity while other options were being followed up by the 
unions, including an unsuccessful appeal to the Chairman of the South West 
Regional Health Authority for the management of the services to be subject to 
external review. 
This in fact had been sought by the senior nurse in rehabilitation, who 
claimed to have been continuously frustrated by higher management in his imple-
mentation of service developments. Events however took a new tum in early July 
when he announced his resignation from the Health Authority. This decision was 
justified by what he described in an interview as recurring uncertainty over funding 
and a management structure which was insufficiently representative of prac-
titioners. He also attracted considerable local media publicity for claims that he had 
unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with the Authority for adequate resources 
over several years. The context had now changed substantially, with public accusa-
tion and counter-accusation flying between the Authority and its former senior 
nurse, broadening out from the original issues to include several allegations con-
cerning sensitive aspects of patient care. 
By now, several staff working in rehabilitation were concerned about the 
effect the publicity might be having on patients and their families. COHSE, and 
particularly its full-time officer, had also been closely associated with the pUblicity. 
The Divisional Nursing Manager for mental health, a COHSE member for very 
many years, resigned from the union, amid suggestions that others might be doing 
the same. She now found herself protective of the general management against the 
claims being made by the former senior nurse. This was one aspect of a broader 
deterioration in relations between the COHSE Full Time Officer and Health 
Authority senior managers during this period. The situation caused considerable 
concern for several lay representatives, particularly the Branch secretary who 
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expressed a fear that this was compounding local communication problems which 
were seen as existing within COHSE itself. 
Throughout what had become an increasingly acrimonious and public dis-
pute, the RCN maintained a far lower public profile, referring instead to the 
preparation of a case to present to the United Kingdom Central Council (UKCC), 
responsible for professional matters. Some nurses appeared to prefer this approach, 
and this may have been a factor attracting them to the RCN. An attempt to bring 
nursing staff together again was made in the calling of a further joint meeting of 
members in July, where discussion took place on the need for staff to be involved 
in drawing up the future plans for the service and not leaving it as a management 
activity. 
Having resisted acceptance of the original offer from management this was 
logically the only direction left to take. Yet one of the most interesting parts of the 
discussion were comments expressed particularly by the RCN Full Time Officer, 
who was the former Plymouth nursing manager who had resigned over spending 
restrictions, that the unions should not do this but instead leave it to the nursing 
team leaders. This division of responsibility was justified on the grounds that as 
professional staff they would possess the necessary "credibility" for such a task. 
The view appeared to gain some resonance among many of the staff who were pre-
sent, indicating a fear that to identify the unions too closely and directly with 
"professional issues" might have the effect of undermining the arguments. 
After all, where jobs and employment conditions had been to the fore, as with 
the issues discussed in the previous chapter, the unions had during their period of 
opposition been accused of hiding behind claims about food hygiene and patient 
care. It was also interesting to note in the current context the perception that the 
team leaders were seen as representatives of the staff rather than of management. 
There was a further element to this delegation of service delivery issues to 
those in positions of management, which can be illustrated by reference to a discus-
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sion at a COHSE meeting called to discuss the issue. This was also attended by the 
Full Time Officer and the senior nurse who had resigned. At one point, the PTa 
was making some general comments about those who performed the work 
generally knew most about it, at which point he paused and a female Enrolled 
Nurse joined in to continue in terms of the need for staff to be involved in deci-
sions. The PTO then interrupted, turning to the fonner senior nurse for his views. 
The widening of the issues involved in this case created some uncertainty 
within the unions, and rather different responses from COHSE and the RCN. The 
more active COHSE representatives felt that the RCN was deliberately seeking to 
use the opportunity for recruitment by adopting a lower-profile and, in the words of 
one, "sent COHSE over the top". If this were the case, the tactics taken by COHSE 
had been largely shaped by those of the former senior nurse. In this there was rela-
tively little in the way of internal debate as to whether this was the appropriate 
action for the union to adopt. The union had been drawn into a dispute which 
originated in a conflict between general management and a section of the nurse 
management. 
Ultimately little happened to resolve the situation decisively. A later call to 
renew the threat to withdraw from flexible working arrangements no longer 
received the support from staff it had earlier. The departure of the senior nurse, 
despite highlighting concerns in the short tenn, had in a small but potentially sig-
nificant way altered the local negotiation of order. The RCN appeared to gain some 
support for the style which it adopted of seeking to support and advise in a process 
of indirect staff involvement in service planning. It is a style in which legitimacy is 
founded upon individual professional expertise, and not necessarily in the collec-
tive knowledge of members. 
The apparent failure of COHSE to achieve greater staff involvement in serv-
ice planning has also to be understood in the context of what was said earlier about 
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relationships between staff in rehabilitation and the acute sector. Some staff work-
ing in the latter appear to regard the difficulties within rehabilitation as 
exaggerated. Several expressed the view that problems of uncertainty and 
underfunding existed just as much within acute wards. 
For example, since at least the early 1980's plans have existed to transfer 
acute psychiatric beds from Moorhaven Hospitals to Derriford General Hospital, 
and in Plymouth Health Authority's Annual Programme for 1985/86 the date for 
this was set at March 1985. This was later postponed and a new date of transfer set 
for 1986/87. Later still the opening date was again set back to 1992, a date which 
was finally achieved. While this did create uncertainty it has also to be noted that 
several staff appeared more content to stay with existing services than was the case 
among staff in rehabilitation services. 
Of greater importance as a source of grievance in the acute services was an 
alleged shortage of staff. The impression was also given by some acute staff that 
they considered their own work experiences with people having serious disorders 
as being particularly demanding, or in the words of one, "absolutely knackering". 
Whatever the relative difficulties faced by staff in the two sectors, complaints about 
low staffmg levels in acute services did receive some conftrmation. In May 1989, 
around the very time when issues in rehabilitation were coming to the fore, a con-
sultant psychiatrist wrote to the divisional nursing manager for mental illness serv-
ices to say: 
I am writing to you because of my extreme concern about the 
risk to staff and patients on Moorfields Ward (an acute ward). 
Due to inadequate levels of nursing staff the quality of care 
available to patients has been low for some time. (internal cor-
respondence ). 
The consultant added her view that patients were becoming more disturbed as 
a result of receiving minimal attention: 
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This increases .the stress on staff, which is exacerbated by the 
hours of overUme they need to work to maintain a minimal 
staffing level. (ibid). 
It was perhaps unsurprising that this should have arisen around the same 
time, as it was a period of widespread pressure on health spending. What is more 
notable is the lack of joint activity between the two sectors which this situation 
provoked. If anything it seemed to reinforce existing divisions. Issues within reha-
bilitation had come to a head as a result of conflict within management in that sec-
tor, but this had not emerged within the acute services. 
A lack of common identity between the two groups of nursing staff was an 
obstacle in the way of general ising the issue of staff shortages and improvements in 
service delivery. Added to this was an uncertainty demonstrated by the unions in 
their objectives, linked to a hesitation in taking a high profile on what were deemed 
to be "professional" issues. The tactic of calling for an independent review of 
management at the hospital had been intended to obviate this problem but this 
proved unsuccessful. 
Ironically, just such an inquiry was held two years after the events described 
here, conducted by the Health Advisory Service, a body originally established in 
the wake of 1960's inquiries into psychiatric hospitals. In many respects the report 
appeared to conftrm the views which had been earlier expressed by staff and their 
unions. The report's opening words highlighted the context of managerial change, 
claiming: 
General management has a signiftcant task to perform in over-
coming the negative attitudes held by many professional groups 
towards its concept. .. Attention should be focused on the style 
and practice of general management so that it is able to prov~de 
the leadership and inspiration necessary to secure the a~uve 
partnership and commitment of practitioners. (NHS AdVISOry 
Service, 1991). 
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Comments in the report on the rehabilitation service were generally positive, 
particularly in terms of the role of staff. It was described as having a, "well thought 
out philosophy", and, "the enthusiasm and commitment of most of the staff is com-
mendable ... and have adapted well to the new settings in which they work." 
Criticism was reserved for some aspects of the way in which the service was 
developing, particularly concerning the resources available. Specifically the report 
expressed concern whether bed numbers had been reduced to "below the minimal 
survival level" . 
Some of the harshest criticism was however reserved for features of the acute 
service, illustrated in the following extracts: 
staff are trying to maintain a service in very difficult circum-
stances. Some of the conditions are unacceptably poor ... The 
appearance of Moorfields Ward is grim and drab.. the build-
ing is in a poor state ... toilet facilities are inadequate ... Drake 
Ward has limited facilities. (ibid). 
Overall the report noted a, "strong sense of the need for urgent improve-
ments", emphasising what it saw as problems over staffing levels, particularly 
where more severely disturbed patients were concerned. Despite the fact that the 
report provided independent confirmation of many of the complaints which had 
earlier been made, by the time of its publication the situation was very different. 
The management of the community services unit, within which mental health serv-
ices were located, were now submitting an application to secure Trust status. 
An important element in the advantages claimed for this move was that the 
services had been inadequately resourced under previous arrangements where gen-
eral hospitals had dominated. Nurse managers gave their support to this view, to the 
extent of writing to every member of the nursing staff expressing their support for 
the application. Only the small group of medical consultants appeared to resist the 
proposal. 
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However, when COHSE put the question of Trust status in a ballot of mem-
bers it was overwhelmingly rejected, indicating how far the distance had become 
between many nurses and their managers. The latter were increasingly being seen, 
as had earlier been the case in the general hospitals over the changes in rotas, as the 
"agents" of general management. The two years from 1989 to 1991 demonstrated a 
remarkable shift in alliances. The period had started with the senior nurse and con-
sultant in rehabilitation expressing joint concern about changes, and the consultant 
in acute writing directly to the divisional nurse manager to express dissatisfaction 
over staffing levels. Two years later, general and nursing managers were jointly 
advancing a strategy for Trust status in the face of opposition from consultants and 
the majority of nursing staff. 
This emergent coalition, evident in an early form at the time when the senior 
nurse in rehabilitation announced his resignation, reflected a changing managerial 
context. However, earlier divisions within nurse management, staff and unions can-
not be ignored. Staff had been structured, not so much by capital as by alternative 
identities and ideologies of psychiatric nursing, which were reinforced by separate 
nurse management systems. The unions were to be shown very much as secondary 
organisers in this situation, ultimately unable to generalise what in many respects 
were common experiences. 
The possibility cannot be ruled out that such divisions may prove less durable 
than those arising through structural relations created within capitalist exchange 
relations. Whether the mutual production of use values can be a source of overcom-
ing sectional divisions is discussed in terms of mental handicap services. These 
provide a different opportunity to consider ways in which staff and unions sought 
to constrain financially driven managerial objectives. 
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Resisting Private Provision in the Mental Handicap Services 
Proposed Reductions in NHS Provision 
The background to these events lay in the transfer of services to Plymouth. A 
significant change in the direction of policy intentions occurred in 1984 with the 
production of a joint strategic plan for mental handicap services by Plymouth 
Health Authority and West Devon Social Services. This proposed that the NHS 
cease to provide residential facilities, with the exception of a twenty-bed short term 
treatment unit, to concentrate instead on the provision of community services. 
Responsibility for implementation of the plan was vested with a Joint Management 
Group (JMG), representing the Health Authority and Social Services. 
COHSE regarded the proposals with considerable concern. The union 
asserted that its arguments were based on the interests of the users of the service, 
although it was accused of seeking to safeguard its own members' jobs first and 
foremost. Unlike the situation in rehabilitation, where members were committed to 
the development of NHS community based services, the issue in the mental hand-
icap sector revolved principally around the respective contributions of the NHS and 
the private and voluntary sector. 
At an early stage, COHSE won some support from management for its claim 
that a twenty-bed NHS provision being proposed would be inadequate. In March 
1984 the District Management Team stated in a report subsequently endorsed by 
the Health Authority: 
The DMT questions whether the twenty beds listed in the plan 
will be adequate for the long-term NHS provision, it was 
impressed with the COHSE submission on this point (PHA 
Mental Handicap Strategy paper, 1984). 
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The relative contribution to be made by the NHS and the private and 
voluntary sectors shaped the character of much sUbsequent debate, with a major 
element in the Health Authority/Social Services joint strategic plan being a substan-
tially increased role for the latter groups. An account of the closure of Starcross has 
noted: 
The major trades union involved seems generally satisfied at the 
levels of care which are being maintained, with the exception of 
patients due to return to the Plymouth district (Radford and 
Phillips, 1985, p23). 
The writers comment on the contrasting ratio of NHS, social services, private 
and voluntary sector provision in the different District Health Authorities in Devon 
and Cornwall. Exeter proposed by far the greatest NHS provision while Plymouth 
had much the greatest private and voluntary sector contribution. An important fac-
tor in this was again the pressure of financial resources. It was a feature which both 
COHSE and the Joint Trade Union Negotiating Committee had objected to 
strongly, particularly in the context that private provision was already greater in 
Plymouth in the early to mid-1980's than in many other parts of the country. 
Despite these objections the plans now foresaw an increasing role for the "inde-
pendent" sector. 
The unions were nevertheless able to protect NHS provision for the best part 
of a decade. In this, an important factor had been their ability to demonstrate the 
inability of the private and voluntary sectors to provide the levels of service 
required, especially in the case of those for people with more severe handicaps. 
Before describing the ways in which management responded to the difficulties this 
created for the implementation of the new plan, it is relevant to note early but 
unsuccessful attempts to incorporate COHSE into the planning mechanism. 
From the outset, COHSE had distanced itself from the original plans and 
objected to the proposed composition of the Joint Management Group. The 
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response from management to this was to suggest nursing staff should also be 
represented, and offered a new seat on the JMG to the staff in addition to that 
already held by the senior nurse in the service. COHSE nursing stewards, who 
formed the most likely candidates for this seat, felt uneasy about accepting this 
offer. The matter was brought to a COHSE branch meeting where it was decided to 
reject it, a view which by all accounts appeared to have the support of members 
within the service. A general feeling was that acceptance would risk isolating and 
possibly compromising an individual representative. 
However, management then responded to this rejection by offering the seat to 
the Joint Trade Union Negotiating Committee. This was an interesting move as ini-
tially the offer had been made to, "a member of the nursing staff', apparently sig-
nifying their professional rather than trade union role. The majority of the unions 
on the JTUNC viewed the offer more positively than had COHSE, and felt that it 
should be accepted. This reflected the fact that it coincided with a period in which 
the unions had been demanding more involvement in decisions taken by manage-
ment. In this situation it appeared contradictory to many union representatives to 
reject an opportunity such as this. At one point during the meeting of the JTUNC 
where this was discussed, it seemed that a representative might be elected to take 
the seat but COHSE successfully secured a delay for the issue to be taken back to 
their members. 
Eventually it was agreed to put forward the name of the COHSE Full Time 
Officer for the seat. It is doubtful whether the taking of this seat afforded any sig-
nificant planning input, and events which subsequently developed were in any case 
to lead to the officer resigning from the JMG. The significance of it lay more in 
what it illustrated about the nature of alliances within the service. While the local 
COHSE representatives had been unwilling to accept a degree of incorporation into 
the management structure, four other forms of alliances were to prove crucial in 
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later events. These involved staff at Starcross, staff within the Plymouth service, 
nurse management and user's relatives. 
The flrst of these, initially of greatest importance, arose from the Plymouth 
COHSE branch persuading COHSE members at Starcross Hospital not to assist in 
the discharge of patients to Plymouth until agreements had been reached on local 
services. The impact of this policy was noted in the account of the closure of Star-
cross referred to above, which identified the action taken by COHSE as being of 
particular signiflcance in: 
stalling the discharge of patients to the Plymouth area because 
of what it sees as an undue reliance on private sector provision 
with possible concomitant reductions in the quality of care 
(Radford and Phillips, 1985, p32). 
The impact of this blocking policy removed the possibility of a wholesale 
reduction of NHS proviSion in Plymouth, other sources of support were however 
needed to ensure this situation was maintained. Throughout the mid-1980's indica-
tions were coming from management that their intention remained to reduce local 
NHS provision, yet these were to prove equally unsuccessful. Of considerable 
importance in this was the alliance among staff within the Plymouth services. 
Union organisation in the mental handicap service was generally more effective, 
with better internal communication and a more active steward system, than was the 
case at Moorhaven. In practice this involved a relatively small number of people in 
terms of regular activity, but there were not the divisions which had been so evident 
at Moorhaven. 
There were two important aspects to this. Firstly, despite the existence of dis-
tinct identities between individual NHS mental handicap units, as for example 
between those providing services fo~ adults or children, there appeared to be a com-
mon service identity which crossed such boundaries. One factor in this may have 
been the preponderance among qualifled staff of younger members, recruited to the 
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area to develop the new service. Secondly, the almost "single union" character of 
mental handicap services, where the overwhelming majority of staff were members 
of COHSE, avoided the situation which had emerged at Moorhaven as a con-
sequence of rivalries and suspicions between COHSE and the RCN. 
Together these created a situation in which a high level of trust and con-
fidence appears to have existed between stewards and members, standing in some 
contrast to the earlier example of changing nurse rotas. This is particularly 
noteworthy in the context of wider debates about the impact of workplace frag-
mentation upon union organisation. Such fragmentation was noted to have been a 
problem within the general hospitals, but this was not so for mental handicap serv-
ices despite the geographical dispersion of the units. One consequence of this was 
that, although plans for mental handicap services were probably subject to greater 
change than was the case with mental illness services, there did not appear to be the 
same degree of frustration amongst the staff. COHSE appeared better able to give a 
collective "voice" to individual fears and anxieties. 
Closely connected with this was the third form of alliance which COHSE was 
able to develop, that involving nurse management. In particular, considerable trust 
was placed in the senior nurse within the service, with whom close formal and 
informal contact was maintained. Here the view was not taken that nurse manage-
ment had accommodated itself with the objectives of general management. In some 
respects there were greater similarities with the earlier situation of the RCN in the 
general hospitals, with the senior nurse, who was a COHSE member himself, 
taking a part in union affairs including attendance at annual conferences. The link 
between the union and nurse management had a reciprocal effect: it both helped to 
sustain a collective identity among staff while simultaneously acting as a counter-
balance to pressures of incorporation upon the nurse manager himself, as had been 
seen elsewhere. 
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In this connection it is also worth noting that at times COHSE took a similar 
view as had been expressed at Moorhaven regarding its role in advancing "profes-
sional" concerns. On one occasion the response to a set of management proposals 
was left entirely to charge nurses and sisters to compile on the grounds that this 
would give it greater professional legitimacy. The main difference between the two 
was that COHSE was able to adopt a far more active co-ordinating role within the 
mental handicap services. Nevertheless, the example illustrates the potential con-
flict in roles and definitions of purpose which can emerge when linkages are drawn 
between service provision and jobs. 
The fourth form of alliance which COHSE entered was with relatives of serv-
ice users themselves, which at times was to be of significant importance. Because 
of the nature of the service it had a relatively defined population of users and the 
opportunities this created may not be generalisable. Parents of children and adults 
with a mental handicap had particular concerns about future service provision. and 
in addition had come to know individual members of staff through regular contact. 
COHSE was able to utilise this contact to encourage the formation of a group 
representing users in which a number of mothers were particularly active. In inter-
views they expressed a high level of confidence in the nursing staff and a low level 
of trust in management. They-engaged in several activities, including lobbying of 
Health Authority meetings and collecting petitions, which presented a major 
obstacle to management plans to reduce NHS provision. 
Together these alliances considerably weakened the scope for management to 
implement desired changes. In particular, they stalled the planned closure of NHS 
units in Plymouth for at least a decade. In rejecting incorporation into the Joint 
Management Group, COHSE had instead been able to act as a catalyst in uniting 
user's relatives, Starcross staff, Plymouth staff and nurse managers in opposition to 
the plans of Health Authority and Social Service managers. Although this imposed 
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major constraints on the options available to the them, it did not remove the 
underlying policy intention of securing a "cost-neutral" solution. Management 
instead was forced to identify alternative routes to achieve this. 
A New ManageriallniJiative 
The consequences of this were to be realised in January 1988 when senior 
managers of Plymouth Health Authority and Social Services announced the estab-
lishment of a private company, Havencare. The company was to operate as a pri-
vate trust, providing small residential homes in the community for the mentally 
handicapped and mentally ill. Its Managing Director was to be the Health Author-
ity's District General Manager, with the Director of West Devon Social Services 
becoming its Director of Operations. 
For COHSE there was some irony in the fact that the initiative was in part 
justified on the grounds that the private and voluntary sector was not proving able 
to cope with service requirements, particularly for clients having more specialised 
needs. In a letter from the Social Services area director to members of the West 
Devon Social Services sub-committee the role of the financial regime under which 
they were operating was explained: 
The need to go to all these lengths to achieve the simple objec-
tive of caring for vulnerable people in the community is regret-
table, but is necessary, as you know, in order to provide capital 
for the acquisition of properties and secure the payment of 
Social Security benefits for the residents' weeldy charge 
... Our commitment is to ensure that, in the absence of Health 
and Social Services Authorities being able to finance residential 
homes in the community directly, a means does exist to meet 
the real and urgent needs of vulnerable people and their 
families. It was our assessment that existing voluntary societies 
working in the residential care field could no~ ~rovide ~e st~le 
of care required for all the patients now aWaItmg hospltal dls-
charge. For this reason the Havencare initiative was taken. 
(internal letter, dated 29th July 1988). 
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Havencare was a management device to gain access to funding sources which 
would otherwise be unavailable. It was established to resolve the contradiction 
created by Government funding policies, which made resources available to a pri-
vate sector which had proved itself unable to provide a comprehensive service. A 
sub-group of Plymouth Health Authority responsible for mental handicap services 
received a confidential paper from the management which further explained: 
If Havencare is to have the resources to provide facilities for the 
mentally handicapped, it must be able to qualify for DHSS 
benefit and all the other financial advantages which a charity 
enjoys. 
To achieve this Havencare has to be completely independent 
from the statutory bodies. The DHSS Commissioners must 
NOT be able to trace a formal managerialHnk: between Haven-
care and either the health authority or the social services. (inter-
nal Health Authority paper, no date). 
The paper went on to emphasise that one consequence of this was that: 
The manager must be independent and be seen to be so. All the 
policies relating to either the staff or the operation of individual 
houses must stress this independence. (ibid) 
After the four to five years in which COHSE had achieved some success in 
arguing the case for reducing the reliance on the private and voluntary sector 
Havencare represented a new challenge. Its role was originally confined to the 
establishment of new homes, which had largely been identified in the 1984 
strategic plan as the responsibility of non-statutory organisations. However, by 
early 1989 some evidence emerged that a wider role was being considered. Con-
fidential minutes of an NHS management meeting held in February 1989 referred 
to discussion on two of the four units for the mentally handicapped still provided 
by the NHS. On one of these, Tamar House, it was agreed, "The unit should be 
transferred to the management of an agency outside the NHS." For the other, Cum-
berland House, "The unit should be run by the NHS (or) ... as a registered nursing 
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home by Havencare." Again this is likely to have reflected the DSS funding 
mechanisms existing at that time. 
COHSE was not able to prevent the development of new services by Haven-
care but it was able to restrain a shift of existing services into its responsibility. The 
alliances which it had forged again proved crucial in this process. The basis of 
these alliances lay in an effective linkage of issues relating to services and jobs; 
emphasis was given to the former, although concerns over the employment 
implications of a reduction in NHS provision were never far from the surface. 
Ultimately however, the influence COHSE was able to achieve was founded upon 
the twin sources of legitimacy it could lay claim to. The first of these came from 
implicit endorsement by nurse management, the second from relatives of service 
users. Without these it seems highly likely that COHSE would have been engaged, 
not in resisting change, but in bargaining over the terms of its implementation. 
The two episodes discussed here suggest that there may be significant 
opportunities for unions to give more attention to issues of work organisation and 
not only the terms of employment. Influence in the local negotiated order was 
important, although in this respect its particular form may be all that makes the 
health service distinctive from other organisations. Support from users relatives 
was very important in the case of mental handicap services, but these were rela-
tively unique in having a defined group of users. Where such an opportunity is 
absent internal pressures arising from an increasing symmetry between public serv-
ice managers and those of capitalist enterprises may be much harder to withstand. 
These examples have also illustrated that opportunities for unions may still be con-
strained by the nature of relationships within management, as in these cases 
between general and nurse managers. 
The nature of occupational identities also emerged as a highly important fac-
tor influencing the opportunities for unions to generalise experiences. These were 
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seen to be very much a product of workplace socialisation, and as such were them-
selves subject to the influence of the character of nurse management. To this extent 
the secondary nature of unions is confirmed, but so too is the possibility of alterna-
tives arising. One factor in this may be the role of unions themselves. It became 
increasingly evident in the research that unions could be extremely hesitant about 
openly encroaching upon "professional" issues. In adopting this distinction, some-
times more than general managers were prepared to do, they illustrated how 
influential the bargaining model has become, even where the objectives are 
extended. 
This suggests that those unions which are seen by their members and by 
others as predominantly bargaining organisations may have diffiCUlties in 
simultaneously adopting 'professional' roles. It may not be so easy for them to 
simply supplement existing concerns with those of the 'content and objectives' of 
work. Nevertheless, in each of the two examples reviewed here, unlike the episodes 
discussed in the previous chapter, management did not seek to withhold bargaining 
opportunities until resistance to proposals was withdrawn. An important factor in 
this was the greater claim to "professional" and user legitimacy which the unions 
were able to make, even where they distanced themeselves to some extent from 
these issues. The nature of relations between general and nurse managers was also 
significant in this. One consequence was that in each of the episodes described here 
unions did not face the same tensions between maintaining opposition and seeking 
improvements in terms which had characterised those discussed in the preceding 
chapter. 
Given the importance of relations with different sections of management 
which all four episodes have illustrated in differing ways, the following chapter 
considers two examples where the- union's need to maintain institutional support 
from employers came into more direct conflict with wider objectives. These were 
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concerned with defending the existing basis of NHS provision, arising firstly from 
proposals to replace an NHS hospital with a private service, and secondly in plans 
by management to achieve Trust status. The examples are used to assess whether a 
campaigning strategy may represent an alternative or a supplement to both bargain-
ing and professional strategies. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
BEYOND BARGAINING? 
CAMPAIGNS AND SOCIAL ALLIANCES 
The previous chapter illustrated ways in which union involvement in issues 
of service delivery could be achieved while noting the difficulties this faced. Three 
significant factors in this can be emphasised. Firstly, the extent to which service 
managers accommodated with the objectives of general management; secondly, the 
character of union organisation in relation to the occupational identities on which it 
was founded; and thirdly, alliances with service users. 
This chapter seeks to explore more fully the possibilities which may be asso-
ciated with the last of these. It is this, perhaps above all other aspects, which might 
be held to signify a continued distinctiveness of health service trade unionism, with 
strategies involving wider public campaigning activities having been advanced by 
some writers as representing an important model for public service unions (eg 
Fryer, 1989). The discussion in this chapter seeks to identify factors which may 
encourage or inhibit such a strategy by looking at two issues which generated both 
bargaining and campaigning responses. The account highlights the conflict that 
trade unions can experience between bargaining objectives and engaging in broader 
social alliances by looking at managerial intentions to involve a private company in 
the provision of elderly care and proposals for the establishment of a self governing 
trust. 
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Defending public provision and seeking recognition in the private sector 
Some background is required to explain the context of management's 
proposals for elderly care at St. Mary's Hospital, Launceston. The town falls within 
the area managed by Plymouth Health Authority in East Cornwall, situated twenty 
five miles from Plymouth. With a population of six thousand, Launceston is rela-
tively isolated in a predominantly rural area. There was widespread agreement that 
St. Mary's, a one hundred and fifty year old former workhouse providing forty five 
elderly care beds, needed to be replaced. The Health Authority had originally 
planned to start rebuilding in 1987 but the necessary capital was unavailable from 
within the NHS. In 1988 discussions took place between senior PHA managers and 
representatives from a private company, Westminster Health Care, to consider 
alternatives. 
Westminster Health Care already owned Old Trees private nursing home in 
Launceston, which it proposed to replace with a unit capable of accommodating 
additional beds to lease to the NHS. Forty beds would be leased to Plymouth 
Health Authority to replace St. Mary's, with a further twenty beds for leasing to 
Cornwall Health Authority for elderly patients with psychiatric disorders. In total a 
new hospital for the elderly with one hundred and seven beds was being proposed. 
The company involved is part of a major multinational health organisation. 
Companies House records show its origins to lie in the fonnation in 1985 of 
Isobaran Ltd, registered as a travel agency and having two shareholders each with a 
£1.00 share. Within five weeks the two shareholders changed the name and Articles 
of Association at an Extraordinary General Meeting, establishing Westminster 
Health Care Ltd, registered for, "the provision of private hospitals or nursing 
homes". 
On 19th November a further Extraordinary General Meeting of the two share-
holders agreed to increase the share issue to 100,000, redesignating 90% of them to 
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NME (UK) Ltd and 10% to a Mr. Carter, who became a director and subsequently 
the managing director (Westminster Health Care, Annual Accounts). NME (UK) 
Ltd is a subsidiary of the American National Medical Enterprises Inc., described in 
a standard source-book on international health services as, "among the world's 
largest health care companies." (Graham and Trotman, 1988). Some of the directors 
of this company were also installed as directors of Westminster Health Care. In 
1988 NME Inc sold NME (UK) to BUPA Ltd. Two years later, BUPA was 
(unsuccessfully) referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for the scale 
of its involvement in private health. 
Though Westminster Health Care represented a small part of a multi-national 
organisation its growth has been considerable. In 1986, the fIrst full year of trading, 
the number of employees averaged 53, rising to 291 in 1987,641 in 1988, and 850 
in 1989. The 1989 accounts show a turnover of £6,019,352 and fixed assets valued 
at £17,955,826. Mortgages established through the company indicate the buying of 
properties and land throughout the country, from Yorkshire to Cornwall and Sussex 
to Clywd (Westminster Health Care, Annual Accounts). This was the stage which 
the company had reached when discussions took place with Plymouth Health 
Authority in 1989. 
In May of that year the Health Authority considered three possible "options" 
for the future of elderly care services at St Mary's. The first was to do nothing, the 
second to replace St. Mary's with a new NHS provision, and the third was to lease 
beds from Westminster Health Care. As most people accepted the need to replace 
St. Mary's, the fIrst option had little backing. The second was effectively ruled out 
because the Regional Health Authority was refusing to provide the necessary capi-
tal. This left Westminster Health Care's proposal, which offered an additional 
attraction to the Health Authority in anticipated annual savings of £250,000 over 
existing costs of the service. Even with this being offset in the first year by 
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redundancy costs, it represented a substantial contribution to the Authority's cost 
improvement programme target of £924,000. It has already been noted that these 
were being identified as increasingly difficult to find. 
Campaigning for public services 
The decision by the Health Authority provided the impetus for a union 
response which was dominated by campaigning activity. From the outset the health 
unions, through the JCCN, had expressed unanimous opposition to the proposal, 
ruling out any accommodation on the plans. Of all of the issues and episodes which 
were observed, this was the one which generated the greatest public expression of 
opposition. A local Action Group was established to oppose the proposal which had 
close links with the staff, being chaired by a Nursing Auxiliary at the hospital. 
Although a COHSE member, she had not previously been actively involved in the 
union, neither did she express interest in becoming a union representative. It did not 
seem to be involvement in industrial relations activities which motivated her so 
much as defending the local NHS hospital and its service provision. 
There was political involvement in the Group, for example its Secretary had 
previously stood as the local parliamentary Labour candidate, but it received much 
wider support. This included the collection within a relatively short period of time 
of a six thousand name petition: a number in excess of the total Labour votes 
recorded within the constituency in the previous General Election. In addition the 
group organised a number of local activities and meetings within the area. 
By the end of the consultation period on the proposal the Health Authority 
had received forty six formal responses. Only two of these could be described as 
representing more or less unqualified support, one of which came from the local 
Conservative MP. He applauded the proposal suggesting it could, "pave the way" 
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for similar schemes in the future allowing the Health Authority, "to concentrate on 
operative treatment and corrective treatment". All other responses were critical of 
the plan. 
Objectors included the Community Health Councils of both Plymouth and 
Cornwall, Cornwall Health Authority, two consultant physicians, North Cornwall 
and Caradon District Councils, and Launceston Town Council. A report to a sub-
sequent meeting of Plymouth Health Authority mildly acknowledged: "The 
Authority accepts that there is opposition to the proposal within the Launceston 
community". 
Buoyed up by extent of local opposition, COHSE which represented the 
majority of staff at St. Mary's, refused to meet with Westminster Health Care, 
although apparently such an opportunity had been offered to discuss terms of 
employment for staff. A statement issued by the JCCN indicated the collective 
view of staff organisations towards the proposal: 
The decision is essentially one of principle and will 
unquestionably shape the future of not only St. Mary , s but also 
of other hospitals in the Plymouth District. .. 
The assumption underlying the proposal is that a private nursing 
home is equivalent to an NHS hospital for the elderly. This is 
not the case. The difference is not just in terms of who runs the 
establishment. An NHS hospital, like St. Mary's, is accessible 
to all according to need .... A private nursing home is a com-
mercial undertaking ... 
The vast majority of the staff are determined to carry on their 
opposition to the proposal regardless of the Authority's decision 
. . . Members of the Authority need to take account of the 
certainty of a long drawn out campaign. (JTUNC, Response on 
St. Mary's Consultation). 
In its response to this, the Health Authority gave a thinly coded warning of 
the possible consequences of sustained opposition: 
Plymouth Health Authority has negotiated with Westminster 
Health care for the transfer of all staff irrespective of post, hours 
of work etc., and in addition is paying severance pay and facili-
tating early retirement where appropriate. The Authority will 
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need to consider the statement that the staff will carry on their 
opposition to the proposal regardless of the Authority's deci-
sion. (PHA, Summary of Responses to St. Mary's Consulta-
tion). 
The line adopted by the unions was clearly influenced by the strength of pub-
lic feeling, and the hope that this would be sufficient to cause the Health Authority 
to change its plans. However, two important obstacles to such an outcome were to 
emerge. Firstly, the broad coalition of opposition to the plans included a con-
siderable diversity of opinion; and secondly, while opposition to the plan was 
primarily local the pressures for change came largely from elsewhere. 
The local identity of the campaign was an important element in its strength, 
but it created a specific difficulty for the unions. This arose from the fact that 
COHSE members at S1. Mary's were members of the union's Cornwall Branch 
despite being employed by Plymouth Health Authority. It was the Plymouth 
COHSE Branches, which had no members directly involved, which were 
represented on the joint negotiating structures. One consequence of this was that 
the leading role on the issue was taken by the COHSE Full Time Officer and there 
was limited direct contact between the joint union committee and the S1. Mary's 
Hospital staff. 
However, because of the unanimity of view within the unions this did not 
create such a problem as might otherwise have been the case. Instead, what 
increasingly began to emerge was a divergency of views within the broader coali-
tion of opponents. The unions had explicitly linked their opposition to the proposal 
to a general hostility to what was seen as a piece-meal privatisation of the NHS. In 
contrast, the response submitted by Cornwall Community Health Council stated: 
Members ... ignored the fact that Plymouth Health Authority 
had gone for a private option; privatisation was not the issue, 
only the quality and quantity of patient care that was on offer. 
(Cornwall CHC, Response on St Mary's Consultation). 
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In its original summary of the formal submissions received during the public 
consultation period, the Health Authority management identified the main issues 
which had been raised: 
C?pposition exp.ressed has principally bee~ because of opposi-
tion to the pnvate sector, the general Ideology of nursing 
homes, the fear that all NHS facilities will be lost in Launceston 
and anxieties about the standards of care in the proposal. (PHA, 
Summary of Responses to St. Mary's Consultation). 
From this point on an important element in the strategy of the Health Author-
ity was to loosen the coalition of opposition. The Authority had little regard for 
objections which it described as "ideological", even though its "pragmatic" 
response was just as much framed by the current ideology of public policy. More 
serious attention was given to answering specific concerns. In particular, this 
related to claims that the higher capital costs included in the NHS proposal were 
misleading, and criticisms that the lower revenue costs being suggested by West-
minster Health Care might signify a lower quality of service. 
On the first of these, several objectors who favoured the option of building a 
replacement NHS facility challenged the estimated capital costs of £2.8 million. 
This was for a smaller forty-bed unit, compared to the one hundred and seven bed 
hospital being proposed by Westminster Health Care at an estimated capital cost of 
£3 million. The Authority's response was that the NHS estimate was based on the 
Regional capital allocation for such a project, simply adding that the private sector 
was, "clearly able to build such a facility at a reduced cost." 
This issue was taken further by the District General Manager in a letter to 
Plymouth CHC. This implied that, aside from the problem of capital fmancing 
itself, there had been an indication from the Regional Health Authority that it did 
not regard the service as a priority for calls on NHS funds. The letter stated that the 
building of a new NHS hospital: 
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was rejected by the Service Planning Group and this decision 
was supported b.y the Re~ion~ General Manager on the grounds 
of both the service plannlOg Issues as well as the lack of capital 
funds available. (Letter from DGM to Plymouth CHC, 18th 
May 1989). 
Faced with this obstacle attention focused on whether the lower costs of the 
WHC option might indicate a lower level of staffing and poorer standard of care. 
This concern had been taken up in an earlier letter to Plymouth Community Health 
Council from the District General Manager, in which it was stated: 
As a result of the monitoring exercise it was possible for West-
minster Health Care and ourselves to compare levels of staffing 
and the skill mix that was required. This in fact indicated that 
levels that we currently have at St. Mary's by way of qualified 
staff are too low and Westminster Health Care agreed to put in 
the staffing levels that would equate to the findings of the 
exercise. The position that we have therefore is that the number 
of staff allowing for a reduction of five beds and the cessation 
of day hospital activities will equate to about the same as is pro-
vided now for the patients that will transfer across to the new 
facility. However, the skill mix will be improved so as to 
increase the percentage of qualified as opposed to unqualified 
nursing staff. (Letter from DGM to Plymouth CHC, 24th April 
1989). 
It seems that the increase in the proportion of qualified staff may be achieved 
at the expense of reducing the relative earnings of unqualified staff and altering 
existing patterns of work. To this extent the private sector was following a similar 
direction that has already been noted within the NHS. It was also becoming 
apparent that the organisation of labour by Westminster Health Care was itself 
proving an attraction to the Health Authority. As the District General Manager 
noted in his second letter to the Community Health Council: 
The methods of patient care are those which have bee.n esta~­
lished by Westminster Health Care in ac~ordance With t~elf 
experience both in this country and in Amenca. The system fol-
lowed is very similar to the nursing process ... We must not 
assume that the NHS has a monopoly on the best forms of care 
as indeed there are several systems which are equally as good. 
(Letter from DGM to Plymouth CHC, 18th May 1989). 
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This was accompanied by some further guarantees to the CHC concerning 
patient care, including an assurance that CHC would continue to have the 
opportunity to monitor the service. A significant stage in the campaign of opposi-
tion had been reached. In the light of these reassurances, the Community Health 
Council's of both Plymouth and Cornwall withdraw their objections to the 
proposal. A final and significant factor in this decision was explained in an inter-
view by the then Chair of Plymouth CHC, himself a TUC nominee. He referred to 
the legislative basis for CHC objections, stated in the relevant regulation in the fol-
lowing tenns: 
If the CHC wishes to object to a closure or change of use, it 
should submit to the Health Authority a constructive and 
detailed counter-proposal; paying full regard to the factors, 
including restraints on resources, which have led the Health 
Authority to make the original proposal. (emphasis added). 
So long as the Regional Health Authority refused to supply capital for an 
NHS replacement this could not be offered as a "constructive" counter proposal: in 
this context the Westminster Health Care scheme became the only viable option. 
Identifying a practical alternative solution had also created difficulties for the 
unions. At one stage they had even suggested to the management that an income 
generation company set up by local NHS managers, Advanced Business Consult-
ants, be used to obtain funding. This was despite the fact that the unions had earlier 
advised their members to have nothing to do with ABC Ltd., and reflected the real 
difficulties of arguing for an alternative which external financial constraints seemed 
to rule out. 
The withdrawal of objections by the CHC's considerably altered the situa-
tion. As the CHe's represented the only bodies legislatively capable of halting, or 
at least delaying, the proposal considerable reliance had been placed on their role in 
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the campaign. Much of the impetus behind the campaign now appeared to dis-
appear. Although the jOint staff organisations had promised a long drawn out 
campaign whatever the Authority's decision, the emerging reality of Westminster 
Health Care taking over the service began to alter priorities. 
Seeking Recognition in the Private Sector 
During the period of public campaigning, COHSE had attracted considerable 
local media attention as a result of which some members of staff at WHC's Old 
Tree Nursing Home approached the union to join. An early opportunity to identify 
the attitudes of the company to trade unions was provided when one member at Old 
Tree faced disciplinary action and sought COHSE representation. She and the 
union were told by the manager of the home that this would not be permitted. 
COHSE persisted with attempts to gain the right to represent the member, and 
eventually the industrial relations officer from the head office of Westminster 
Health Care became involved. However, he reafflrmed that the company policy 
was not to recognise unions, though he added that individuals might be 
accompanied by "a friend". 
Shortly after the Health Authority's decision on St. Mary's members of staff 
at the hospital were invited to interviews with the managing director of West-
minster Health Care to discuss their future employment possibilities. The majority 
of staff indicated that they wished to be accompanied by their trade union full time 
official. As the staff were still at this time employees of the Health Authority, 
COHSE made a request to the relevant NHS management for this to be arranged. 
Given that there had earlier been an informal offer to COHSE by Westminster 
Health Care to discuss employment, and at Old Tree the company had accepted the 
presence of a "friend", the response to the union's request from the Health Author-
ity's Community Hospitals Manager seemed uncompromising: 
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A~ Westmi~ster Health Care do not recognise trade unions, you 
Wlll appreclate I am sure, that your attendance at meetings 
between Mr. Carter and members of staff on 26th and 27th June 
could prove to be counter-productive and possibly even 
exacerbate an even already difficult situation. (Letter from 
UGM to COHSE Full Time Officer). 
The issue was brought to the following JCCN meeting which sought an 
assurance from the management side that the Health Authority would ensure inter-
viewees could be accompanied by a union representative. A commitment was now 
given that Westminster Health Care would be approached on the issue, but the 
management argued that they could not dictate to a private company whether or not 
they should recognise trade unions. On this it became almost a matter of principle 
that it was not for the Health Authority to interfere in the policies of a private com-
pany. Whatever may have been the form in which the approach was made, it did 
not achieve the outcome desired by the unions. 
It was evident that at important stages in this episode, both COHSE and 
Westminster Health Care had altered their position on meeting with each other. 
While COHSE had already met with the company's industrial relations officer at 
Old Tree, the block on further meetings coincided with the direct involvement of 
the managing director. It was he who is shown in Companies House records to have 
been appointed at the time the American-owned NME Inc took the original com-
pany over. The American influence may have been a factor in the anti-union stance 
being taken, although the policy appears to have been maintained following the 
subsequent buying-up of the company by B UP A. 
Two alternative interpretations may be placed on the outcome from this 
episode. The ftrst would suggest that whatever stance had been taken by the unions, 
there was little likelihood of securing recognition from WHC and outright opposi-
tion to the plan was their only available response. Alternatively it might be thought 
that had a more accommodative response been adopted to Plymouth Health Author-
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ity management, they may have been prepared in the crucial early stages when 
great efforts were made to overcome opposition, to have pushed for a greater 
degree of co-operation from the company. 
A difficulty for the unions in adopting the latter course would have been that 
it would have brought them into conflict with many of their own members, apart 
from other groups and the wider public outside. The example illustrates how public 
campaigning and the formation of external social alliances against managerial plans 
can be a high-risk strategy, potentially threatening the level of support which the 
employer is willing to provide the union. 
This may suggest that health service trade unions possess relatively little in 
the way of distinctiveness when issues of recognition are at stake. For this to be 
sustained a union may be required to demonstrate a greater degree of accommoda-
tion with employer's objectives than might otherwise be expected. This issue was 
to come to the fore again very soon after the question of St. Mary's had been finally 
resolved, this time in the context of managerial proposals for the establishment of a 
hospital trust. 
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NHS Trusts and Union Recognition 
This episode differs from the others in providing an example of union non-
involvement in a high-profile publicity campaign organised principally by medical 
consultants. In many ways it provides an even clearer illustration of the pressures 
unions may be required to accommodate to if a bargaining relationship is to be 
maintained. This section develops the theme of whether, within a changing 
managerial culture, health unions may be required to abandon broader objectives in 
order to retain institutional support from the employer. Firstly, some background is 
required on how the proposal came about. 
The application for Trust status 
The possibility of seeking Trust status emerged out of the Government's 
1989 White Paper. Initially in Plymouth there was little evidence of any firm 
management intent to pursue the option, with the District General Manager writing 
privately to the South West Regional General Manager to state: 
I am pretty sure we will not be in a position to express any 
meaningful interest by 8th May because, whilst there is 
enthusiasm for self-governing amongst managers, there is pre-
cious little enthusiasm by anyone else. You may care to advise 
me whether you would want a management submission and the 
extent to which we should ignore the views of others. (Private 
letter from DGM to Regional General Manager, March 1989). 
The letter seems to indicate a willingness on the part of managers to accom-
modate to the views of others. This was confmned in a further letter from the Dis-
trict General Manager to the Regional General Manager informing her that after 
discussing the issue with other Chief Officers, "It is our unanimous view that we 
cannot put forward any proposal at the moment." This was justified by reference to 
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Government commitments that the, "substantial involvement of those likely to be 
involved" in a Trust was required. The District General Manager noted: 
The consultant body as a whole is pretty antagonistic to the con-
cept ... Our preference therefore is not to indicate an interest at 
the moment but to continue to work with the consultants to try 
to talk them round. (Letter from DGM to RGM, 2nd May 
1989). 
While this indicates that the attitude of the consultants was seen by the local 
managers as the crucial factor, the letter added that among the Health AuthOrity 
itself, "There is little enthusiasm for the idea amongst the membership ... I will let 
you know if I pick up any change of heart". Yet within a few days of this letter 
there was a surprising tum of events. At the next Health Authority meeting, being 
held on the closing date for "expressions of interest" in self-government, a proposal 
was moved from the floor that one be submitted. This was agreed and managers 
were requested to draw up more detailed proposals. It has been conftrmed from a 
reliable source that pressure was being applied by the Regional Health Authority to 
submit an application, and it may well have been done in this way to create some 
initial "distance" between it and the managers. 
A prominent voice of opposition to the application within the Health Author-
ity itself had been that of the TUC nominee. In July 1989 the Regional Health 
Authority announced that he was not to be reappointed for a further term from Sep-
tember. This was the ftrst time that Plymouth Health Authority had not had a ruc 
nominee, and the decision made it the only one out of eleven Authorities in the 
South West Region without one. A reliable source within the Regional Health 
Authority has claimed that the Chairman of Plymouth Health Authority telephoned 
the Regional offtce to make it clear that he did not want the ruc nominee to be 
reappointed. The Regional Health Authority eventually agreed to a new ruc 
nominee, and the place was taken by a former COHSE Branch Secretary in 
November 1989. 
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In the same month the Government published a shortlist of seventy nine 
proposals to be considered for self-government, and among which was Plymouth. 
A subsequent confidential management paper on self-government describing the 
proposed Trust provides a source of information on managerial attitudes and inten-
tions. Firstly, it was to be a large organisation, with four thousand five hundred 
staff (equating to three thousand seven hundred and fifty whole time equivalents), 
and operating with an annual budget of £50 million. Much of the document reflects 
a more commercial orientation, as in the comment that, "The Trust will initiate a 
number of co-operative ventures with the private sector with a view to developing 
facilities for cheaper private medicine". 
Particular attention was given in the document to the opportunities which 
Trust status would afford for reappraising existing employment arrangements. One 
of the greatest benefits of Trust status was described as being the ability to take 
direct control over pay and labour costs, and thereby, "control locally the largest 
element of its composition . . . this aspect is the biggest area of challenge and 
opportunity for its managers". 
The unions recognised that Trust status could put at risk some of their exist-
ing agreements. From the outset they sought to steer a middle course between not 
being seen to support the Government's plans while maintaining a dialogue with 
local management. From the regular joint meeting of the trade unions and manage-
ment in September 1989 the minutes record: 
The staff side ... said as a body they remained implacably 
opposed to self-government but having said that they would 
want to express an interest in what was being proposed. The 
staff side wished to invite management to recognise all the 
unions who were represented on the DJCCN for neg.otiation ~nd 
consultation purposes within any new self-governmg hOSpItal 
trust. (JCCN minutes). 
At this point the management's response was simply recorded as being: "It 
was too early at this stage to take up the staff side offer." This response gave rise to 
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some concern among the unions as rumours were beginning to circulate that fewer 
staff organisations would be granted recognition within a Trust. Management then 
agreed to the holding of talks with representatives from the JCCN rather than the 
whole body. It has been claimed that the talks were agreed to by management on 
the understanding that the unions would issue no public statements on the proposals 
for Trust status. No written verification for this exists, although it is noteworthy 
that of the six issues studied in this research this was the only one on which no pub-
lic statement was made by the unions. 
This approach to collective bargaining by management was very different to 
that shown by managers of Westminster Health Care. Local health service 
managers were keen to alter the basis upon which it took place but not to reject it 
entirely. As a draft document produced by management for the early stage of talks 
stated, "The Trust will be committed to the process of collective bargaining." 
However, an important distinction was drawn between union involvement in col-
lective bargaining and their representational role. The document stated that all 
existing organisations would be recognised for, "consultation and individual repre-
sentation", but that the Trust: 
will seek to agree the future forum for the local negotiation of 
pay and terms and conditions of employment in conjunction 
with the present staff side. (Draft management paper). 
While talks surrounding these issues were progressing between unions and 
management, a very different approach to the question of Trust status was being 
considered by the medical consultants who were overwhelmingly opposed to the 
plans. Their own organisation, the Hospital Medical Staff Committee (HMSC), 
organised a ballot in October which showed seventy three per cent against self-
government, twenty two per cent undecided and just five per cent in favour. Of par-
ticular significance was the fact that only thirty four per cent were prepared to sup-
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port discussion with management on the proposal, with sixty three per cent 
explicitly rejecting this. The ballot was followed by a meeting of the HMSC at 
which the Executive was instructed to organise a, "high profile public campaign of 
opposition" . 
The HMSC Chairman, who had sought a mediating role, then invited the 
Health Authority Chairman to attend the next HMSC Executive meeting. After this 
had taken place the Health Authority Chairman wrote to the HMSC Chairman 
having, "discussed this problem further", to suggest that, "Instead of requiring the 
Medical Executive Committee to embark on a high profile public campaign ... an 
ad hoc group be set up to pursue this aim." This attempt on the part of the Health 
Authority Chairman to engineer a separation of the campaign from the official rep-
resentative body was to be unsuccessful. Minutes of the subsequent meeting of the 
Medical Executive Committee state: 
The formation of an ad hoc group separate from the Medical 
Executive Committee, to embark on a high profile public 
campaign is not agreed with. The Medical Executive Com-
mittee is mandated by the Hospital Medical Staff Committee to 
initiate and conduct this campaign. (Minutes of Medical Execu-
tive Committee). 
The meeting then accepted the resignation of the HMSC Chairman and 
elected a successor. Whereas attempts by managers to dissuade the unions from 
adopting a public campaign appear to have been successful the rejection by the 
consultants of such an approach illustrates the important differences between the 
two. The consultants continued to regard themselves as powerful actors within the 
organisation. Consultants have not only gained a high level of autonomy in their 
own work but have frequently exercised a high degree of control over that of 
others. Trust status may have been seen as a threat to their traditional power, as the 
impact of general management upon them was still relatively limited. This inde-
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pendence was reflected in the pressure which they applied to their representative 
body. 
In contrast, unions had already accommodated with the new managerialism, 
and entering talks on establishing a continuing basis of this was a natural develop-
ment. Inversely reflecting the position with the conSUltants, there was compara-
tively little pressure from members on this issue. Of all of the episodes considered 
in this research the Trust proposal appeared to generate the lowest level of trade 
union member participation. 
While partly a consequence of the confidential nature of discussions being 
held, it is also the case that union representatives were not being subject to pressure 
from members. Many staff expressed unease about Trust status, but more anger 
was expressed during this period following an ill-timed announcement by manage-
ment on the introduction of a car parking fee for staff. When this was immediately 
taken up by the unions the plan was temporarily shelved. 
Such differences also reflected different perceptions of power. As was the 
case with many members, the majority of union representatives interviewed 
expressed the view that the decision on Trust status was a fait accompli, and faced 
with this saw their role as preserving a basis for future trade union organisation. 
Consultants did not tend to regard the outcome with such inevitability, seeing the 
local general managers as only one set of actors in much wider frame. For example, 
the consultants were prepared to go over the heads of local managers, making 
direct contact with officials within the Department of Health in an attempt to 
undermine their position. 
214 
Conflict and Accommodation 
For the consultants, a period was being entered characterised by increasing 
conflict with management. At one point the Health Authority Chairman publicly 
rebuked the incoming HMSC Chairman for saying that there was a lack of trust 
between doctors and management, stating he would be "astonished" if this 
represented the view of the majority of the consultants. This prompted a ballot of 
consultants on their views about the management; the result showed eighty seven 
per cent agreed there was a lack of trust, and seventy three per cent felt there had 
not been good management or effective leadership. 
A far less unified approach was becoming apparent from the unions. In 
negotiating with general managers, the unions were now finding that a new accom-
modation would require further change on their part. In particular this related to the 
issue of recognition for bargaining rather than representational purposes. 
Managerial intentions on this were indicated in a confidential management paper 
issued only to Health Authority members: 
The Trust will limit the number of organisations it recognises 
for the purpose of pay bargaining ... In agreeing these repre-
sentative organisations, it will be essential to afford recognition 
to those who are truly representative of the staff. (Internal 
Health Authority paper). 
The statement is reminiscent of that by the Director General of the Engineer-
ing Employer's Federation quoted on pages 32-33. Though there was no suggestion 
of a single-union arrangement, by this time the unions had effectively dropped their 
claim for recognition of all unions. This was explained by the staff side Secretary 
of the JCCN in an interview as resulting from a fear that individual unions might 
otherwise establish their own recognition agreements, undermining the cohesion of 
the joint body. 
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The ability of management to gain an acceptance for the number of unions 
recognised for bargaining to be reduced was founded in large part upon the level of 
suspicion which was being generated between individual unions. As Willman 
(1989) notes, much union recruitment effort in the 1980's was being directed 
towards maintaining existing membership basis through reaching agreements with 
employers. Informal talks between management and individual unions were 
undoubtedly taking place, involving on at least one occasion a national trade union 
official. What was happening was evidently not in the spirit of the TUC's "Code of 
Practice" on recognition which, it has been pointed out, was not intended solely to 
apply to "single union agreements": 
The spirit and intention of the Code of Practice was that it 
would apply to any recognition agreement under which a union 
which claims an interest is excluded (TUC, 1989). 
By the end of 1989 the strategies being followed by the unions and the con-
sultants had diverged completely. Two consequences flowed from this. Firstly, con-
sultants began to make direct attempts to win staff backing for their cause; and sec-
ondly, some dissatisfaction was being expressed from within the unions towards 
their own stance. 
Consultants initially sought to gain the support of others within the local 
health service by distributing a letter to all staff in January 1990, explaining their 
grounds for opposition and announcing a series of meetings. Within days the Dis-
trict General Manager responded with a counter-letter challenging many of the 
claims. This was followed by a special issue of the staff magazine which gave a 
very favourable account of self-government, including assurances that Whitley 
conditions could be retained by individual staff if they so chose. 
Although the consultants appeared to achieve some success in winning staff 
support, management were equally successful in isolating them from the staff 
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organisations. Frequent suggestions were made that the opposition from consultants 
simply represented self-interested defence of their existing contracts. Such claims 
had resonance for many union representatives who had not in the past experienced 
support from most consultants. This had been the case in the 1982 pay dispute, and 
it was a consultant who had been the principal person involved in the grievance 
over the lack of time-off afforded to the JTUNC Secretary. 
Not all union representatives were however satisfied with the low public pro-
file being taken by the joint union committee. Dissatisfaction developed within 
COHSE, resulting in the calling of a special meeting of the Branch Executive to 
discuss the issue. This was attended by the local full time officer as well as a 
national official, both of whom cautioned against union hostility to the application 
being expressed too overtly. Instead, they emphasised the union's role as being first 
and foremost to represent members' employment interests to the employer. 
Union involvement in broader opposition should, they argued, be through the 
avenue of the Labour Party. In addition, a suggestion was made that this need not 
prevent individual members and stewards becoming involved in an ad hoc 
campaign, formally independent of union organisation but enjoying their implied 
consent. Such an approach is reported as having been adopted in London during the 
"Hands Off Guys" campaign. While representing a route which had been rejected 
by the consultants, there were some parallels with the St. Mary's Action Group 
which gained the involvement of members of staff while being substantially inde-
pendent of union organisation. Union endorsement of that campaign had been 
explicit, and at the COHSE Branch Executive some members expressed their desire 
for a more forthright opposition and the meeting ended rather ambiguously. 
Unlike the health unions themselves, the local Trades Union Council become 
publicly involved in the issue. Comments were made by some health union repre-
sentatives that while they welcomed this, it was difficult for them to become too 
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closely identified. An ad hoc body, "Plymouth Health Emergency", involving the 
local ruc, several individual health service union representatives, Labour Party 
members, and members of the BMA, was established under the auspices of the 
TUe. For the local ruc, participation in public debate on the issue was not con-
strained by bargaining objectives. 
This also remained the case for the consultants who by February 1990 were 
being balloted for a third time, this time again on their views about the self-
government proposal. Abstentions were not invited and the result showed eighty 
per cent against and twenty per cent in favour. The cohesion among consultants had 
been maintained throughout the preceding months. When in April it was announced 
by the Government that the Plymouth application had been unsuccessful the level 
of internal opposition was apparently noted in a private letter to district manage-
ment. In particular, they were not seen to have established a management structure 
capable of making the proposal work. 
A further aspect of this episode worth noting is that while it generated a high 
degree of public interest and debate it did not create the same level of activity. The 
campaign which had greatest overt public campaigning activity, around St. Mary's, 
was instead unsuccessful. An important difference between the two was the linkage 
between local activity and national decisions which were made by the consultants. 
This showed how local health managers continued to operate within a "matrix of 
social power" in which a variety of pressures might still be brought to bear. 
This chapter has described potential conflicts for unions in participating in 
broad campaigns of opposition to managerial policies, while simultaneously seek-
ing accommodation to secure continued bargaining activities. The possibility that 
recognition might be put at risk where unions engaged in public opposition might 
suggest it to be a highly constrained strategy, even in the context of health services. 
Two points however should be noted. 
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Firstly, considerable differences were evident between the managers of the 
NHS and Westminster Health Care, reflecting contrasting organisational cultures 
and traditions. The differences in attitudes towards collective bargaining may have 
their origins as much in the distinction between dominant British and American 
industrial relations practices as in that between the commercial sector and public 
services. The approach adopted by health service managers appeared to have much 
in common with that of many managements in the private sector in Britain during 
the 1980's noted in Chapter Two. 
Secondly, opportunities for NHS management to seek a reduction in the num-
ber of unions recognised for bargaining largely arose because of suspicions and 
rivalries between individual organisations. Compared to the highly solidaristic 
stance taken by the consultants as a collective body, the unions were highly frag-
mented. 
Each of these episodes brought to the fore the question of definition of union 
purpose. They highlighted the fact that the defence of employment and its terms 
and conditions may not always be synonymous with the defence of public services. 
Health service trade unions may not organise workforces whose structure is wholly 
determined by capital, but they nevertheless operate in the context of the wage rela-
tionship. This might suggest that maintaining bargaining activities will increasingly 
come to shape the character of union behaviour. The possibility of alternatives is 
returned to in the conduding chapter. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
There have been two underlying themes in this research. The rust has con-
cerned the nature of organisational change in the health service, including whether 
recent restructuring can be interpreted as a partial reversal of the processes of 
'decommodification' earlier suggested by Offe. The second has related to the sec-
ondary nature of trade unions, and the extent to which their structure and character 
is shaped by the social relations in which they arise. Each of these concerns have 
analytical and policy implications for the nature of health service trade unionism. 
The case study method has been used, not as an attempt to find a typicalloca-
tion for analysing these issues, but rather to provide an opportunity to explore some 
of the processes which are involved. This chapter is intended to draw together some 
of the points from earlier discussion, beginning with a consideration of the charac-
ter of managerial control and the labour process. This is followed by a discussion 
on developments in union behaviour and organisation, with some concluding 
reflections on prospects for the future. 
Health service management and the labour process 
In a review of the Government's 1989 health service White Paper one writer 
concluded that a major strand in Government policy: 
has been to restructure the NHS along commercial lines with a 
strengthened management function, facilitating the links with 
the private sector ... The White Paper takes this project a large 
step forward. By instituting an internal market in the NHS, the 
currency of the market place is being brought into the heart of 
the NHS. (Bach, 1989). 
There is no doubt that change has been dramatic in the NHS, but as the 
review in Chapter Three showed, much of this has served to confum tendencies 
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already evident prior to the Conservative election victory of 1979. In particular, the 
strengthened managerial function has been put into place as a means of overcoming 
difficulties faced by the state in securing local adherence to central policy. 
Increases in central control have arguably been of far more significance than an 
extension of market forces. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the Health Authority selected for the case 
study offered a considerable advantage. It was one in which the new general 
managers had appeared to embrace much of the new philosophy, including a will-
ingness to adopt a much more commercial criteria. By their own accounts they 
were seen at national level as being to the fore in implementing the proposed 
changes. 
There is no doubt that this brought about a major change in the nature of 
decision taking, but it is questionable as to how far this can be regarded as 
representing a wholesale process of commercialisation. Probably the clearest exam-
ple of such a process was in the catering service, with the introduction of the cook 
chill system in response to competitive tendering. Yet this arose before the intro-
duction of general management, under the combined influence of the compulsory 
tendering process and strict financial controls. 
In many of the other cases which were examined financial resources emerged 
as a dominant issue. This was certainly the case with the proposals to replace St 
Mary's hospital, where a private company became involved initially because the 
Regional Health Authority would not provide capital funding. The difference 
between this and the situation existing in much of the NHS in the 1950's was that 
local managers were now given greater freedom to find alternative solutions. 
Within the constraints in which they operated this necessarily involved them 
developing contact with the private sector, further reinforcing new elements of the 
changing managerial culture. Nevertheless, this continued to highlight the relatively 
limited freedom which local NHS managers enjoyed. 
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This appeared to provide a large part of the justification for the Trust 
proposal, which gave great emphasis to the opportunities it allegedly provided for 
securing capital resources and introducing more flexible employment packages. 
That this was an unsuccessful bid was in part due to the fact that the local managers 
had not been able to take consultants with them. In embarking upon a radical 
proposal, managers found that there was still a need for them to develop alliances 
with others if they were to carry their pOlicies through. 
Much the same applied to the establishment of Havencare, this time as a solu-
tion to problems of revenue funding given its eligibility to claim DSS benefits on 
behalf of residents. An interesting comparison can be drawn here with experiences 
in Exeter, closely related as a consequence of the Starcross Hospital closure but 
seemingly involving more harmonious relations between unions and management. 
This comparison also provides an illustration of the scope for management to 
utilise existing features of union culture as a means of encouraging a more accom-
modative response. 
Historically, Exeter had a much larger number of psychiatric hospitals than 
had been the case in Plymouth, a factor which left an important imprint upon the 
character of union organisation. For example, the Exeter District General Manager 
published his own account of the hospital closure process in which he describes his 
initial perceptions when arriving as District Administrator in 1974, two years after 
a local strike at one of the psychiatric hospitals. He comments, 'It was impossible 
to discover who was in charge of the hospitals ... there was a suspicion that the 
trade unions had perhaps the most powerful voice' (King, 1991, p30). 
However, by the time of the closure programme and in contrast to many 
aspects of comparable changes in Plymouth, the importance of securing support for 
the service objectives is given considerable emphasis. In this it is pointed out that: 
Exeter's most radical changes were introduced and brought to 
pass by the now discredited management culture and style 
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~efore the intr~du~~on of General Management. Far more 
lmpor~nt than mdlvldual accountability had been the group 
commttment to a common goal (King, 1991, p38). 
Exeter's District General Manager goes on to say, 'Trade unions supported 
all the changes and helped to make them work' (pS7), adding a comment on the 
role of lay union representatives who he describes as being: 
in conta~t with grass roots opinion, ensuring they did not lose 
touch With what was acceptable to their members, and there-
f?re, possible. It was an enormous benefit that all the negotia-
tlOns were conducted by our own staff and not by paid union 
officials, simply because this shortened lines of communication 
(King, 1991, pS8). 
Interviews with two of the lay union officials involved in these negotiations 
broadly confirmed this desire to find a mutually acceptable solution. They also 
indicated that not all members were satisfied with the approach they were taking, 
but they took the view that closure was inevitable and getting closely involved in 
the direction of change was essential. Union representatives and the District Gen-
eral Manager further identified the guaranteeing of no compulsory redundancies as 
being a key factor in securing this supportive union response. On one occasion 
managers even managed to secure Ministerial sanction for delaying competitive 
tendering to ensure this commitment was maintained. 
In appearing to adopt a more accommodative style, general management in 
Exeter were able to rapidly move forward with a programme which on the face of it 
seemed to create a far bigger threat to the unions than was the case in Plymouth, 
given that it involved large scale closures rather than growth. The major difference 
between the two areas lay in the relative contribution to be made by the NBS and 
the private sector in the new services, and this factor was significant in determining 
the union responses. 
However, Exeter health service managers were soon to experience financial 
difficulties in running the new community based service. The original intention had 
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been for this to be based in small Health Authority run hostels in which residents 
would be eligible for DHSS benefits, but this was declared unlawful by the Depart-
ment in 1986. The solution which was then adopted was to transfer the homes to a 
charitable body, Home Care Trust, which would lease property from the Health 
Authority from which it is also granted some additional funds. This bears close for-
mal parallels with the creation of Havencare, although the context and culture in 
which they emerged was of course very different. 
And it is this which illustrates how scope for local variations prevailed even 
under general management, increasing central control and despite Government 
funding regimes intended to encourage the private sector. Inevitably this casts con-
siderable doubt upon notions of a more generalised move towards the com-
modification of health care. However, the issue of ownership could itself be closely 
linked with those of control. For example, the considerable degree of change expe-
rienced by ancillary staff in the competitive tendering processes occurred in the 
context, as reported by one manager, that management had been given the brief to 
retain services in-house. This directs attention to the question of whether 
managers are nevertheless increasingly required to act as if they were capitalists in 
their control of the labour process (Crompton and Jones, 1984). Of particular inter-
est is whether any such moves would be expected to create a situation in which 
traditionally heterogeneous groups of staff find themselves subject to more 
universal systems of control. 
The case study demonstrated a very clear change in the extent to which local 
NHS managers were prepared to alter patterns of work. In this, they were also 
prepared to go beyond those staff groups subjected to nationally imposed changes 
such as competitive tendering. Despite this, changes in control over the labour 
process did not have uniform outcqmes for different staff groups. While originating 
from the same financial pressures these were mediated by social relations other 
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than those of capitalism alone. Two aspects of importance in this were gender and 
professional identities, with the two being closely inter-related. 
The role of gender-structuring of jobs was clearly evident in the case of the 
cook chill catering system, where the changes reinforced divisions among the 
workforce in a way which created further segmentation. Similarly, the introduction 
of bonus systems based upon budget savings, which introduced a pay cut as well as 
creating considerable uncertainty about earnings, had its greatest impact upon 
predominantly female groups of staff. Because of the way in which the bonus was 
calculated they can additionally be seen as potentially reinforcing an intensification 
of work among these groups. 
In contrast, attempts to control the medical staff proved far less successful, as 
in the case of the Trust proposal. An intention to challenge some of the traditional 
control by the medical profession was noted in Chapter Three as being an element 
in new central policy initiatives, but this proved to be highly constrained. The 
ability of senior medical staff to use institutional sources of influence illustrated 
their continuing level of authority. As a postscript to that episode, it is worth noting 
that in the summer of 1992 a new proposal for a Trust for the general hospitals was 
submitted, this time with the support and active involvement of the consultants. 
Within the internal negotiation of order they were able to renegotiate the 
basis of the proposed structure and their position within it, appearing to justify the 
suspicion of union representatives who in 1990 were doubtful about the basis of the 
consultants' opposition to the original management proposal. The change by the 
consultants has been justified in terms of the inevitably of Trust status by the later 
stage and a consequent desire to be involved in it rather than outside of it. In this 
there are close parallels with the views expressed by union representatives in the 
Exeter hospitals faced with closure. For both groups a crucial aspect was the 
amount of organisational influence they could bring to bear, and an important fac-
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tor in this was the degree of congruence between occupational identities and 
institutional representation. In this an important triadic relationship could be 
observed involving the occupational group, their respective 'professional power 
holders' (nurse managers and the Medical Executive Committee) and general 
managers. 
An example of this arose in the changes to nurse rotas, with nurse managers 
being frequently perceived as having adopted the view of general managers despite 
opposition from the nursing staff themselves. Similarly, many nurses in the mental 
illness services expressed disquiet about the role of some nurse managers. Within 
nursing, only in the case of mental handicap services can there be said to have been 
a consistently high degree of correspondence between the views of staff and their 
managers, and it was here that general management experienced some of the 
greatest difficulties in implementing changes. 
These examples demonstrate the continuing importance of the notion of 
professionalism within the NHS, while simultaneously confIrming the difficulties 
which nurses have traditionally faced in utilising it to their advantage. One element 
in this may be the historically ambiguous role of nurse management. In part this 
can be traced back to the position of the hospital matron, which Ann Witz has 
described in terms of the 'moral discourse' embodied in Florence Nightingale's 
image, involving an expectation of subservience and low pay among nursing staff 
(Witz, 1992). Despite the formal ending of this institutional role many elements of 
the culture were arguably retained, a factor having particular signifIcance in a con-
text of the ascendancy of general management. This style stands in stark contrast to 
the speed with which the consultants in the case study removed those of their repre-
sentatives who were deemed to have become too closely incorporated with the 
Health Authority in the original Trust proposals. 
SignifIcant in this difference is the way in which concepts of "professional" 
and "skill" are socially constructed. Although in many ways the extensions to 
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managerial control over the labour process were analogous to those of a capitalist 
enterprise, it is also important to recognise specific features deriving from the more 
distinctive occupational categories of the health service. This meant that organisa-
tional influence was often closely tied to notions of legitimacy founded upon those 
of professional expertise. For example, the success of the consultants was 
ultimately based, not on their clinical expertise per se, so much as their use of this 
as a source of credibility in securing influence in the "social matrix of power" 
(Offe, 1984). Nurses were not on the whole able to make such claims effectively, 
and as was noted in at least two episodes, could be hesitant in combining 
'professional' and 'job' issues. 
This local experience needs to be located in the context of attempts by nurs-
ing to establish greater authority. Past difficulties in achieving this have in recent 
years encouraged the re-emergence of a credentialist strategy based upon educa-
tion. However, entry numbers into student nurse training courses have been declin-
ing and there have been accompanying indications of a return to the recruitment of 
less qualified staff. As one review of the social history of nursing concluded: 
If we ask who will be standing beside the patient's bed in hospi-
tal providing the direct hands-on routine care in the year 2000, 
it is difficult to resist the conclusion that it will still be the hand-
ywoman class in the new guise of support workers. Indeed, they 
are also likely to dominate non-hospital, non-family care ... 
Professional ambitions must be reconciled with economic 
realities. No elitist programme of nursing refonn has yet been 
allowed to succeed (Dingwall et ai, 1988). 
In this context it is also relevant to note evidence from nursing in America 
where nursing staff have achieved new areas of responsibility by arguing the case 
of their cost-effectiveness. Often this has involved taking over tasks previously per-
fonned by doctors. While there is little evidence as yet of similar developments in 
the NHS, within the newly created Trusts such moves cannot be ruled out. This 
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however could be seen as representing another form of labour substitution, in a 
form which meets managerial goals as much as those of nursing itself. 
Nevertheless, even with the problems which nursing may be experiencing in 
the face of encroaching managerial control there were episodes in the case study 
when opportunities arose for gaining involvement. Leaving aside the degree of col-
lective identity which was shown, which is returned to in the following section, an 
important distinction must be drawn between control over pay costs and over the 
labour process itself. To understand the difficulties faced by management in 
achieving the latter it is useful to return to the notion of "sentimental work" 
(Strauss, 1983), and the indeterminacy of health care interactions which this 
implies. While this will always constrain the extent to which nursing work can be 
subject to managerial regulation there may be the possibility of utilising it more 
broadly in the context of claims about more responsive services, quality, and the 
information and choice given to patients. 
Despite the very substantial changes described in the case study, much of the 
evidence also indicated the considerable constraints under which managerial con-
trol operated, deriving both from the complex nature of social relations within the 
health service and from its highly political character. However, the impact of these 
constraints was not in any way uniform, with much of the case study evidence sug-
gesting they served to reinforce rather than reduce occupational differentiation. A 
significant factor in this is the lower status accorded to "caring" work, a challenge 
to which may be more important for many groups of health staff than seeking the 
traditional attributes of professions. 
However, this would require an assault upon conceptions whose origins lie 
much wider than within the workplace. For this reason alone it represents a difficult 
strategy at a time when many decisions on work organisation are being shifted to 
local level. Instead, the evidence from much of the case study material suggested 
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the likelihood of this encouraging greater attention to bargaining over the terms of 
change. This is considered in the following section, which examines some of the 
consequences of organisational and managerial developments upon union 
behaviour and organisation. 
Bargaining and social alliances 
It has earlier been noted how the introduction of incentive bonus schemes for 
ancillary staff in the late 1960' s and 1970' s provided new opportunities for 
bargaining over work content and staffing levels. This was seen to be part of a 
broader, although uneven, process towards the adoption of a more generalised 
industrial model of trade unionism within the health services in this period. The 
1980's in contrast saw the RCN experiencing the greatest membership growth, 
implying at least a partial tum away from such a model. The early award of a Pay 
review Body to nurses seemed to offer an endorsement of this rejection of more 
"unionate" characteristics, although as noted earlier, there was more rhetoric than 
reality in the Government's claim. 
Much of these experiences would nevertheless tend to confIrm the secondary 
nature of trade unions, and in doing so also presenting something of a paradox. The 
basis of this lies in the differing forms of accommodation available to unions, par-
ticularly at the levels of the state and the individual employer. Mechanisms of 
institutional support may be available at either level, but these can require differing 
obligations in return. At national level, for nursing staff at least, the style of the 
RCN appeared capable of achieving certain gains being denied to TUC unions. At 
the same time, as was evident in the case study, traditional sources of local strength 
for the RCN were capable of being put at risk by the emergende of the 'new 
managerialism' . 
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In the face of this changing local context two principal responses were avail-
able to the unions. The first involved giving priority to bargaining over the terms 
and conditions of change, the second required the mobilisation of internal and 
external sources of support to resist the content of change. Overall, the case study 
evidence suggested that the need to maintain institutional support from the 
employer on the one hand, and the difficulties in developing wider alliances on the 
other, combined to encourage the adoption of predominantly the former response. 
Initially, this was particularly evident for ancillary staff, as existing bargain-
ing arrangements came to be recast as a consequence of competitive tendering. No 
longer were the unions able to bargain over the details of work study results by 
reference to national formula. The potential threat of a private contractor changed 
the basis upon which bargaining occurred, substantially weakening the possibility 
of gaining union influence. Although unions were being urged from several direc-
tions, including their national organisations, to give greater attention to specifica-
tions and the content of work in this process, the case study suggested that this was 
less easily obtained than were opportunities to bargain over conditions of employ-
ment for the in-house tender. 
Much the same applied to nurses affected by the changes in rotas. It was only 
in the case of Westminster Health Care, which refused to recognise the unions, that 
a different situation arose. So far as NBS management were concerned, in the main 
there was no indication of a desire to bypass unions in bargaining over the terms of 
change, despite an increasing willingness to assert "management's right to manage" 
over the content of such change. Partly because of the already differentiated nature 
of the labour process in health care, this had the effect of further widening dis-
parities. This was particularly so where external pay relativities impinged upon 
bargaining processes, as occurred in negotiations over payment systems in the 
cook-chill system. This example illustrated the dilemma facing unions in the new 
230 
situation. While an important consequence of change has been an extended scope 
for local bargaining in certain circumstances this is likely to introduce considera-
tions derived from the external labour market which reinforce existing segmenta-
tion. This process is most likely to occur in work which is less distinctive from that 
conducted elsewhere, and for which market criteria become more important. 
Bargaining formed a necessary response to the new challenges, but one 
which was limited. Differential outcomes aside, a significant problem was the lack 
of workplace organisation to sustain such a strategy, as was evident in the case of 
the changes to nurse rotas. The development of workplace organisation was not an 
insurmountable problem, as was shown by the mental handicap nurses, but this was 
very closely related to the broader nature of workplace relations in this sector. 
Here, as among many of the mental illness nurses, there was a close cor-
respondence between job-related and service-related issues. As was noted in the 
previous section, an important element in this was the role played by nurse 
managers. 
The limitations of an exclusively bargaining model were illustrated perhaps 
above all in the discussions concerning recognition in the proposed Trust. 
Increasingly management was able to use offers of institutional support as a means 
of shaping the negotiating framework. However, this was made possible by the 
combined influence of weak workplace organisation and inter-union rivalry which 
in tum reflected a lack of a distinctive union identity among large sections of union 
memberships. In policy terms this suggests the need either to concentrate upon 
efforts to develop workplace organisation capable of sustaining effective bargain-
ing activity at local level, or to reassess such an approach with attention instead 
turning to the building of wider social alliances. 
Different views on the possibilities for unions to engage in such alliances 
have already been noted. Although critics of such a strategy have recognised the 
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possibility of its relevance to public services (Kelly, 1988), advocates have also 
noted the limited extent to which it has been adopted (Fryer, 1989). One question 
which the case study sought to address was whether and how far this might be con-
sidered as a viable strategy. 
This certainly appeared to be the case in the mental handicap services where 
an alliance with users' relatives was of considerable importance, although this serv-
ice was relatively unique in having a defined population of users. Where this was 
not so, as in the two examples where attempts were made to generate wider 
campaigning activities, outcomes could be considerably different. Nor did these 
outcomes necessarily correspond with the level of public activity. Resistance to 
proposals to replace St Mary's Hospital won a large amount of local support but 
was ultimately unsuccessful, while the successful opposition by consultants to the 
Trust proposal had not generated as much wider public involvement. 
An important factor in explaining these outcomes is the level at which rele-
vant decisions were being taken. In the case of St.Mary's Hospital the final deci-
sion was constrained by those taken outside of the locality, for without Regional 
approval for capital expenditure the local Health Authority could not proceed with 
its own development. The very local nature of the campaign contrasted with that 
orchestrated by the consultants who went to considerable lengths to influence 
decision-takers at a higher level. In a structure as politically complex as the NHS 
there can be a need to achieve an influence at more than one level, reflecting Offe's 
notion of 'cumulative arenas of conflict' (Offe, 1984). In policy terms this has con-
siderable organisational implications for unions where local organisation may be 
inadequate to effectively intervene in the 'matrix of social power.' 
But arguably of greater significance than such organisational issues is the 
basis of legitimacy upon which any such campaigns are to be founded. Again this 
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arises from the nature of the relationship between jobs and service issues. To a 
large extent the ability of the consultants to generate public support for their stance 
reflected the traditional hegemony of medicine in Western health care ideology. In 
the eyes of many this gave them far greater legitimacy than that enjoyed by general 
managers. 
In contrast, other staff groups found it more difficult to mount campaigns 
where concerns over services could be represented as a subterfuge attempt to pro-
tect jobs. As has been noted, on several occasions this prodl,lced a hesitancy on the 
part of unions in engaging too directly in service issues. In addition to the social 
construction of professional legitimacy, this also reflected the legacy of the distinc-
tion between industrial and political objectives and methods, with the fonner 
having historically been constructed as the primary purpose and activity of trade 
unions. 
However, several of the episodes described in the case study served to ques-
tion the continued relevance of such a 'role-model' for public service trade unions. 
One of the difficulties facing a transposition of industrial methods has earlier been 
noted in relation to strike activity. Yet there seems no reason why the notion of 
"willingness to act" (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980) need be restricted to the with-
drawal of labour. After all, this sanction itself came to replace earlier ones of riot 
and sabotage. It may even be the case, contrary to Kelly's argument, that social 
alliances are no longer to be associated with the public sector alone. 
From German metalworkers to British coalminers there have been examples 
of trade union based campaigns designed to win broader popular support, suggest-
ing the need for a broader reassessment of the relationship between consumption 
and production. The tendency to sharply distinguish between the two has had a 
long history, and is evident in much academic analysis as well as Labour move-
ment activities themselves. Because trade unions arise in the context of the wage 
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relationship they inevitably concentrate upon the sphere of production, but workers 
are also consumers within a cycle of exchange. 
The failure to overcome this distinction, evident within the case study, is 
most immediately explained by the fact that bargaining and campaigning activities 
were not always easily sustained alongside each other. Largely this was a con-
sequence of the potential threat that campaigning might present to more formalised 
institutional arrangements between management and unions. However, a further 
important factor to consider is the relationship between campaigning and the 
broader notion of a 'willingness to act' on the part of members. 
The potential for campaigns to generate membership activity was an impor-
tant strength of the St.Mary's campaign, with the involvement of local hospital 
staff, not themselves union representatives but motivated by a concern over the 
threat to the hospital as well as to their jobs. In this instance in fact such staff 
seemed less inclined to make the distinctions between 'jobs' and 'service' issues 
more frequently made by union representatives. 
This points to an important aspect concerning the relationship between 
definitions of union purpose, sources of institutional support and union participa-
tion. Powerful pressures towards the 'incorporation' of union representatives was 
not simply the product of negotiating processes encouraging a greater degree of 
accommodation towards objectives. More than this, the character that such objec-
tives took was coloured by these relationships from the outset. In other words, 
objectives of influencing the conditions of employment required formal bargaining 
arrangements which in tum encouraged the articulation of such objectives. Ends 
and means became mutually reinforcing. Potential consequences this might have 
for union democracy are illustrated by the discussions held concerning bargaining 
arrangements in the proposed Trust, conducted with very little in the way of mem-
ber involvement. 
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There are parallels here with Offe and Wiesenthal's notions of 'monological' 
and 'dialogical' patterns of membership communication, the latter being more 
restricted and sustained by the existence of alternative systems of organisational 
support from employers or the state. In pointing to the links between internal union 
democracy and sources of external support the case study evidence also con-
tradicted the idea of an 'iron law' of oligarchy. Although some episodes occurred 
which might be described as reflecting the 'bureaucratisation of the rank and file', 
these were also highly circumscribed. 
Nevertheless, episodes of greater membership involvement were relatively 
few, and this was not simply attributable to a lack of encouragement by the unions. 
For much of the time a relatively small number of activists sustained union 
organisation and participated in most decision-making. While this did not generally 
pose an inherent obstacle to bargaining activity, it was far more of a problem in 
relation to more campaigning activities. For these a more 'dialogical' pattern of 
membership communication was required if members were to become involved, as 
indeed occurred in the mental handicap services. Alternatively, as at St. Mary's, 
campaigning bodies could develop semi-independently of union organisation. This 
difference was at least partly a product of differing occupational and organisational 
contexts. 
The need to locate processes of union decision-making within their work and 
occupational context raises a further issue, essentially one which is emphasised 
more generally by contingency theories of organisations. In seeking to explain 
internal organisational variance as a function of external environmental factors an 
obvious problem with this approach is a tendency towards determinism. A fIrst step 
in avoiding this pitfall is not to make too sharp a distinction between internal union 
processes and the external environment, given that the 'secondary nature' of unions 
reflects the close correspondence between the two. Then it is necessary to consider 
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the generally low level of membership participation in union affairs, for it was this 
that stood in marked contrast to the consultants who were able to impose a con-
siderable counterweight to the pressures towards incorporation being experienced 
by their own representatives. 
As was also shown in the nurse rota proposals, the pressure of membership 
and management influences upon unions could be a dynamic process, at times 
undermining opportunities to create a more stable framework. This suggests that 
policies designed to encourage greater membership involvement could have 
unintended consequences in creating new sources of tension with efforts intended 
to secure institutional support. At the same time, greater membership involvement 
appears essential if more effective workplace organisation is to be established. 
This paradox suggests that the relationship between union democracy and 
employer accommodation comes to be reassessed at significant periods of organisa-
tional change, as has been experienced within the NHS. How this is resolved can be 
significantly influenced by the definition of union purpose by union members, in 
turn a reflection of the character of their own occupational identity and experiences. 
Some implications of this for the future prospects of health service trade unionism 
are considered in the final section. 
The Future for Worker Organisations in Health Care 
A significant feature of the case study was that in none of the examples con-
sidered was there any substantial evidence of a desire among staff to reject collec-
tive organisation. On occassion the opposite was true, as in the approach by staff 
employed by Westminster Health care to join a union. Equally, the only example of 
management refusal to recognise a union came from that same company. The con-
tinued evidence of attachment to trade union organisation would seem to have con-
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siderable significance in the context of some claims concerning a perceived shift 
away from collective identities. However, it would equally be wrong to conclude 
that continued allegiances were founded upon deep and abiding senses of loyalty. 
References have earlier been made to several examples suggesting this was not 
always the case, including the movement of members between organisations, and 
criticisms and frictions within as well as between unions. 
Instead, much of the material from the case study would lend some support to 
points made by Scott (1990) on the need to look at collective action in both macro 
and micro terms. For the latter, particularly in response to the influence of writers 
such as Mancur Olson, it is important to, 'locate processes of preference formation 
within collective action and not merely as an exogenous variable' (Scott, 1990, 
pI22). At the same time, suggests Scott, it is important to look at sources of 
instability within collective action, an aspect often ignored when attention is princi-
pally devoted to its persistence. 
On the first of these points, the case study indicated a close association in 
most of the episodes between objectives and what was judged by participants to be 
possible. A word used in relation to proposed changes on several occasions was 
that of 'inevitable' , even though this did not always tum out to be the case. In such 
situations individual preferences were very closely associated with levels of collec-
tive confidence, in tum adding to potential uncertainty. 
For Olson (1965) a likely response from unions would be to emphasise indi-
vidual, private and selective benefits, which to some extent has been reflected in 
decisions taken by national union organisations in recent years. This has not been a 
major focus for this research, partly because such a reversion to a 'friendly society' 
role is not judged to be a viable alternative and in any event has even more limited 
relevance for local organisation. This is not to deny that an extension to individual 
services may not continue, but that this will have to form part of activities more 
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directly concerned with work itself. Of particular relevance are those described ear-
lier and used as a framework for the case study, namely market unionism, and rep-
resentational, professional and campaigning strategies. 
Examples of each of these were found within the case study episodes, 
although this should not be taken to imply that they could always be com-
plementary to each other. Instead, as observed earlier, there is considerable scope 
for tensions between each of these strategies, at the heart of which lies the question 
of control over the content and nature of work. The case study material showed 
these four strategies to be essentially representing two alternative methods of pur-
suing at least two different sets of objectives. Ways in which each of these came to 
be adopted suggests that the typology of union strategies described earlier (Table 
2.2, p46) can to an extent be recast. Where they were then located in terms of sec-
toral contexts they can now be seen to be equally well locatable in terms of aims 
and purpose. 
Market unionism and representational activities were both intended to secure 
improvements in the terms and conditions of employment. In accommodating to 
change, and negotiating over the terms of its introduction, the unions performed a 
role which otherwise would have been left undone, with many staff being otherwise 
worse off. Moreover, health service managers were prepared to provide institu-
tional support for unions in performing this function, suggesting that in organisa-
tional terms trade unionism has a relatively secure future in the health service even 
though much of the institutional basis upon which it rests has altered. The selection 
of either market-bargaining (as in the cook-chill negotiations) or more representa-
tional activities (as with the new nurse rotas to a large degree) was highly 
influenced by both the institutional response of management and the nature of 
workplace organisation. 
In contrast to both of these approaches, the other two strategies are based 
upon greater linkages between the conditions of employment and the content and 
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context of work. While the professionalising strategy required a sufficient 
legitimacy to intervene in questions concerning work content and the fonn of its 
delivery, campaigning activities demanded public support over issues often relating 
to the organisational context of work. Winning this could be made easier where a 
claim for accepted professional expertise was also made, although this was not 
essential. 
While there may be scope for some combination of activities by unions there 
remains important underlying points of difference between them. Alongside that of 
the relative emphasis upon the content or conditions of employment are the ways in 
which boundaries are drawn around the groups to which they apply. The social 
construction of skill and the gender-structuring of jobs can cause both professional 
strategies and market-bargaining to become divisive and even elitist. On the other 
hand, representational activities together with broader campaigns and social 
alliances can be seen as attempts to develop more inclusive strategies. It is there-
fore possible to locate the four strategies along two dimensions as in Figure 9.1. 
Figure ~.! Matrix showing union strategies by objectives (horizontal) and 
boundaries (vertical) 
Inclusive 
REPRESENTATIONAL 
Employment 
conditions 
MARKET UNIONISM 
Exclusive 
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SOCIAL ALLIANCES 
Job controll 
content 
PROFESSIONALISING 
This is of course a simplification, but as such nevertheless poses two funda-
mental questions for trade union strategies: what are the objectives being pursued 
and for whom? On the rust of these, if the slogan, 'Defend Jobs and Services' is to 
be more than an empty one a reassessment of union purpose is essential. 
Opportunities undoubtedly exist to recast debates on efficiency, quality and effec-
tiveness, and to address issues concerning the control and democratisation of public 
services which affect both users and workers within them. Equally, finding ways of 
altering the relationship between paid health work and the increasing burden being 
placed upon unpaid domestic labour in the home need to be explored. 
Developments along these lines would be required to overcome some of the 
long-standing distinctions between a focus on the conditions and content of 
employment, and of that between the industrial and the political and the profes-
sional and the manual. However, such distinctions have been deep-rooted and per-
sistent, and are very evident in legal definitions of a legitimate 'trade dispute'. 
Workers resisting privatisation, for example, need to demonstrate their concern 
with its impact upon employment conditions and not its effect upon services. 
Furthennore, for the majority of union representatives the most pressing 
questions are ones detennined by immediate bargaining and representational 
responsibilities. Where these are accepted by management as being the legitimate 
concern of trade unions the granting of institutional mechanisms of support can 
reinforce an emphasis upon such concerns. This need not mean that no involvement 
in wider issues will be supported, but that this may well take the fonn of ad hoc 
bodies from which the unions keep a degree of fonnal organisational distance. 
There are thus a range of pressures upon unions to restrict their field of 
engagement to issues related to conditions of employment. Much the same applies 
to attempts to broaden boundaries of inclusion. Certainly so far as the law is con-
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cerned, while it will accept the legitimacy of a trade dispute designed to pursue the 
most narrowly conceived sectional self-interest, it will find against any who would 
seek to further the interests of others. And even without such legal interpretations, 
the occupational identities among many work groups themselves is a powerful 
force which not simply restricts the generalising of experiences but causes many of 
these to be experienced differently from the outset. 
And yet, as with the potential opportunities for linking issues concerning the 
conditions and the content of employment, so too there could be ways of avoiding 
some of the problems of sectionalism and professional elitism. One approach 
would require a shift away from an emphasis upon technical competence and 
expertise, which frequently lie at the heart of socially constructed definitions of 
skill, and towards a recognition of the importance of Strauss's notion of 'sentimen-
tal work'. As hinted at earlier however, this would involve a much wider assault 
upon definitions of skill, particularly in relation to caring rather than curing, which 
do not emerge solely from within the workplace. 
All of this suggests that notwithstanding the possibilities of an alternative 
strategy emerging, existing pressures and constraints present enormous obstacles to 
its widespread adoption. To embark upon a wider strategy founded upon the estab-
lishment of broader social alliances would also involve a substantial reassessment 
of union character. It would mean seeking to alter existing social relations rather 
than simply expressing them. 
For these reasons and others the continuation of an emphasis upon 
bargaining-based activity seems most likely. In the context of the NHS, where there 
has now been several decades of high levels of union membership, this may take 
the form of market unionism, although in many cases representational activities 
may predominate. But in either case it must also be recognised that the basis of 
such organisation and behaviour is always unstable, as was shown in the case study 
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through the experiences with Westminster Health Care. Perhaps untypical for 
today, it may nevertheless represent a significant portent for the future. In the 
absence of effective workplace organisation, continued managerial support for 
existing bargaining mechanisms cannot be assumed. This much was evident in the 
NHS managers plans for collective bargaining and representation in the proposed 
Trust. 
This being the case, unions organising within the health service would be 
unwise to devote exclusive attention to bargaining activities. Early indications from 
Unison suggest an intention to engage in wider issues, and identifying organisa-
tional mechanisms for developing activities on different fronts may represent an 
necessary task. The important question however is not only that of the organisa-
tional survival of trade unions, vital though that in itself is. It is also about re-
establishing the legitimacy of unions being involved in a range of issues of social 
and economic concern. In this sense the future of collective worker organisation in 
the health service is bound up with that of wider issues of public policy. 
It is possible to conceive of two future scenarios for the organisation of health 
and other public services. One revolves around the endless development of 
efficiency targets, quantifiable perfonnance indicators, and other such 'neo-
Taylorist' techniques. In focusing upon how much as been done, as with hospital 
discharge numbers, far less attention may be given to how well it has been done, as 
with the proportions of readmissions. Alternatively, therefore, the future could be 
one in which concerns about quality and service are continually to the fore, with 
wider workforce and public involvement in setting priorities and objectives being 
considered essential. 
At the moment the direction of movement generally seems to be towards the 
fonner, and challenging this requires a reassertion of the benefits of democracy and 
participation against narrowly conceived managerial prerogatives. Some decisions 
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taken in the context of health care priorities are not in any event questions of formal 
rationality as of substantive rationality, and to follow Weber's approach, democ-
racy is a vital and important ingredient in tackling such matters. Yet increasingly 
change is moving in the opposite direction. For this reason, even though the inter-
ests of workers and users may not always coincide, extensions in the involvement 
of each is neither contradictory or undesirable. Instead, this would represent a vital 
counterweight to either managerial or professional dominance on the one hand, and 
an important encouragement to wider participation in society on the other. 
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